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ABSTRACT
The literature about participation was reviewed. An
analysis of participation under State Monopoly Capitalism
was followed by analysis of reformist and administrative_
theories, and of the relationship between participation and
alienation and decentralization. The Southwest Expressway
was analyzed in historical context and the gradual institu-
tionalization of participation was traced through a 10-year
period. Participation during the design and engineering
phase of the project was then studied, followed by detailed
analysis of participation in the programming and design of
a particular section of the project.
The study demonstrates the complex relationship between
a popular movement, the state, and various planning profes-
sionals around a major urbanistic transformation in the
Boston Metropolitan Region, and draws a series of lessons
for both activists and progressive planners.
Thesis Supervisor: Tunney Lee
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INTRODUCTION
In the late 1960's, bulldozers began to tear down hous-
ing along a swath of Boston's working class and minority
communities. Jamaica Plain, an Irish working class commun-
ity, and Roxbury, a working class Black community were suf-
fering this demolition as part of a project to build an 8-
lane expressway -- called Interstate 95 -- from the peri-
pheral roads to near the center of Boston; 1-95 was to -be
one of several major radial spurs emanating from an inner
belt. At that time it was known as the Southwest Express-
way.
The bulldozers did not work unopposed, however, the
late '60's being a period of intense political struggle in
major American cities. Across the country, neighborhood
groups campaigned to halt urban renewal and highway con-
struction, to demand civil rights legislation, to integrate
public education, for equal access to institutions and
social services. There were picket lines, squatters in
vacant buildings, confrontations with the police, rent
strikes, mass marches and rallies. Starting in 1964, Black
and Latino ghettoes rebelled in dozens of U.S. cities and
the "Urban Crisis", previously a word used in government
circles and academia to refer to the fiscal crisis of
municipal governments, became one of the "buzz words" of
the media and the popular vocabulary; its meaning had deep-
ened beyond an economic crisis to a social and political
crisis as well. Boston was no exception, and the transpor-
tation plans of the State -- of which the Southwest Express-
way was a part -- were the object of intense struggle in
the political arena as well as the technical and professional
fields of urban planning. In that process, the expressway
became the Southwest Corridor.
The Corridor was born out of a drastic -- in the
context of the U.S. -- form of "community participation";
working class and nationally oppressed communities were the
prime force in a movement which forced the state to abandon
plans for a major transformation of the city -- Interstate
95 -- and replace it with another. This movement generated
a coalition which included academics, environmentalists,
professionals, which succeeded to a great extent in achiev-
ing the reform sought. Instead of the highway, a rapid
transit line is being built. The 100-odd acres of densely
populated urban land cleared for the highway are being
redeveloped with a variety of projects aimed at "re-weaving
the urban fabric", in the words of a planner prominent in
the battle against the highway. The Corridor is currently
the largest project of its kind in the country, with the
most wide-ranging, officially instituted community partici-
pation component.
Perhaps the most compelling reasons for a case study
of participation in the Corridor is its very "success" in
attaining its goals. The relationship of popular movements
to projects undertaken by the State apparatus is a question
of vital importance to both activists and concerned profes-
sionals, and a situation where working class communities
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were able to decisqvely influence a major project during
many significant stages is a lesson to be learned and treas-
ured. The same can be said of the Project's shortcomings.
A second set of reasons why the Southwest Corridor
Project is an important case to study may be grouped together
by recognizing the magnitude and complexity of the Project.
It is, of course, beyond the scope of a thesis to alight
all of these issues; it is, however, possible to focus on
those aspects of the Project which pertain to participation
and shed clarity on them. Without pretending to resolve
theoretical dilemmas which would require concentration on
one or two specific issues, participation in the Project
may be treated as a case study, as empirical evidence which
can illustrate a number of theoretical postulates.
Among the problems on which a case study of the South-
west Corridor can shed some light are the following:
* Are urban struggles a good vehicle for advancing the
interests of the classes and oppressed nationalities
engaged in them?
* Is the technical process an arena where popular move-
ments are inherently at a disadvantage, or can an al-
liance of progressive professionals and working and
oppressed people be capable of engaging in it and gain
benefits without getting derailed?
* How have contradictions always found in participatory
situations -- empowering vs. cooptation, legitimization
of the State vs. rate of social change, the neighbor-
hood as a unit vs. the city as a unit -- been played
out in the Corridor and what forces have been determin-
ant in resolving them?
This paper will begin with a review of the issues in-
volved in participation and an overview of the most signifi-
cant literature written about them. This will allow us to
lay a theoretical basis for an analysis of the Southwest
Corridor as well as presenting a position vis-a-vis partici-
pation which will guide the rest of the paper.
Next the paper will give a theoretical overview of
participation in the Corridor and place the Corridor in
the context of urbanistic history of the city of Boston.
This section will be organized as an historical narrative,
building on the chronology of events as a basic structure,
but departing from it in order to reflect on the implica-
tions, present relevant information, and put the facts in
perspective. It will cover the origins of the 1948 Massa-
chusetts State Highway Plan, through the 1960's when the
entire road plan became the object of intense struggle,
until the 1970 moratorium on highways began to institution-
alize participation. There will be short sections on the
1970-72 Boston Transportation Planning Review (BTPR) and
the 1975-76 Environmental Impact Assessment process. The
major sources for this section will be a series of books
written on the history of the Corridor, as well as books
and articles on the development of U.S. cities. Interviews
with participants and planning documents produced in the
process will also be used, as well as my recollections as a
minor actor in the fight against 1-95.
The third chapter of this paper will begin in 1977,
when community struggles forced the State to implement com-
munity participation as an integral "component" of the pro-
ject. Known in the project as the "Design and Engineering
Phase", it has to be approached from a different angle. Be-
cause of the technical complexity, chronology will not suf-
fice. A description of the participation component as it
was designed and as it has evolved over the last three
years will replace chronology as the structure of the paper,
with theoretical discussion diverting from it whenever per-
tinent or ne.cessary, as in the first half. My sources will
be the documents produced by the Southwest Corridor Project
Office and consultants, interviews with different. actors,
and my experience as part of the central planning staff.
The final part will consist of a study of the design
of the Project in Boston's South End, particularly the
effects of participation in the programming and design of a
deck covering the rapid-transit and railroad tracks in that
neighborhood. Sources for this part will be the records of
meetings of the community and consultants where the program
and design of the deck were discussed, as well as interviews
with the participants.
I.
PARTICIPATION: THE ISSUES AND THE LITERATURE
"How promiscuous is the term participation,
it is mistress to many masters"
- Kavanagh, 1972, p. 121
Discussing "participation" is very much like discus-
sing "democracy"; it means different things to different
people. For some it's sacred; for other it is the useful
currency of demagoguery. Different classes and social
groups advocate it for different reasons, depending on cir-
cumstances. Since our purpose here is to shed some light
on- the process of participation in the Southwest Corridor
Project, we first need to define the parameters of our
literature search.
Several important issues come to mind. First of all
participation has to be discussed in a context -- historical,
political and economic -- since only then will the term
have some meaning. The context of the Southwest Corridor
Project is a major city in the U.S. in the last 30 years.
Politically, the U.S. is a bourgeois democracy. As a social
formation it is the most developed example of State Monopoly
Capitalism, a concept which will be explained later in this
chapter. Our search for pertinent literature would therefore
lead us first into a study of participation under State
Monopoly Capitalism. In that context, what is the function
of participation for the system? Under what conditions can
the working classes and oppressed peoples benefit from par-
ticipation? Why does the state promote participation, an
apparent contradiction on the surface? What have bureaucrats
pursued by participation?
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Since participation is such an ambiguous term, and
since it can serve different social groups for different
purposes, ideas about participation are loaded with ideo-
logical implications which need to be explored briefly.
We will look at the ideological role of some of these ideas.
Then, we will briefly analyze some of the literature writ-
ten by bureaucrats on participation, and see how they pro-
mote it for their own ends.
Since participation is often peddled as a remedy to
alienation we will explore the conditions under which this
may be in fact true and under which it may be misleading.
Decentralization is also often proposed as a more democratic
and participatory scheme. Since planning for the corridor
was, in 1973-1977, relatively centralized, and since 1977
relatively decentralized, we will pause for a look at this
issue.
Finally, we will consider some of the historical ante-
cedents in Boston to participation in the Corridor before
drawing some lessons from the literature and a discussion
of the issues to orient the rest of our society.
PARTICIPATION UNDER STATE
MONOPOLY CAPITALISM
Participation in the context of State Monopoly Capi-
talism is a complex subject which requires the clarification
of a theoretical foundation prior to an inquiry. In the
context of Marxist theory, participation is essentially a
political phenomenon. Conceptually, it therefore has to be
understood as part of the superstructure of the social for-
mation of which it is part.
Schematically, what ultimately determines the nature
of a society is the level of the productive forces -- the
means of production, and the productive capacity of the
labor force -- and the relations of production. Taken
together these can be conceived as the base or infrastruc-
ture of society. The superstructure consists of all the
ideas, institutions, cultural, religious and philosophical
patterns which in any given society tend to reproduce the
social foundation. Neither the base nor the superstructure
is ever static but in a constant process of transformation,
driven by antagonisms inherent in the social relations of
production. One class controls the means of production
and exploits the others, accumulating the surplus wealth.
This class is also dominant in the superstructure:. it
organizes, controls and influences institutions, ideas,
political events in order to maintain control and continue
to extract the surplus. Classes and social groups which
are exploited or oppressed, however, also create their own
institutions, ideas and political channels which further
their interests and therefore necessarily come into conflict
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with the oppressors. This conflict is the motor of change.
The major institutions of the dominant groups in maintain-
ing the social order convenient to them is the state.
While the ultimately determinant factor is the infrastruc-
ture, at any one time the realm of ideas, of laws, of poli-
tics may become dominant in deciding the outcome of a par-
ticular historical moment. (Cornforth, 1977; Harneker,
1975)
Any society can be analyzed as a social formation,
where the ultimately determinant factor is the dominant
mode of production and the corresponding social formation.
Capitalism, where the bourgeoisie is the ruling class, is
based on wage labor and on the extraction of surplus value
from workers at the point of production. It is the dom-
inant mode of production in the U.S. State Monopoly Capi-
talism, however, is a term which refers to the particular
form which the U.S. economy and state have taken in the
last 40 years or so. It is therefore important to briefly
touch on its historical development.
During the economic crisis of the 1890's in the U.S.,
capitalism went through a significant change. The monopol-
ies absorbed a significant part of the productive economy,
and finance capital was able to use the crisis to establish
its dominance over other sectors of capital. Growing beyond
the geographic and economic limits at its disposal, U.S.
capitalism pushed beyond its national borders imperialist
expansion, and into the - so-called "Spanish-American War".
Western European nations followed a similar process culmin-
ating in the First World War. (Lenin, 1968)
Internally, these nations went through a parallel pro-
cess. In the first thirty years or so of the century, with
the exception of the devastation caused by the World War I
years, capitalist economies grew at a fast clip until the
Great Depression of the thirties made capitalists wary of
the future prospects of the system. In the U.S., under the
New Deal, the state began to play a greater role in the
economy, and consequently in the political life of the
country, leading to the particular form of capitalism called
State Monopoly Capitalism.
The Great Depression led to the Second World War, from
which the U.S. emerged as the dominant power in the world.
Its productive capacity was reinforced and domestically the
U.S. embarked on a massive reorganization of its physical
infrastructure. Part of this process was the construction
of a huge new limited-access highway system, of which Bos-
ton's Southwest Expressway was a small segment. This
expressway led to the Southwest Corridor Project. Therefore,
the conditions from which the Corridor arose can definitely
be traced to changes in socio-economic formation of the
United States.
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What concerns us first, however, is the superstructure,
since it is in the realm of institutions, politics and
ideas that participation occurs and where it can be under-
stood. The major institution in the superstructure of any
society is of course the state, the major instrument by
which the dominant classes maintain control. A suitable
place to begin a discussion of the state's role in partici-
pation is Lenin's The State and Revolution. (Lenin, 1969)
Written just before the 1917 revolution, it is a polemic
against Social Democratic parties of Europe who had taken
an excessively parliamentarian approach to political activ-
ity and who had taken a right-nationalist track in support-
ing their own national governments in W.W.I. rather than
militate against the war. The book begins by quoting Engels
in arguing that the state is an organ for domination by the
ruling class, rather than of reconciliation among classes
and groups. (Lenin, 1969, p. 9) The book's emphasis is on
the ultimate recourse of the state -- the power of an appar-
atus of armed men and prisons who guarantee the supremacy
of the interests of those in power, although we can note
that it usually enforces the existing order through the
judicial structures and promotes its dominance through in-
stitutions for the propagation of ideas akin to its inter-
ests. The thrust of State and Revolution is a warning
against expecting that participation in the institutions
sponsored by the ruling class, particularly the bourgeois
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parliament, will advance the interests of the working class
and the oppressed to the point of hastening the day when
they come to power. But even the Lenin of this book saves
some of his lash for those who make non-participation in
these institutions a matter principle, such as the anarch-
ists. Dialectically, the circumstances of participation
in the machinery of the state are held to be critical.
"Marx knew how to break with anarchism ruthlessly for its
inability to make use even of the 'pigsty' of bourgeois
parliamentarianism, especially when the situation was
obviously not revolutionary..." (Lenin, 1969, p. 43)
There are several points about the position mentioned
above which need comment. Lenin was writing based mainly
on the Russian experience, where the state was autocratic
and highly repressive, leaving little room for participa-
tion. He was writing in a period when the capitalism state
was relatively young, striving to form a permanent bureau-
cracy as part of the state apparatus. Participation in the
affairs of the state was limited to the parliament or to
electoral politics at best; it has been impossible to find
evidence of attempts by the state to sponsor wide participa-
.tion in "projects" such as urban renewal, which did take
place in the 19th century, notably in Paris. We have to
assume that if such a practice existed it took place at
the level of informal class connections outside the insti-
tutional frame of state.
The capitalism of the United States in the century is
substantially different from that of Eastern Europe in the
1910's. Monopoly of capital accumulation in which the
state takes a significantly greater role than it did in com-
petitive capitalism. (O'Connor, 1973) Moreover, the United
States is a bourgeois democracy which puts it in the cate-
gory of western industrial bourgeois democracies, but also
with its own particular democratic traditions. These simple
facts raise a host of issues which are important to touch
upon.
Under Monopoly Capitalism, the reproduction of the sys-
tem takes place on many levels. Economically, simple repro-
duction of the labor force is carried on privately and is
financed through wages. At a more complex level, as capital
becomes more concentrated there is a tendency for the rate
of profit to fall (Rumiatzen, 1980); the state invests at a
loss to keep the average rate of profit from falling. A
larger share of social reproduction is financed through
state expenditures and takes place at the level of social
consumption (Castells, 1978, p. 30). Among these we can
count added expenditures to subsidize housing, education,
socio-cultural facilities and transportation. This in turn
has several consequences. The state maximizes its regula-
tory function, increasing the role of planning. Because
the state is a political entity, urban issues which tended
in the past to be treated as technical problems become highly
politicized. (Castells, 1976) Furthermore, the realm of
consumption takes on added importance in determining the
social status and class of urban dwellers. At the private
level this translates into the "keeping up with the Joneses"
syndrome (Ashton, 1978) an attitude which strengthened
the organization of a consumer society. But the increased
level of social consumption means that issues of public
consumption, such as the housing policies of the state,
become the object of political struggle. No wonder the
demolition of working class housing to make way for highways
became such a hot potato. The state itself politicizes
areas of life previously upoliticized, giving birth to
what have been called urban social movements. (Castells,
1976).
This politicization is promoted by the state in dif-
ferent ways. The government of the U.S. is, of course,
dominated by a ruling class, despite fitful arguments to
the contrary. But it does not rule merely by repression.
A bourgeois democracy depends to a large extent on accep-
tance of the status quo by those without state power, on
the hegemony of the rulers over the society through a vari-
ety of institutions in the state and civil society. (Gram-
sci, 1971). This is done ideologically, disguising the
rule of the powerful through the propagation of ideas which
hide the rule. All of the myths of "American democracy"
are the most clear evidence of this. But it is also done
politically, through the granting of reforms by the state.
The state plays, therefore, the role of mediator not only
among divergent interests among the rulers, but to some
degree also between the rulers and the ruled. The working
classes and oppressed groups are encouraged to keep their
political activity within the bounds of legality by the
granting of reforms which convince the oppressed that it
is worthwhile to "work within the system" (the carrot) --
while repressing those who outstep the bounds of permis-
sible activity (the stick).
This means that the state is less a monolithic block
and more a complex and at times contradictory organism; it
appears to have a "relative autonomy" from direct class
rule. (Poulantzas, 1974) An often quoted example of this
is legal aid offices funded by the federal government which
engage in class-action suits against "the feds" on behalf
of poor clients. It is the same kind of complexity that
allows federal funds to finance advocate planners who pro-
vide technical assistance to "grassroots" groups engaged
in opposing government policies. The important factor in
this theory is that this contradictory behavior by the
state does not imply that the state is an impartial arbitra-
tor; it still is an instrument of domination, but through
negotiations, building consensus, "buying out" insurgent
leadership, funneling political activity into convenient
bounds, etc. rather than by naked coercion. (Castells,
p. 84) The capitalist state, then, promotes participation
as a political means to reproducing itself, using a flexible
policy of granting the reforms which are afordable, pro-
vided that the working class and oppressed groups can be
convinced to carry out their political activities within
the structures which it provides for this purpose. By ac-
cepting these conditions, participation legitimizes the
state.
PARTICIPATION AND
IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE
The state under Monopoly Capitalism is a complex
animal, but certain features of it can be identified. We
have already mentioned its role in promoting accumulation
and social reproduction of the system, and its doing this
through a process of negotiation in which planning takes a
significant role. A further function of the state is in
the realm of ideas -- the legitimation of particular policies
(O'Connor, 1973), the obscurity of class rule. In this
task urban planning also takes on a prominent place. Manuel
Castells, in the first chapter of The Urban Question (Cas-
tells, 1977), detailed a critique of current ideas about
i4eas-about "urban" problems. These ideas present "the
urban" as a phenomenon which can be studied apart from the
social foundation, as spatial, technological phenomenon.
In this light, the ideas promoted by the state in a planning
situation are part of the ideological task of the state and
other bourgeois institutions. Interpreting policies such
as highway construction as "neutral" technical needs of so-
ciety without taking into account socio-economic basis of
such policies, is an example of the ideological tasks of
planners functioning for the state.
Participation is the object of considerable political
and ideological attention by the state. On the one hand,
participation may be seen as a forum for the struggle of
opposites. The working classes and the oppressed partici-
pate under certain conditions in order to further their
interests. In order for this participation to be worthwhile,
according to Marx, these main ingredients are important:
numbers, a clear consciousness, or ideological clarity, and
"that bond of brotherhood which out to exist between workmen
or different countries." (Kasperson, 1980) For the oppressed
to benefit from participation, ideology, among other factors
must play a crucial role. Participation is seen by reform-
ists, on the other hand, as a vehicle for reconciliation of
opposites. The monopoly state, complex and contradictory,
promotes participation for the sake of funneling activity
into the channels which benefit dominant groups. Piven has
written, for example, of the wave of participation promoted
by the federal government in the 60's as an effort by the
Democratic Party -- an instrument of the rulers -- to funnel
the activity of minorities away from politics, where it was
relatively successful, to the arena of technical planning,
where the edge would go to those with technical resources.
The civil rights movement would then be confined within the
limits of planning debates and electoral politics where the
Democrats could harvest the major benefits. (Piven, 1970)
The cost was the Great Society Reform program, which the
state could afford given a period of economic expansion.
Such a strategy for participation needed ideological ammu-
nition; the "reconciliatory" function of participation had
to become prominent, and therefore a series of ideas about
"participatory democracy" had to be developed and cultiv-
ated.
This task was not filled so much by the state, but by
what Gramsci called "civil society". The (uling class exer-
cises hegemony not only through the state, but through the
institutions outside the state which forge ideas, cultur-
al habits and patterns which are essential to the repro-
duction of the system. Through this, the rulers govern
with the consent of the governed, but this consent is incul-
cated in the population through the active involvement of
institutions under the influence of the rulers. In the
case of participation a vast volume of literature was
developed which placed participation within the bounds of
bourgeois democratic ideas in gneeral and within the "Amer-
ican" tradition in particular. Most of this work was done
by intellectuals within universities and a significant por-
tion of it pertains to the planning profession. Because
they are based on a variety of theoretical frameworks --
functionalism, empiricism, ethnomethology, etc., it is dif-
ficult to categorize them. Despite this, some of the liter-
ature is genuinely helpful in studying participation, either
because they document the process in the last few decades
in the U.S. or because they clearly illustrate an important
point of view.
REFORMIST THEORIES OF
PARTICIPATION
Before the 1960's, planning theory in the U.S. was gen-
erally dominated by people like Rexford Tugwell, a brilliant
intellectual, part of Roosevelt's Brain Trust and appointed
governor of Puerto Rico at the launching of massive govern-
ment planning efforts in the 40's. He sought to justify
the massive growth of the state sector by appealing to plan-
ning as the instrument to guarantee "the common good" (Good-
man, 1976; Kasperson, 1979), as an instrument of rationali-
zation above the forces of the market. It worked for awhile
as the ideological principle of state planning. Several
historically determined -factors made these ideas gradually
obsolete. The reorganization of State Monopoly Capitalism
just after the war, as we have mentioned, increased the
conciliatory functions of the state, its apparent autonomy,
the granting of reforms, etc. Urbanistically, the strati-
fication and geographic segregation of working people by
income, race and ethnicity became more acute. (Gordon,
1978) The politics of interest groups gained prominence
(Mollenkopf, 1978) and the urban question was politicized.
As the 60's advanced, the struggle of black people for
equality made the myth of "common good" patently a myth. A
theoretical perspective was needed to account for the new
condition. Political scientists worked on new definitions
of democracy and planners began to talk about Pluralism and
Advocacy.
It was precisely the urban movements against projects
like highways and urban renewal that sparked the search for
new ideas. Using the example of the battle against 1-95,
Lisa Peattie (Peattie, 1970) wrote "Reflections on Advo-
cacy Planning". The original state-sponsored highway plans
claimed to be a technical promotion of the common good.
The technical studies by Urban Planning Aid in this struggle
exposed the emptiness of this claim, demonstrating the
political nature of planning. There were hundreds of
situations like this one in every city of the United States,
so it became necessary for the system to develop a planning
ideology which could take into account the reality of
social conflict in the planning arena and still recognize
the legitimacy of the system and the viability of struggling
for more just and democratic planning. Society began to be
explained as a multiplicity of social and ethnic groups com-
peting freely for the benefits of society, except for the
fact that some groups were denied equal access to sources
of power, like the electoral process and technical resources.
(Davidoff, 1965) What was necessary for the correction of
"failures of democracy" and "market failures" was political
and technical intervention aimed at making the system work
as it should. Planners began to take sides, allying them-
selves with groups struggling against state plans. Peattie
describes this process as that of planners looking for a new
client, which was partially true, and raises the question
of the degree to which advocates manipulated the groups they
worked for in order to further their own interests. In the
case of the fight against the Corridor, there were numerous
groups working against the road for different purposes; it
was professional advocates led by Jim Morey who eventually
forged the coalition which defeated the highway.
This contradictory role of advocates -- at once helping
and manipulating the poor and minority communities -- has
been the subject of some controversy. We have already men-
tioned Piven's critique of advocacy as funneling minorities
into the Democratic Party. Myrna Breitbart's (1979) article
on advocacy traces the roots of the professional practice
to efforts to educate citizens to policies already formul-
ated. Participation in this context meant using people to
further decisions of powerful interests. Later it became
common practice to organize "blue ribbon" committees to
legitimate these decisions, usually drafted from the upper
strata of the affected neighborhood. As movements against
plans gained strength, those who had been excluded demanded
access to institutions of power. Through conflict, nego-
tiation and agreements, degress of participation were a-
chieved in different situations. Given the fact that
under these conditions participation could vary enormously
from one situation to another, some literature explores
the degrees to which participation may be meaningful to
the participants. Sherry Arnstein (1969) defines partici-
pation as:
The redistribution of power that enables the have-not
citizens, presently excluded from the political and
economic processes to be included in the future. It
is strategy by which the have-not/s join in determin-
ing how information is shared, goals and policies are
set, tax resources are allocated, programs are oper-
ating, and benefits like patronage and contracts are
parcelled out. In short, it is the means by which
they can induce significant social reform which en-
ables them to share in the benefits of the affluent
society.
It is important to note that this defintion is though far-
reaching, es.sentially reformist and liberal, since it does
not posit participation as a route to a structural trans-
formation of society but to a larger piece of the pie. She
then produces a useful and famous "ladder of participation"
which requires very little comment:
Citizen Control - Degrees of Citizen Power
Delegated Power
Partnership
Placation 
-Degrees of -Tokenism
Consultation
Informing
Therapy Non-participation
Manipulation
While Arnstein leaves out any discussion- of popular or-
ganization, the only source of power capable of allowing an
oppressed group the possiblity of "climbing" on her ladder,
her scheme provides a useful checklist for analyzing any
particular participatory situation, since often reforms
granted by the state or the bureaucracy strive to keep par-
ticipation at the lower rungs.
The specific situations of participation are more com-
plex than Arnstein's ladder would allow us to think: the
purpose of participation, the characteristics of the parti-
cipants are left out. There are other writers, however,
iho have pursued what can be called a multivariant problem
and proposed useful schemes. Jon Vantil and Sally Bould
Vantil (1970) propose one such scheme which also requires
relatively little explanation.
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Participation
focuses on:
Participation Administrative Political and admin-
concerns only istrative concerns
Elites only Elite coalition Politics of reform
Elites and Citizen advice Pluralist partici-
non-elites pation
Non-elites Citizen partici- Grassroots partici-
only pation pation
While slightly more powerful as tool of analysis than Arn-
stein's ladder, there are serious problems with this scheme.
It does not allow for the process by which participation oc-
curs to enter into the analysis, and since any political
process is essentially historical, the scheme falls apart
as soon as we seek to apply it.
Jose Olives (1973), using a Marxist analysis, gives us
another scheme, a more complex and useful one. He deals-
with slightly different variables, since he is not so con-
cerned with race and classes differences within the urban
movement, merely with the political results of such strug-
gles. He derives four categories: Urban Effect, Mobili-
zation, Organization and Type of Action, and Political Ef-
fects. Urban effect is limited to the achievement or non-
achievement of a reform. Mobilization includes successful
Social Process of the production of a political effect by urban struggle according
to observations of the struggles against urban renewal in Paris.
Urban Effect Mobilization.
Organization/
Type of Action.
rei vi ndi cati ve
reivindicative
Satisfied
Rei vindi cation
and political
reivindicative
reivindicative
and political
Continuation of reivindi-1
cative action without. 1
politicizing the struggle.
-'1
2
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Urban Effect Mobilization
Type of Action/
Organization.
Unsatisfied
reivindication
reivindicative ----- > Demobilization
Discouragement
Radicalization
political
SPolitical Repression
reivindicative Individual
.... Withdrawal
*\ political
Maintenance of reivin-
dicative/political level.
Higher stage of politi-
cal struggle.
Social Integration.
(Paternalism).
Political decomposition
" (political integration
to institutions)
Political
Effects.
T4
Political
Effects
}
GRAPHIC No. 2 Oliva's Analysis of struggles against urban renewal in the Paris
region, combining the struggles for reforn, their political content and effect. (Castells,1977)
or unsuccessful mobilization. Organization and type of
action are divided into merely reformist and reformist-and-
political-at-once. He then charts the different combina-
tions possible and predicts the political results of each
one. It's actually based on a survey of urban struggles in
Paris. (See Graphic No. 2)
What is most striking about this scheme compared to
the previous two is the emphasis it places on the relation-
ship between the purely reformist and what is political as
well as reformist. We have already discussed the importance
of the consciousness of participants in making participation
a valuable vehicle for advancing their interests. The goal
of an immediate reform may be won or lost, but the longer
range benefits to the oppressed groups may be more political:
is there a deeper understanding of the functioning of insti-
tutionalized oppression? Is there a higher level of popular
organization among participants in an urban movement, or
does the movement achieve a reform and dissolve without a
lasting political benefit? In the case of the Southwest
Corridor, the victory over the highway resulted in a highly
modified project which is having the effect of raising prop-
erty values in the surrounding housing stock. This in turn
means that the dreaded displacement may be taking place any-
way, only through a different mechanism -- the market
instead of the road. Given this possibility, an evaluation
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of participation of the SWCP must take into account the
political and indeological effects of the process on the
surrounding communities which would increase their ability
to fight against displacement.
Some of the other literature pertinent to a study of
participation is basically in the same tradition of Arnstein
and the Vantils. This tendency is reformist in that it
accepts the parameters of the established order, pluralistic
in that it recognizes diversity of interests and claims
that the state is harmonizing them. Charles Lindbloom
(1963), the well-known father of "incremental planning",
bases his theory on a rejection of goal-oriented planning.
He decries comprehensiveness as unrealistic and instead
argues that the test of a good policy is the level of agree-
ment among participants. His basic argument in The Intel-
ligence of Democracy (1965) is that the virtue of the U.S.
political system is precisely its ability to embody a "pro-
cess of partisan mutual adjustment". Participation by op-
pressed groups in this context is merely the smooth func-
tioning of democracy. The question of "who participates"
in this context becomes very important, however, because if
certain groups participate at a significantly lower rate
than the rest of the population the state will not be able
to carry out its function. In the 60's, with increasing
dissatisfaction and rebellion by blacks and other minorities,
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promoting the participation of minorities within the system
became a strategic question.
Allan Altshuller, in Community Control (1970), argues
that the value of giving power to the black community lies
in the subsequent "socialization" of black Americans to the
values and practices of mainstream U.S. society. Blacks
would benefit from having a "s take in the system," whites
from "the peace of reconciliation." It is tempting to call
this approach cynical, but in fact it is perhaps a more can-
did expression of the kinds of views of participation -we
have been reviewing. Besides honesty it has the value of
sharpening the awareness of the aims of the defenders of
the system in promoting the participation of the oppressed
within the system: "socializing" the oppressed into accept-
ing the parameters of bourgeois democracy. The empirical
counterpart of this theoretical position is an endless
series of studies about rates of participation among blacks,
Latinos, and working people in general based on income,
background, status, psychological make-up, shade of skin
and other factors (May, 1971, pp. 6-8, pp. 61-69). Other
literature argues that people make crude cost-benefit stud-
ies of the efforts and benefits from participation before
deciding the degree to which they will be involved. These
studies can be used as empirical evidence of the kinds of
barriers placed on people's attempts to determine their
own destiny, the daily operations of monopoly capitalism
at a difuse cultural and institutional level. They are
also useful for organizers in that they can heighten aware-
ness of the many ways political and participatory efforts
can be derailed. Finally, the importance of technical
knowledge in opening or closing doors is pertinent to the
efforts of advocates and organizers alike and will prove
important in the Southwest Corridor Project.
Other literature focuses on the effects of participat-
ing in protest on the participants themselves. Those in-
volved in Alinsky-style efforts apparently derived great
benefits in tightening neighborhood support networks, chang-
ing damaging and self-defeating habits even if the goals
of the movement resulted in few results. (May, 1971, p. 8)
While we may disagree with the negativity about proletarian
and minority cultures implied in this view, it is true than
any intense process transforms both participants and groups
involved. It would be more useful to study changes in abil-
ity to confront the power structures, knowledge of pertinent
technical issues, increased hope in the possibility of win-
ning through struggle. In parallel arguments, others argue
that the poor, in participating, change their attitudes,
"adapting" them to those of more middle-class residents
and planners, making urban renewal easier. (Loring, et al.,
1957) Conversely, others see participation by "the poor"
as threatening the goals of urban renewal by introducing
"self-serving" attitudes into the process. (Wilson, 1966)
An interesting case study of participation in Newark
around opposition to a Medical Center expansion led by the
Newark Area Planning Association (NAPA) is discussed in an
article by Junius Williams. (1970) The thrust of this
article is that the main measure of participation should be
goal-attainment. While refreshingly direct, this approach
leaves out the long-range political and ideological effects
of the process on participants, and is, therefore, not that
useful.
A different set of issues is dealt by literature which
seeks to study more structural factors affecting participa-
tion, such as local political variables and local political
structure. As local political variables are included in
the political history of the local city in question. A
strong political party organization, for example, implies a
fairly difficult process of influencing the machinery.
Where a mayor is elected by loose reform coalitions the
situation may be more maleable to popular pressure and hence
more promising for participation. (Greenstone and Peterson,
1968) What this means is that the specific political his-
tory of the city being studied is important to the outcome
of participation, a useful lesson. The formal political
structure, or city charter, the level of corruption, the
role of the mayor, etc. have effects on participation.
Piven and Cloward, in "Black Control of Cities," argue that
current efforts at "metropolitization" of the administration
of metropolitan regions is a first step in diluting the pol-
itical power of blacks in central cities. (May, 1971, p. 34)
ADMINISTRATIVE GOALS IN
PROMOTING PARTICIPATION
Literature on participation written from the point of
view of administrators is substantially different and worth
noting. Edmund Burke, for example, establishes a morphology
for participation which is worth quoting at some length:
Education-therapy focuses upon the presumed need to
improve the individual citizen and institutes parti-
cipation programs as a form of citizenship training.
Behavioral change aims at influencing individual be-
havior through group membership. Changing the behav-
ior of the system's members or leaders becomes the
vehicle for overall system change. Staff supplement,
as the term suggests, simply involves supplementing
the expertise of particular citizens. Usually this
type of participation is restricted to task-oriented
advice and does not include citizen involvement in the
determination of goals and priorities. Cooptation is
a means for capturing or neutralizing opposition by
including the dissenters as participants without sur-
rendering decision process. The inclusion of these
participants also wins consent and legitimacy from the
populace as a whole. Finally, community power, accord-
ing to Burke, involves the creation of new power cen-
ters to confront established centers as ameans of.gen-
erating social change. Size and dedication are their
resources conflict their tactic. (Burke, 1971, in
Kasperson, 1971, p. 6)
Cold. A very clear picture of a cynical state bureau-
crat's approach to citizen participation. Not surprisingly,
Burke favors "behavior change" and "staff supplement" as
the preferred strategies. It is very useful to keep this in
mind when analyzing why and how the state promotes "partic-
ipation" in certain moments, or responds to pressures for
participation by instituting it in bastardized ways. There
is a significant amount of literature in this vein. Judith
May (1971) reviews several books written from the perspective
of organizational theory which recommends participation as
a strategy for improving organization effectiveness. She
groups them into several categories. Under Goal Attainment,
Theodore Kaplow develops a byzantine mdtrix of variables to
analyze behavior of the individual in organizations, recom-
mending participation as a means of increasing the control
of the individual by organizations with the purpose of
reaching organizational goals. Under Integration she dis-
cusses Chris Argyris' thesis that the conflicts between
individuals and organizations can be eliminated by partici-
pation while encouraging "individual growth". Under Adap-
tation participation is seen as a method for promoting
group-consciousness among workers and supervisors. Under
Socialization, May reviews a book by Alexander Leighton on
what he learned from running a "relocation" camp for the
Japanese in the U.S. During World War II. This is perhaps
the greatest travesty of the term "participation" in print,
but in its extreme way it is a powerful reminder of the
fact that participation is a double edged sword. No wonder
many activists, including planners, refused to "participate"
at 'all in the activities organized by the state. Bob
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Goodman warned that planners could become "soft cops" manip-
ulating the oppressed for the benefit of the rulers and
counseled conscious activists to fight to stay outside the
system in their efforts. (Goodman, 1974)
PARTICIPATION AND
ALIENATION
Still another issue often related to participation is
alienation. Particularly in the 60's, there was considerable
dissatisfaction with the anonymity of large cities, their
promotion of isolated individuals with no social ties. Par-
ticipation was thought to be a remedy to alienation, even
within the existing social structure.
From the point of view of liberalism, alienation was
related primarily to centralized, unresponsive bureaurcra-
cies. The concept also recognizes degrees of empowerment
and marginality -- some social groups, such as Blacks and
Latinos were "left out" of the political processes in
which the majority participated. The remedy therefore was
to decentralize bureaucracy and to establish programs for
the effective participation of the disempowered in deci-
s ion-mak ing .
From Marxist point of view, alienation is the result
of the existing social structure. It is rooted in commod-
ity production where the worker sees the fruits of his
labor appropriated and put on the market. The value of
his production is not only its "use value" but its "ex-
change value". But alienation also takes place in the super-
structure, since the oppressed groups are not only kept
from power by force, but constantly bombarded with ideas
which are against their interest. A social nature in this
view, participation is a remedy of alienation only to the
degree that it heightens consciousness of the oppressed
about their oppressed state, and improves their ability to
fight against oppression.
Marxists recognized different levels of consciousness
among groups in any given class and oppressed groups. Thus
while massive participation is deemed necessary, it also
stresses a dialectical relationship between more conscious
sectors -- the leadership -- and less conscious, more num-
erous group. The degree to which leadership can strengthen
its ties to a mass movement raising its consciousness in
the process of struggle is also a measure of extent to
which participation is a remedy to alienation. The qual-
ity of participation is critical. Alienation is combatted
when the working class and oppressed become aware of their
true time situation in society, but actually begins to be
eradicated only when they consciously and actively struggle
to change society.
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In this light, participation under capitalism through
making the bureaucracy more responsive can create the appear-
ance of diminishing alienation, but by hiding the reality
of oppression and class rule, citizens can be further alien-
ated from the true state of society. Only through struggle
can alienation be overcome.
PARTICIPATION IN PROGRAMMING
AND DESIGN
During the Design and Engineering phase of the Southwest
Corridor Project, participation in the project entered what
I call its most institutionalized phase. By this time the
Corridor Project, through consultants, structured and regu-
lated aspects of participation, mainly involving programming
and design. Since these tasks are relatively technical,
the political considerations become less prominent, although
they are by no means unimportant. In order to inform our
case study well, it therefore becomes important to review
some of the issues and literature involved in participatory
programming and design. Our main guide in this will be
Gary Hack's Ph.D. thesis, Environmental Programming: Creat-
ing Responsive Settings, 1976, MIT.
Hack defines programming as "the process of arriving
at a set of specifications about what to build or change in
the way of man-occupied- settings. This activity takes
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various forms, including preparation of architectural pro-
grams, the development of environmental development stan-
dards, and on-going management of built settings. Design
may be defined as the transformation of program into plans
and specifications for built form. In the Corridor, both
of these activities predominated during the institutional-
ized phase of participation. The task of programming has
only recently been approached in a systematic way; tradi-
tionally it was an intuitive or personal focus that was
used. Hack uses a couple of case studies, particularly
that of Marvin Gardens, a low income housing development
in Roxbury, to show the potentially disastrous results of
this. He then proceeds to group programming tasks around
four environmental definitions: 1) environmental packages,
2) environmental patterns, 3) performance guidelines, and
4) clientship.
By packages, he refers to the scale and mix of activi-
ties that will take place in a mixed environment. In some
cases, as in a shopping center, this mix will be determined
primarily by economic calculations. In other cases there
are "rule-of-thumb" guidebooks, such as "x-parking spaces
per apartment". In still other cases, as in designing a
new community, the mix cannot be derived so readily from
given criteria but flows instead from patterns or perform-
ance standards. (Hack, 1976, pp.. 117-42)
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Performance standards are a series of normative state-
ment of what should be. They have been commonly applied to
buildings which can be derived from a prototype, such as
schools. Again, transit stations must meet a set of MBTA
guidelines. Hack finds them useful in "structuring the dia-
logue in participatory settings." (Hack, 1976, pp. 175-98)
Clientship is also important for our purposes. In most pub-
lic environments there is a potential contradiction among
the client who is paying -- the state and its representa-
tives -- and the user clients -- the people who will use
the environment. He proposes the use of "scenarios" or
imagined complex situations, in order to better define
clients. Participation brings both patrons and users into
the programming and design process.
Participation in programming and design is seen to
include a number of important issues: 1) who to include,
2) how should people be organized to work together, 3) how
should sessions be arranged, 4) how can analysis be grounded
in accurate data and experience, 5) how can normative views
be encouraged, 6) how can there be a transition from wishes
to firm proposals, 7) who should be the managers and leaders
of the process? These seven issues are a very useful set
of guides for analyzing participation in both programming
and design.
It is important to note that the approach to partici-
pation outlined, however, has certain necessary implications.
First of all, its major aim is one of conflict resolution
leading to a concrete program and design. Raising the con-
sciousness, improving the organizational level and technical
knowledge of the participants is not an explicit goal;
rather, the program or design product is the priority. In
the light of other literature, the politics of participation
in this stage are not addressed, but t'hey remain critical.
Another useful tool introduced by Hack is a typology
of participants. He groups them as being impacted directly
or indirectly, and as imparting financially, programmatical-
ly, experientially. When we explore the mechanics of par-
ticipation in the Corridor, these distinctions will become
useful.
Finally, the relationship between professional program-
mers and designers as reflections of class, race and ethnic
groupings are critically important.
DECENTRALIZATION
Decentralization is another "buzz word" with totally
ambiguous meaning. Since it is closely tied to participation
and is a very relevant concept in the context of the South-
west Corridor, it deserves consideration.
Rhetorically, decentralization attempts to "restore
government to the people". It also aims at more efficient
functioning of the bureaucratic machines, lessening aliena-
tion, more effective project design. For years it has been
recommended by government blue-ribbon commissions, the most
famous one being the 1968 National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders. One third of major U.S. cities have tried
it in some way (Kasperson, 1979, p. 27) and it has of course
affected the structure of state-sponsored projects like the
Southwest Corridor.
In France a very useful distinction is made between de-
centralization and deconcentration (Kasperson, 1979, p. 28),
the latter term seen to be a reorganization of the bureau-
cracy to permit a better link between the center and the
citizens affected. In fact it is seen as a "penetration"
of the periphery by the center. In the U.S. much of what
passes for decentralization can more accurately be called
deconcentration. Practices like BRA site offices and Little
City Halls in Boston are best seen in this light.
Some efforts at a more genuine decentralization have
been tried, notably under the auspices of the Ford Founda-
tion. The decentralization of the public educational struc-
ture of New York City, for example, led to long and bitter
struggles, particularly on the Lower East Side, but resulted
in significant involvement and participation by Puerto Ricans
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in that area of the city, as well as to some temporary,
minor empowerment of that community which has been rolled
back with the years. The experience remains, though.
Michael Lipsky argues that decentralization is an antidote
to "bureaucratic breakdown", based on an analysis of the
relationship of "street level" bureaucrats to their clients
and central offices. (Kasperson, 1974, p. 32) It can in
fact allow for more efficient and frictionless communica-
tion than a more centralized structure. This is not,
however, good in itself, since it depends on the question
of who stands to gain by this efficiency. The specifics
of the situation must be considered.
Decentralization is supposed to yield more democracy,
make government more representative, reduce alienation.
This is dubious, in light of experience. It also omits
issues such as "what are the stakes in participation" and
"what are the technical issues involved". It can under some
circumstances make the delivery of services more equitable.
In theory, it is possible to use decentralization to
create "enclaves" of power for oppressed groups, and has
been used this way. But by the same token, it can divide
groups and areas by fostering parochial concerns over
general issues that unite. This dynamic is present in the
design and engineering phase of the. Corridor Project and
should be kept in mind when studying that process.
Furthermore, decentralization can actually benefit reac-
tionaries, as the North American rightwing's emphasis on
"state's rights" clearly indicates.
Decentralization as a concept has a peculiar "fit" to
Boston's ideosyncratic preoccupation with neighborhoods.
In general, decentralization theorists have emphasized the
neighborhood as a unit and stressed the need to reinforce
their structures. In the Corridor Project, we'll see a re-
flection of this thinking in the structure of the design
and engineering teams.
ON THE RECENT HISTORY OF
PARTICIPATION IN BOSTON
It seems pertinent to review briefly a few aspects of
participation from an historical perspective. Two areas
particularly are worth noting: 1) forms of participation
particular to the city of Boston, with participatory struc-
tures in some cases similar to that of other cities and in
some cases with a peculiar "bend" characteristic of the
area, and 2) the recent history of federal regulations of
participation in state-sponsored projects.
Like every city in the U.S., Boston has a history of
citizen activity around issues which may be considered
"urban" today -- housing, building codes, development stra-
tegies today. In Beacon Hill, the Beacon Hill Association
was formed in the latter half of the 19th century, after
the development of Back Bay attracted the wealtheir resi-
dents of the city and "the Hill" began to decline. An
elitist organization, they organized to protect the "qual-
ity" of the neighborhood, prevent the construction of apart-
ment buildings, and put limits on height and size of build-
ings. (Rubin, 1971, p. 5) Back Bay, likewise, spawned
citizen organizations in that period. The Back Bay Associ-
ation coalescing merchants and the Back Bay Neighborhood
Association attracting activist residents. Also elitist,
these associations organized against transients, students,
rooming houses and other symptoms of neighborhood "decline".
(Rubin, 1971, p. 6) The above two examples are relevant to
our case only in an indirect way, since they set a precedent
for citizens organizing outside the bounds of the state,
yet attempting to affect commercial and state activity
within their neighborhood. It is also peculiar of Boston
that such a great percentage of this activity occurred at
the neighborhood level rather than on a citywide basis.
More relevant to the situation in the Southwest is the
history of participation in working class neighborhoods of
the city. In the Boston Urban Observatory's Organized Citi-
zen Participation in Boston, a section on "historical back-
ground to 1960" describes citizen organization in the West
End and North End of Boston. Based on Whyt/e's Street Corner
Society amd Herbert Gans' The Urban Villagers, the section
describes the organic organization of these communities
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through markets, churches, benevolent associations, profes-
sional organizations, "home-town" associations and more
assimilated groupings, the role of the extended family,
neighborhood networks, etc. While these phenomena may be
in some way- related to "participation", it seems more use-
ful to take note of them as peculiar formations through
which immigrant workers organized themselves in the areas
of residence. The term participation is perhaps best used
to describe the relationship between these organizations
and the state. In the case of the West End, Gans argues
that the urban renewal approach which ignored indigenous
formations and conceived of its project as a bulldozer-
created "Tabula Rasa" where a new creation could sprout,
would promote bitterness and resistance to renewal by resi-
dents, as well as lead to the destruction of "valid" and
constructive social structures. In later urban renewal --
and highway -- efforts, the state would learn from this
lesson.
The history of participation in the South End is more
directly relevant, because the corridor goes through that
neighborhood and because the neighborhood's activity against
the highway was certainly conditioned by its history. In
1888, the central council of private charities did a survey
of housing conditions in the South End and organized a citi-
zens' committee to get demolition laws changed. This was
followed by a series of committees which organized around
II.
THE STRUGGLE AGAINST URBAN EXPRESSWAYS
"When the American people, through their Congress,
voted a little while ago [1957] for a twenty-six-
billion-dollar highway program, the most charitable
thing to assume about this action is that they
hadn't the faintest notion of what they were doing.
Within the next fifteen years they will doubtless
find out; but by that time it will be too late to
correct all the damage to our cities and our coun-
tryside, not least to the efficient organization of
industry and transportation, that this ill-conceived
and preposterously unbalanced program will have
wrought."
- Lewis Mumford, 1963
GRAPHIC No. 3
Rendering of Plans for 1-95 at Forest Hills, Jamaica Plain.
(WFEM Archives)
- -appNEWL
The Southwest Corridor must be seen in the context
of the road system of which 1-95 was to be a part. After
the Second World War, the U.S. embarked on a major public
works project: the construction of the Federal Defense
Highway Network, also known as the Interstate Highways.
Linking every major industrial and population center, the
system had the ostensible purpose of providing the country
with a network of roads where troops, armaments and materials
could be moved from anywhere in the U.S. to any other spot
without a single traffic intersection. The rumor was that
Eisenhower had been impressed with Germany's Autobahns
during the war and had been maneuvering for the U.S. to
build a similar highway network. The scope of the project
was enormous -- it was to be the largest public works project
in the history of the United States. It would physically,
economically and culturally change the face of the country.
INTERSTATE HIGHWAYS AND THE
RATIONALIZATION OF THE MONOPOLY CITY
Of course, a major transformation of the man-made
geography of the U.S. was not undertaken only for direct
defense reasons; there were other powerful forces at work
which are often summed up with the single word "Detroit".
The U.S. was entering the automobile era in earnest. In
the next twenty years, population patterns would change,
with increasing suburbanization in every major population
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center; the entire pattern of location for most economic
activity would shift from dependence on a mixed transpor-
tation network to one almost totally dependent on the auto-
mobile and trucks. Parallel with the development of a
major transportation network, a major reorganization of the
center of metropolitan districts was also underway. Urban
Renewal programs were discussed and planned from the 1940's,
although they began to be implemented a few years later
than the highways -- in the late 50's. In Boston, Urban
Renewal and the Southwest Corridor coincided in time and
space, and the popular struggles which surrounded them were
closely related. This is, of course, no mere coincidence,
since these two major projects stemmed from the same source
and affected the same social groups and classes.
But before we can argue this convincingly, we need to
backtrack a little, discuss some theoretical issues, and
narrate some of the history of the Corridor. It is common
practice in orthodox urbanism to attribute the major trans-
formation of urban structures in the post-war period merely
to the automobile, while in fact a more fundamental process
was underway. This view of the period is symptomatic of a
general approach to the entire field of urban studies and
urban history which attempts to find laws of some inexorable
process of urbanization inherent in industrialization and
development, independent of the socio-economic historical
formation of the societies whose cities are being studied.
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Several intellectual currents influence this orthodox per-
spective. Technological determinism argues that the develop-
ment of the form of the industrial cities can be derived
from the inexorable developments of successive technologies
of production, transportation, etc. (Noble, 1977) There
are several variants of this perspective from a "right
wing" version which argues that the logic of technology is
the best measure for the organization for cities, to a neo-
Marxist view, or "vulgar" Marxist view, which places undue
emphasis on technological development in explaining the
transition from one historic epoch to another. The latter
is usually justified by quoting Marx out of context, where
he states that, "The handmill gives you feudalism; the
steam engine gives you capitalism." In studying the post-
war period in the U.S., the increased presence of cars and
trucks, the development of the Interstate Highway network
looms so powerful that a technological explanation is tempt-
ing. But, in the words of Harry Braverman (1974), "These
necessities are called 'technical needs,' 'machine charac-
teristics,' 'the requirements of efficiency,' but by and
large they are the exigencies of capital and not of tech-
nique."
This kind of explanation is often accompanied by a
variant which has been called spatialism or spatial deter-
minism, which suggests that there is also an inexorable
logic to the way industrial economic life is organized in
55
space. Using this perspective, the construction of highways
in U.S. cities becomes a material manifestation of the more
efficient organization of production, and it is often accom-
panied by a fatalistic approach to the future of city form.
(For a critique of the spatial theories of Losch, Alonso,
Isaard, et al., see the first chapter of Stewart Holland's
book, Capital vs. the Regions (1976).) Highways were iden-
tified with "progress", and the negative social and politi-
cal consequences of highways are accepted as byproducts of
some inevitable process. Urbanization, whether in the
underdeveloped or the advanced industrial countries is seen
as "a finite process, a cycle through which nations go in
their transition from agrarian through industrial society."
(Davis, 1975) Sometimes the explanation for this "inevit-
able" process is pseudo-economic, arguing in neo-classical
terms that the logic of economies of scale and aglomeration
economies demands particular concentrations and configura-
tions, and super-highways are only one manifestation of this.
While these theories may partially aid in understanding
the history of Boston's Southwest Corridor, they clearly
fall short of the mark. Since a popular democratic movement
had a major impact on this one major urban project, no
theory of urban form which leaves such movements outside
its range of explanation can be powerful enough to shed
light on it, to clarify the forces which influenced its
course. It is clear that an approach is needed which can
explain the forces which gave rise to the project for the
Southwest Expressway in the first place, shed light on the
complex political process which became the history of the
project. The theory must be able to account for socio-
economic and political factors, put important technological
developments (like the "automobilization of society") in a
historical perspective, and contribute to our ability not
only to analyze an urbanistic phenomenon but to guide our
professional practice in relation to it. With these cri-
teria in mind, the only theory powerful enough to be useful
is Marxism.
A Marxist approach to the analysis of U.S. cities
begins with an expoloration of State Monopoly Capitalism
and attempts to explain major man-made environmental trans-
formations as manifestations of deeper changes in that
social formation. It takes into account the concrete his-
tory.of U.S. cities. It seeks to analyze the particular
type of capital accumulation dominant in different periods
and establishes correlations between these, the dynamics of
class struggle in the cities, and the resulting urbanistic
changes.
- In "Capitalist Development and the History of Ameri-
can Cities", David Gordon offers an historical framework
which is useful in putting the post-war highway boom and
the Southwest Corridor in perspective. (Gordon, 1978) He
begins by saying that "The Marxian analysis of the spatial
division of labor suggests that no particular pattern of
urban development is inevitably 'destined,' somehow deter-
ministically cast in a general spatial mold. Spatial forms
are conditioned, rather, by the particular mode of produc-
tion dominating the society under study; they are shaped by
endogenous political-economic forces, not by exogenous mech-
anisms. Marxians also argue that urban history, like the
history of other social institutions, does not advance in-
crementally, advancing step by gradual step along some
frictionless path. Urban history advanced discontinuously,
periodically experiencing qualitative transformations of
basic form and structure. During the capitalist epoch, in
particular, the instability of the accumulation process it-
self is bound to lead to periodic institutional change."
Gordon then argues that U.S. cities have historically gone
through three qualitative stages, each having a peculiar
form which responds to a particular period of capital ac-
cumulation. The Commercial City spanned from the early
settlements in colonial days to the days of the Industrial
Revolution. As industrial production became the dominant
form of accumulation in the mid-19th century, the form of
cities began to change to the industrial metropolis of the
second half of the century. With the turn-of-the-century,
and the domination of monopoly capitalism, U.S. cities
again changed to what he calls the Corporate City, which
has been predominant to this day.
The major characteristic of the Corporate City has
been the decentralization of manufacturing, which he con-
vincingly argues was prompted by Capital's reaction to
the high level of working class militancy and unionism in
the large cities of the period. Accompanying this phenom-
enon are other spatial characteristics, such as the forma-
tion of the central business districts, suburban fragmen-
tation, increased stratification of the labor force, in-
creased segregation of residentail areas by class and race,
the concentrations of Corporate headquarters in the down-
towns, as well as fiscal and social crises in the system
which have become known as the "urban" crisis.
Gordon, however, does not consider the changes in the
post-war period as qualitative but rather as refinements of
the Corporate City, since monopoly capitalism has been the
dominant form of accumulation in the U.S. since the Cuban-
Spanish-American War of 1898:
Once this new urban form crystalized, of course, many
additional influences affected urban growth. Patterns
of defense spending, federal housing policies, the
power of the auto-energy-construction block, the shift-
ing dynamics of urban-land speculation -- these and
many other factors -- contributed to the content of
urban America after World War II. All of these fac-
tors had secondary effects, however, in the sense
that they tended to reproduce the structure of the
Corporate City rather than to change or undermine it.
The foundations of that urban form were so strong
that simple political influences could not change its
basic shape. (Gordon, 19 , p. 55)
While his argument is strong, the physical transforma-
tion of U.S. cities in the period since the war, and the ac-
companying social and economic developments are too signifi-
cant to be unaccounted. Moreover, the task at hand is
putting the Southwest Corridor Project in an historical as
well as socio-economic and political perspective. Even if
we are to understand the post-war construction boom as a
"fine-tuning" of the Corporate City, we have to argue that
it was a major tune up. The Interstate Highway Project,
for example, was the largest single public works project
ever undertaken by the United States; it was passed in 1956
with a projected budget of $56 billion. (Mollenkopf, 1978,
p. 127) The accompanying Urban Renewal program would prompt
local city governments to borrow $22.5 billion in a 15 year
period in addition to receiving an enormous amount of
federal funds.
During the first half of the century monopoly capital-
ism expanded both domestically and internationally at a
very fast pace. The dispersal of manufacturing from the
central cities to the suburbs meant that the major economic
life of the country was gradually being relocated, while
the fiscal structure of the local organs of the state,
which depended on real estate taxes through municipal
finances was not adjusting to the new reality, creating the
embryo of a deficit in municipal financing. Like the indus-
trial expansion which preceeded it, this deficit was financed
on credit, but the bubble of private deficit financing
burst during the Great Depression. Following the Second
World War, with its political and economic advantage tempor-
arily secure in the world, the U.S. turned its attention to
consolidating the structure of monopoly capitalism at home.
The Central City during the competitive capitalist period
had been a machine for production (Mumford, 1961); in the
first period of monopoly dominance it was becoming a machine
for management and consumption. The dispersion of industry
away from central cities and regions of high union militancy
was accompanied by a relocation of the residences of indus-
trial workers. The state played an important role in promot-
ing this relocation, through FHA insured loans which fueled
the suburban boom. The new organization itself spurred new
growth industries, the major one being the automobile indus-
try, which was in turn reinforced by the state through the
construction of the Interstate Highway Network.
This reorganization had other implications. Already
mentioned was the fiscal crisis of city governments. Cor-
porate headquarters were still located in the downtowns as
were the headquarters of the growing financial institutions.
Yet the population in the central cities had changed with
the exodus of white workers and the migration of black and
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Latino workers, as well as with the gradual transformation
of the city's labor market from industrial to service jobs.
The new larger and more complex economic institutions gen-
erated a more complex class structure which was reinforced
with increased segregation by race and class. Slums and
ghettoes were growing restless and demanding services,
threatening the control of the city by the corporate giants.
Shifts in class composition generated shifts in political
alliances, adding to instability. Increasing demands for
funds were met with diminishing resour.ces by local govern-
ments, which forced them to boost tax assessment rates to
the point where "beyond this level will spell disaster".
(Wood, 1958, p. 72) City centers had to be kept accessible
to the major economic activity occuring outside it. John
Mollenkopf explains the situation this way:
According to contemporary analyses, the causes of this
crisis in finances and central-city property values
were twofold: On the one hand, the metropolitan dis-
persion of economic activity meant that central-city
revenues were declining relative to suburban fiscal
capacity. On the other, growing poor black and other
minority neighborhoods required expenditure above their
revenue contributions and 'threatened' neighboring pro-
perty values. Contributing to the problem were in-
creases in tax-exempt land (e.g., for new highways),
limited tax mechanisms and difficulties in raising
public-sector productivity. The appropriate policy
seemed clear: eliminate 'blighting' slums, stimulate
investment in the central business district, and pro-
vide the transportation infrastructure necessary to
keep the CBD 'viable'. And the only funding source
for this policy, it seemed equally clear, was the
federal government. (Mollenkopf, p. 125)
In this context, we can consider the Southwest Express-
way as one project in the reorganization of the city to
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suit the necessities of monopoly capital. It also provided
a mechanism to bail out white residents in changing urban
neighborhoods, who could be reimbursed for their property
taken by eminent domain. and encouraged to relocate in the
suburbs where they would add to the economic boom. Even
more important, there was a considerable amount of industrial
capital located in the inner city which could also be reim-
bursed by the state, thus subsidizing their relocation to a
more profitable site. This is important for several reasons.
It pinpoints the driving force behind the Project and
explains to a large degree the political forces which would
eventually coalesce to stop it and promote the Southwe-st
Corridor. It is an important framework for, understanding
the technical positions of proponents and opponents of the
highway. Community participation became the vehicle through
which the controversy would eventually be "resolved" within
the boundaries defined by the state.
In 1948, the Massachusetts Department of Public Works
issued a Master Highway plan which included an Inner Belt
Expressway, eight lanes wide, and a connecting link to In-
terstate 95 South called the Southwest Expressway.* In
* The chronology of the Southwest Corridor Project used
here was derived from "Community Participation in Boston's
- Southwest Corridor Project," unpublished, prepared by
Elizabeth de Mille, Mauricio Gaston, Jacquelyn Hall,
Wendy Landman, Cheryl Myers, Thomas Nally, of Wallace,
Floyd, Ellenzweig, Moore. 1980
September 1954, President Eisenhower appointed a five person
Advisory Committee on a National highway Plan, consisting
of three representatives of the monopolies, one of them a
retired general, a major transit engineer and the president
of the teamsters union. They produced "A ten year National
Highway program", Congress passed the Interstate and National
Defense Highway Act of 1956, and highway mania was off to a
nationally sanctioned start. (Mollenkopf, 1978, p. 127)
It is important to note that the federal law was not a
mere act of Congress but part of a national strategy which
included important representatives at the local level.
Robert Moses, for example, had become a powerful figure in
New York through the promotion of highway construction into
the central city. He became a national figure promoting
this scheme as a road to metropolitan development in all
major cities. In Massachusetts, John Volpe, a construction
company executive, who had been former State Public Works
Commissioner, campaigned for governor, making the construc-
tion of highways a major part of his platform, specifically,
promoting the Inner Belt and the Southwest Expressway.
(Lupo, et al., 1975) He won the election. Eventually he
would become Nixon's National Secretary of Transportation
in 1969. Volpe was part of a coalition that had been pulled
together in Massachusetts to promote the construction of
highways which reflected the composition of both Eisenhower's
national commission and pro-highway forces in other states:
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Monopolies with specific interests in downtowns (financiers,
retailers, etc.), construction company executives, building
trades bureaucrats, teamster bureaucrats, engineering execu-
tives.
In the light of the ideological form which the struggle
against roads would later take, it is also - important to
note that in the 1950's highways were seen primarily as a
transportation issue, secondly as a vehicle for urban econ-
omic development. At the time there was little consciousness
of the role of highways in manipulating the location of the
populations of inner cities. Chuck Turner, a. black activist
later prominent in the anti-highway struggles, considers
that the intent to manipulate population was secondary. He
puts it this way:
This highway system was planned before groups that are
settled now hit these populations so that as you look
at you can't relate to the initial planning in terms
of a racial thing per se because there has been some
.turning over of the geographic distribution since '48
when the initial plan was conceived although race and
class and economics certainly played a part in the
planning as it went along. But in '48 it was basic-
ally a scheme to get people north and south -- that is
from below Massachusetts to above Massachusetts and
from the ocean to around Cambridge through Boston and
around Cambridge in a more efficient manner than had
been done in the past. (Turner, Note 1)
- As was the case with the twin program of Urban Renewal,
issues of racist manipulation of minority populations and
manipulation of white working class, communities lay just
below the surface and were, in fact, implicit in the overall
strategy for both programs. In the jargon of urban renewal
the deteriorating residential quarters of the working class
and minorities were referred to as "blight", and:
Urban renewal was to throw a wall around creeping
"blight", that is, a growing social problem of the
minority urban poor, in order to preserve and enhance
central city values and contain poor neighborhood's
influence. It was no wonder that the program was
executed with frequent racist overtones. (Mollenkopf,
1978)
Highways are in fact very useful as walls. As engin-
eers, planners and architects began to consider the design
and location of highways entering the central cities, they
began to think of roads as instruments to be used against
working class communities. (See Graphic No. 4)
The state, at the federal, state and municipal levels,
began the 60's with a program to rebuild the cities and
build the brave new road network. In every major city, a
technocrat directed these efforts under reform candidates --
Moses in New York, Philadelphia with the Baems and the
Rafskys, Logue in New Haven and later in Boston. It is not
surprising that the American people were sold this "renewal
and roads" package. There was a love affair with the car
still raging. The reclamation of the city could find reson-
ance among a people who had undergone massive surburbaniza-
tion, acquired cars, and needed roads to get around.
The plan for Boston consisted of radial expressways
leading to the metropolitan core, with three circumferential
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SHIELDING "US" FROM BLIGHT
Suggestions for treating "gray areas," from.
Urban Design: The Architecture of Town and
Cities, by Paul D. Spreiregen, sponsored by the
American Itastitute of Architects
Gray areas are vital functional
and physical adjuncts to the
center of the city.
We can diminish their visual
effects by shielding our ap-
proach views. At the same time
we can relieve the gray areas
with open spaces.
Better still, we can link them
to the center with their own,
system of paths (a), our ex-
pressways can bypass the
gray areas (b), and both
systems can enter the central
city together (c).
GRAPHIC No. 4-
(Goodman, 1971)
rings: one 2 or 3 miles from the center -- the inner belt;
one 12 to 15 miles from the center -- Route 128; and a
third 25 to 30 miles -- Interstate 495. In the central
parts, both the circumferential and radial roads would cut
through heavily urbanized territory. Since the selection
of territory depended on cheap land acquisition, and since
an aesthetic goal was to shield the quarters of the working
class and minorities from commuters (a phenomenon, by the
way, identified by Engels in Manchester in 1844), the roads
naturally were planned through slum areas. Some of the
pieces were already in place: Route 128 had been built in
the mid-50's, with federal and state aid; the Central Artery
(1959), the Southeast Expressway (1959), and the Northeast
Expressway (1954) had been built. In 1965 the Mass Turnpike
was built, destroying acres of land in Chinatown, the first
road in the area financed with tolls. (Sloan, 1974, pp. 12-
14) Missing were the inner belt, the Southwest Expressway,
a connector to Route 2 in the Northwest and a relocated
1-95 on the North Shore. (See Graphics Nos. 5 and 6)
THE FIGHT IN THE NEIGHBORHOODS
OF THE SOUTHWEST CORRIDOR
Before the demolition began, as concrete plans were
made public for the highway system, opposition to the roads
emerged. Not surprisingly, it began in Cambridge in the
early '60's. The city's working class communities had been
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GRAPHIC No. 5
Existing Highway System. (Sloan, 1974).
GRAPHIC No.t
Planned Expressway System. (Sloan, 1974).
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AERIAL PHOTO OF CORRIDOR AT FOWL MEADOW
GRAPHIC No. 7
Aerial Photo of 1-95 at Fowl Meadow. A double barrel
at Boston's working class and minority neighborhoods.
(SWCLDC,1971).
shotgun aimed
fighting institutional expansion by Harvard and MIT, as
well as the beginnings of urban renewal in the communities
of Cambridgeport and East Cambridge. In East Cambridge,
the old industrial economic base had been fleeing the city
to New Hampshire, the U.S. South and overseas. MIT was
promoting the development of the' new aerospace and elec-
tronics industry in the Kendall Square area. Cambridge-
port was being eroded by MIT in the east and Harvard in the
west. There was already a consciousness (among its resi-
dents) of a struggle to save these communities. Cambridge
politicians, who traditionally harnessed votes through some
opposition to these institutions joined the fight which had
been led in part by a Catholic priest. Chuck Turner explains
it this way:
In the '60's the heavy push around the system began,
that is that the Department of Public Works began to
push to collect the land out in Cambridge that could
be used for the building of the inner belt. The first
focus was to be in Cambridge, to start the East-West
Highway. What happened was that Cambridge was already
besieged by MIT and Harvard; that is the Cambridge pol-
iticians, the Cambridge people were already besieged
by these two universities and the politicians took the
position that we can't afford at any cost to lose ap-
proximately fifteen hundred homes and a vast amount of
land and an amount of businesses out of Cambridge,
that to lose that population and that economic base
will say to us and the.. .then this will only be a uni-
versity town. So that the Cambridge politicans, fight-
ing for their own political survival, took the posi-
tion that this was almost a do or die issue. So that
you have the city of Cambridge using its political
muscle, using whatever political tactics it could
devise along with the residents in the area to move
against the highway. As it began to do that, it was
not faced with s.upport of other cities surrounding it.
(Turner, Note 2)
Within Harvard and MIT, particularly in the architecture
and planning schools, there were professionals who had built
ties with the organic leaders of these communities. Har-
vard's Urban Field Service, for example, had worked with
black community leaders in Cambridgeport in promoting day
care centers, low income housing and opposing Harvard expan-
sion into the Riverside district adjacent to that university.
These were the days of the civil rights movement and the
student movement, and the professions of architecture and
planning were beginning to turn their attention to the
social needs of the urban population. When plans for the
Inner Belt were announced, Cambridgeport residents quickly
made contact with sympathetic university professionals who
began to give technical ammunition to the community groups.
The Cambridgeport residents organized as "the Save our
Cities Committee" and began to organize against the road,
principally by influencing local politicians to take a
strong stand, but also beginning to look for technical back-
up, and for alliances from other community groups fighting
the highway. Cambridge residents were able to de ly the
demolition of housing for the Inner Belt, but the threat
hung over them like the sword of Democles. By 1966, they
could look across the Charles River and watch the destruc-
tion taking place in Roxbury and Jamaica Plain. (See
Graphics Nos. 8 and 9)
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GRAPHIC No. 9
Madison Park Area of Roxbury, Showing Demolition for Urban Renewal and 1-95.
(SWCLDC, 1971).
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GRAPHIC No. Aerial View of the Corridor. (SWCLDC,1971).
Location and Context. (WFEM, 1980).GRAPHIC No. 10
In that year, demolition of homes in the path of the
Southwest Expressway began, and so did the efforts to organ-
ize against it. In Jamaica Plain, several groups who had
been discussing alternative strategies to stop the demolition
began meeting together for Sunday brunch. (Lupo, et al.,
1975, p. 26) The group included young people who had been
active in the civil rights and anti-war movements who had
moved into the neighborhood, some with technical planning
expertise, as well as old-time residents of J.P., commun-
ity activists and Irish liberals who had found the "proper
channels" ineffective in fighting the highway. A remnant
of the old Curley political machine led by State Represen-
tative James Craven had made its usual deals with the
highway promoters and were pushing for construction of 1-95
despite the implied removal of a large number of homes, so
that the accepted method of lobbying local politicians had
not allowed the same results that Cambridge citizens had
obtained in their city. (Bassett, Note 3)
Jamaica Plain in the late '60's was perceived as a
working-class Irish neighborhood, although it had always
had enclaves of German and Eastern European migrants, and a
district along Jamaica Pond which was the residence of
wealthy "lace curtain" Irish and powerful politicians. By
that time, moreover, a large public housing project at Brom-
ley and Heath Streets had become predominantly Black and
there was a large Latino population on the small streets of
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the vicinity of Centre Street and Hyde Square. Moreover,
as urban renewal displaced blacks and Latinos from the
South End, many moved to J.P., so this sector was increas-
ing rapidly in numbers.
The Corridor ran along the tracks of the Penn Central
Railroad, located along the bottom of a small valley which
bisected the neighborhood. Along the tracks were located
the remnants of what once had been an important linear in-
dustrial zone; most of the factories there had left the
city or would do so in the next decade.
Originally, J.P. had been a wealthy rural area of
summer estates, so that some of the stately mansions remained
in the area. Around the turn of the century streetcar
lines contributed to transforming the neighborhood into a
middle class suburb of one- and two-family homes, and
workers who labored in the factories along the tracks
settled into triple decker homes and brick row houses. Phy-
sically, J.P. had changed little in thirty years; demolition
for 1-95 was confined to a strip of homes along the tracks
along Lamartine Street. Beautiful parks from Olmsted's
Emerald Necklace ring the community and provide it with
clearly defined physical boundaries on three sides; the
boundary with Roxbury was the subject of considerable
dispute, since minorities moving into the northern edge of
J.P. caused the more racist forces to try to redefine the
northern edge of the community further south so as to keep
alive the idea of Jamaica Plain remaining white turf.
In Roxbury, particularly in the Madison Park area, the
greatest displacement was taking place. Hundreds of families
were being evicted for 1-95, for urban removal around Madi-
son Park, and their homes razed. A considerable amount of
industrial floor space was also being demolished, and the
area soon became a wasteland. But the level of political
organization and resistance in the black community was
also at a high point, based on the civil rights and black
power movements, and energy soon focused on the highway.
1-95 was denounced as another version of "Negro Remov-
al". The theory of the black community as an internal
colony, where territorial struggles played an important
part in defining the terms
currency. The main thrust
black community at the time
cational system. In Madison
around education was tied to
since there was an urban
replace housing with a new
began to demolish more homes
added to what then seemed a
of oppression, began to gain
of the struggle in Boston's
was desegregation of the edu-
Park, in particular, the fight
the fight against urban renewal,
renewal project which was to
high school; when the highway
in the area, another issue was
multifaceted effort to destroy
that part of the community, whether by design or insensitiv-
ity. The Black United Front which grouped many of Roxbury's
black organizations, began to look at the highway plans as
78
W I 04"ONWO"
something that needed to be fought, though initially it
was not considered a priority. (Turner, Note 4)
Roxbury had several distinct sub-neighborhoods adjacent
to the Corridor: Lower Roxbury at the northern edge, Mis-
sion Hill to the West and Highland Park to the East. All
were primarily residentail areas; the last two had a history
similar to Jamaica Plain, originating as county estates,
becoming streetcar suburbs at the end of the 19th century
and later becoming residential districts for Black and
Latino communities. There was also the industry adjacent
to the tracks. Lower Roxbury extended from the north and
Massachusetts Avenue, where it was essentially a continua-
tion of the South End, to the south where Mission Hill and
Highland Park rose from the plain. Mission Hill was bounded
on the west by a complex of medical institutions and in the
north by Northeastern University, which lay adjacent to the
Corridor. Highland Park extended from the Corridor towards
the east, where it became part of the Greater Roxbury neigh-
borhood.
The primary concern in Roxbury was that housing'des-
troyed for 1-95 and Madison Park High School be replaced
with decent, affordable homes, and that development take
place on the vacant land. There was the additional concern
that once the Corridor was built the Washington Street
Orange Line elevated transit line would be demolished,
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leaving the community without viable transportation and
causing severe economic damage in the area of Dudley Street
station, which was the "downtown" of the neighborhood and
Boston's black community.
In the South End, the other major neighborhood affected
by 1-95, the situation was somewhat different, and it was
intricately linked to urban renewal. 1-95 was to terminate
at the inner belt before reaching the South End, but a
South End bypass would take traffic from 1-95 over the Penn
Central tracks, as far as Dartmouth Street. The plans, de-
tailed in the BRA's Southway Study, would demolish four
buildings on every block along the tracks. The BRA, however,
wanted Interstate funds to finance this road, which required
a wider right-of-way and the demolition of up to 150 homes
in the area. (Kruckemeyer, Note 5) In opposition to
this, neighborhood activists organized a Tubman Area Plan-
ning Council, which became the nucleus of the South End Com-
mittee on Transportation, eventually the most important
group in the neighborhood involved in the anti-highway
struggle. The plans also implied a widening of Tremont
Street to three lanes in each direction, converting it to a
major arterial street. Douglass phamacy, a center of pol-
itical activity of the Black Liberation Movement in the
neighborhood, was bought by the BRA for the purpose of
widening the street. As can be seen, transportation and
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urban renewal were intricately related and seen as such by
the communities.
The South End/St. Botolph area was more or less bounded
on the west by the Prudential Center, on the east by the
Southeast Expressway, on the north by the Massachusetts
Turnpike and on the south by Northampton Street. It was at
that time a working-class neighborhood with one of the most
integrated and diverse racial and ethnic populations in the
city. Its architecturally valuable bow fronts structures
occupied by working class homeowners, renters and roomi'ng
houses were scheduled by the BRA to be converted to fashion-
able upper-middle income homes for the new professionals
residents the BRA wanted to relocate into the city. Parts
of the neighborhood were to be razed for new residential
units; parts, including the Puerto Rican community in
Parcel 19, for commercial space. Wholesale convinctions
were-met with resistance, rent strikes, site occupations,
and pickets. Some recent arrivals in the South End consid-
ered themselves "Urban Pioneers", living with the savages
as they bought cheap homes, renovated them, and waited
for the population to change. Others were more sympathetic
_to their working class neighbors and joined them in the
struggle for low income housing, better schools, etc. Among
this latter group were some progressive middle class profes-
sionals who were interested in the highway sue from a
slightly different angle -- saving the "diversity" of the
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city's neighborhoods, improving the city's neighborhoods,
improving the city's transportation system, etc.
THE COALITION AGAINST THE
HIGHWAYS
There were common denominators among these neighborhoods
as they faced the bulldozers of the Southeast Expressway.
All were predominantly working class, and had been struggling
around the issue of displacement, urban renewal and institu-
tional expansion for some years. In all of them the
influence of the civil rights and anti-imperialist movements
were having an influence. In all of them there was at
least a working relationship between working class activists
and architects and planners and lawyers who were involved
in technical support for community-based, land-and-housing
related struggles. But the groups were isolated one from
the other. While there was some communication, particularly
among progressive professionals in different neighborhoods,
there was little collective strategizing and collective
action.
The initiative for coordinated work apparently was
initiated by white professionals working with the Cambridge
group. (Peattie, 1970) They approached the South End hous-
ing activists who in turn approached the Black United Front
in Roxbury. (Turner,. 19-74) They also approached Jamaica
Plain anti-highway activists and Milton environmentalists
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opposed to 1-95 because it would destroy Foul Meadow in
that suburb. (WFEM, 1980) Very soon in the coordinated
fight against the highways several important decisions were
made. The community groups would build coalitions as broad
as possible against the highways. They would seek allies
not only among similar groups but among dissimilar groups
with an objective interest against the highway, such as
environmentalists and among liberals within the political
establishment. And they needed expertise on their side,
which meant seeking friends among skilled professionals who
would be willing to work for their cause.
These strategies were, of course, interconnected, but
there were some underlying assumptions about the political
process and about the city which are important to note.
There was by no means consensus in the establishment that
the destruction of inner city working class and nationally
oppressed neighborhoods was undesirable. There were those,
including then Harvard professor, Patrick Moynihan, who
argued that the relocation of thousands of people would
clear the way for more "enlightened citizens" -- from a
higher class background -- to move the city and change the
balance of forces. (Salvucci, Note 6) It was important,
therefore, for those against the roads to build consciousness
to the fact that the highways put the political forces in
the inner city on the line. But the community groups also
felt that if that issue became the only one in the struggle,
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they would not be strong enough to win. They, therefore,
decided to build strength among people who were opposed to
the highways for different reasons; among those contacted
who later joined the fight against the highway were subur-
ban environmentalists who were opposed to the destruction
of marsh in Canton and Milton -- Foul Meadow. This group
was also gaining strength as the environmental movement got
into full swing with issues like air pollution, endangered
species, etc.
Another important opinion accepted early by the coali-
tion was that the debate taking place around the highways
was not merely political but also technical. The pro-high-
way forces had as ammunition a series of state-sponsored
studies which concluded that the highways were necessary.
It was important to be able to counter this technical weapon
with equally valid technical material opposed to the high-
ways. Thus, it was important to build allies among planners,
architects, engineers, statisticians and other professionals
who could provide the arguments for another alternative.
The world of urbanism would necessarily be a central part
of the fight against the highways.
It was also felt that liberals in position of power
could play an important part in influencing those with
higher power to take positions favorable to the anti-highway
forces. Thus Barney Frank in' Mayor White's office and
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Justin Grey in the Cambridge City Council offices were
courted and won over by the movement against highways.
In 1966, a group of progressive planning professionals
led at the time by Jim Morey -- a former "defense" analyst
turned anti-war activist -- formed Urban Planning Aid, an
organization of advocate planners who aimed at helping com-
munity groups with professional services which would defend
their interests. One of UPA's first actions was to prepare
a critique of the Master Highway Plan for the State, which
counted 15 deficiencies and declared the highway plan to be
"technically and socially unsound". (Lupo, et al., 1975,
p. 17) There were at this time no alternatives posed.
In 1967 the Harvard and MIT faculties came out against
the highways, as did the Cambridge City Council. This
reflected the increasingly middle class, reformist, base of
the movement, but also was a demonstration of strength.
The Boston Globe, on the other hand, "boosted" the highways
plan with a headline reading "Expanded Highways Bring Pros-
perity". (Lupo, et al., 1975, p. 23) UPA countered with
another study showing that 5,000 units of housing would be
destroyed for the roads. The Governor again countered by
asking for another study, this one by the Eastern Massachu-
setts Regional Planning Project, and the battle of the tech-
nical studies was on. For a period of about a year, the
major arena where the battle of the highways was fought was
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the planning arena, primarily on the issue of selecting the
alignment for the inner belt in Cambridge.
Frances Fox Piven has written of community participation
in the planning process as a forum where the interests of
the oppressed could be diverted from politics, where they
are effective, into an arena where technical knowledge
would not favor their interest, but the interest of those
in power, who would have better access to such resources.
(Piven, 1970) She argues that the major thrust of community
participation as an officially instituted project came from
the Democratic machine in an effort to funnel grassroots
dissatisfaction with the system into co.nvenient bounds,
without denying that in the process the interests of the op-
pressed were also advanced. In the case of the anti-highway
movement, this warning was critical, since the political
battles being fought were loaded with technical information
and knowledge.
Not only that, but the professionals were also taking
a leading political role in the fight against the highways.
In 1967 UPA organized the Greater Boston Committee on the
Transportation Crisis, which united professionals, community
groups and even municipalities in both technical and politi-
cal efforts. Its main thrust was to provide a series of
reports countering studies by city and state authorities
which defended the h-ighway. While these studies did not
seek to provide alternatives to the highways, they were based
on different theoretical positions about the nature of the
city which would have implications for the alternatives to
the highways which would emerge later. First of all, they
were more comprehensive in that the socio-political and
economic impacts of the roads were more prominent than
those in the pro-highway studies. They postulated that a
transportation network could not be derived merely from a
number of vehicles that could be projected to move through
the city, but only by assessing the overall impact of
a project on the urban fabric. Some of the studies were
mathematical projections of traffic volumes, which undermined
the current assumptions of traffic engineers who designed
highways. For example, empirical evidence existed which
showed that a new road not only accomodates traffic, but in
fact generates new traffic patterns as well as land-use and
population patterns. Thus, a decision to justify a road
could not be based on mere traffic projections but implied
value judgments as to whether the patterns to be generated
were in fact desirable. This would give more weight to
socio-political arguments, which would favor the side of
the anti-highway forces. Eventually, the profession of
Transportation Planning would be greatly affected.
Both community activists and professionals felt the
need to move the struggle against the highways from the
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technical arena back into politics. While they felt that
the studies produced by the anti-highway movement were not
only politically but techically superior to the pro-highway
studies, they also realized that the process was being used
by the highway builders to stall the opposition, to divert
it, until the road had progressed so much that the arguments
against it would be invalidated; once the residents are
evicted and the housing demolished, they could argue that
the highway can't be opposed on grounds of displacement
since the displacements had already occurred. The political
sphere was more promising. They, therefore, decided to
"hit the streets". A series of demonstrations was held,
including "People Before Highways" Day, backed up by numer-
ous community meetings, lobbying and propaganda.
The movement against the roads had several important
characteristics. It was remarkably widespread and heterogen-
eous. The composition of the participants, the ideologies
represented, the geographic distribution of groups involved
as amazingly diverse.
Although the resistance to the road had begun in inner-
city minority and white working class neighborhoods, UPA
had managed to unite intellectuals, professionals, bourgeois
politicians,- ward hacks in the Democratic machinery, sub-
urban environmentalists, separatist black nationalists, stu-
dents and unions in the effort. This was perhaps the source
90
GRAPHIC No.15
Mural on the Penn Central Embankment in Roxbury. The entire mural read:
"STOP 1-95 PEOPLE BEFORE HIGHWAYS".
(Planning Report, Section II, 1978. WFEM Archives).
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source of strength that made it possible to achieve the
specific goal of stopping the road, but it was also the
source of weakness. There was general consensus on the
specific issue, and on the responsibility of the state for
promoting a destructive policy, but it is difficult to
trade a unified ideology among the different groups. The
closest thing to a unified idea was what Castells (1977)
calls the "concept of the urban". The road proposal was
seen as a mistake on the part of the state which would make
the metropolitan region a worse place to live, and one
which would trample on the interests of residents. There
was recognition of "interest groups" unfairly promoting
this policy, and using their power to push it through --
the highway lobby -- but little effort was made to analyze
the problem as a manifestation of monopoly capitalism. Al-
though there was a mass movement, and increased solidarity
among sectors of the working class who have been generally
divided, collective consciousness raising was not effecl-
tively carried out. In fact efforts to raise the political
level were seen, perhaps accurately, as endangering a fra-
gile coalition.
Furthermore, the leaderhsip of the movement was gener-
ally provided by intellectuals and professionals; as we
shall see, this had both negative and positive consequences.
The movement was very effective in influencing politicians,
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not only at the municipal and state levels, but at the
federal level. Some of the local-based activities in the
Corridor Neighborhood had a genuinely popular character to
it, and did in fact generate consciousness in those com-
munities. A remnant of these activities is the "People
before Highways" mural painted along the corridor in Rox-
bury. The political consequences of continuing the road
were made manifest to bourgeois political leadership of
the area, and the technical arguments became compelling.
It is also important to remember that the struggle
against the road taking place in Boston was not really
unique. Throughout the country similar battles were being
fought. In Newark, the Black community announced "unpre-
cedented resistance" to any attempt to build a planned
road. In 1969, these were powerful words, and the state
government, even Washington, trembled slightly. In Balti-
more, Seattle and other cities there was considerable resis-
tance. (Geiser, 1970) The national mood, the infatuation
with the automobile which had become part of the U.S. psyche
for decades, had begun to change. The state took notice
the monopoly city would have to be rationalized some other
way.
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Eventually the then Governor Francis Sargent, who had
been a proponent of the highways, during the mid '60's re-
considered his position and in 1970 ordered a moratorium on
all highway construction inside Route 128, except for 1-93
from the Central Artery to its terminus in Somerville.
This was followed by two years of a specially constituted
Boston Transportation Plannign Review (BTPR), a massive
technical study of transportation issues, which, in Novem-
ber 1972, led to the Governor's decision against the South-
west Expressway and cleared the way for planning for the
Southwest Corridor Project, roughly as it is being designed
and built today.
It was during this period that the anti-highway forces
began to develop alternatives to the Southwest Expressway.
Throughout the struggle over the expressway, the pro-road
forces used a strategy of forcing the state to commit itself
irrevocably to the expressway. Thus, once the moratorium
was decreed, they argued that the destruction to the neigh-
borhood had already been carried out, and that, therefore,
there was no longer an anti-road argument.
The anti-road forces countered with a complex strategy.
On the one hand they began to argue for mass transit to re-
place the road. Participants in the struggle clearly state
that they did not believe in mass transit as a major issue
(Salvucci, Note 7) but were merely looking for something
to fill the void left by the demolition. But they also
reasoned that part of the major forces behind the road were
not primarily committed to roads but were builders lobbying
for the state to finance some construction. If there was
money in it, these people would have no major objection to
building rapid transit instead of a road.
By -building a movement against the roads which included
working class and middle class constituencies, many of the
politicians, like Mayor White and Governor Sargent, would
be pressured to turn against the expressway, given that an
alternative was feasible which would pacify the big-money
builders. But there was no money yet for rapid transit. By
lobbying with politicians, particularly Kennedy and O'Neil,
people from Boston were able to transfer federal funds de-
rived from gasoline taxes, previously available only for
roads, to public transit, specifically to the new Orange
Line, now known as the Southwest Corridor Project. (WFEM,
1980) This left an alternative that was acceptable to many
forces in Boston but also set a precedent for other cities
in the country engaged in anti-highway struggles.
A significant aspect of this strategy is that neither
the community groups nor the majority of the planners fought
against the highway as a transportation issue primarily.
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Transportation arguments were used as tactical measures
against the road. Rather they fought against the highway
for social reasons and because it "destroyed the fabric of
the city". Once the moratorium had been called, the plan-
ners and community groups turned their attention to the
"tear in the urban fabric and a strategy to reweave it."
(Lee, Note 8)
In the period when the Boston Transportation Planning
Review was operating, 1970-72, the planners and architects
turned their attention to alternatives to the highway.
Rapid transit was one alternative but it would not be spa-
tially large enough nor would it generate enough activity
to fill the space of the demolition. The planning for the
"tear in the urban fabric" would have to be more encompassing
and would reflect a view of the city far more complex than
that of a mere transportation issue. The proposals for
filling the void are the best indications of the views of
the city held by these urbanists.
The organization which generated the proposals. was
the Southwest Corridor Land Development Coalition which
was formed from the separate groups which had fought
against the Southwest Expressway, including the profession-
als who had been involved in the Greater Boston Committee
on Transportation Crisis. Planners and architects from
MIT and Harvard organized design studios which supported
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Example of Alternative Plans Proposed by SWCLDC for Roxbury Neighborhood.
(SWCLDCl971).
the coalition's alternative seeking. Minority professional
firms volunteered their time and efforts.
The community groups were at this time in a fairly
firm alliance with these professionals. Piven's warning
that once the struggle moved from politics to planning the
interests of the oppressed communities would not be safe-
guarded would remain in the air, however, despite the fact
that the professionals had long been involved in fighting
the highway and that their alternative proposals were much
more in accordance with the interests of the communities
than had previous state proposals. In a longer range, the
professionals' approach may find some contradiction with
the interests of the majority of residents, but for the
time being that was not perceived by residents to be a
major issue.
Economically, one of the arguments of the highway
builders was that since jobs had left the city and since
there was unemployment in the inner city, a highway would
improve transportation and make jobs in the suburbs acces-
sible to inner city workers. The coalition debunked this
argument by showing that inner city workers depend to a
large extent on public transportation and that the fact
that a minority worker could physically get to a suburban
plant did not imply in any way that he could get employment
there. Moreover, it argued against the likelihood that
minority workers could physically relocate in the suburbs
to gain access to jobs. It therefore argued that the only
solution was to locate industry in the Corridor where both
land and labor force were available. (SWCLDC, 1972, pp.
15, 16) Implied in this view was that the Corridor was not
merely a way "to get from here to there" but in fact a
place in urban fabric where economic activity could occur.
Also implied is a measure of economic activity by the lib-
eral yardstick of alleviating unemployment instead of tra-
ditional measures such as tax-renevue generating capacity.
It also sought to retain the proletarian popularion base
of the city.
In fact, the proposal for industry in the Corridor
land did not originate directly from the planners, but from
a survey carried out by the Coalition of the perceived
needs of neighborhood residents in different neighborhoods
of the Corridor. This is a reflection of the strength of
the residents within the Coalition but also of the planners'
ideological values. (See Graphic No. 11)
Once the perceived needs were assessed, each of the
alternatives was evaluated on more complex criteria to see
if the activity was justified, then evaluated for feasibil-
ity. Among .the activities evaluated were transit, shopping
facilities, community facilities, social services, light
industry, manpower development- corporations, education and
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health facilities, housing for families and for the elderly,
recreation and street improvements. It also proposed im-
proved bus service and other transportation issues.
The feasibility of any particular activity, however,
depended less on need than on economic constraints and on
the availability and applicability of state, federal and
private funcing for such facilities. The approach of the
planners was twofold. On the one hand they proposed to
build everything needed. The proposal could then serve as
an organizing tool to search for funds. On the other hand,
some of the facilities which were feasible were developed
further. This led to a certain "ad hoc" character to the
proposed programming where serious proposals were those
which were likely to get built. There was, therefore, a
heavy prevalence of public institutions among the proposals
since these were likely to be obtainable through political
activity and lobbying. There was a significant amount of
housing proposed, but as funding for housing became more
scarce in the '70's the amount of proposed housing develop-
ment decreased. Also, public investment was seen as an
opportunity to leverage private funds for such activities
as commercial development.
Among the institutions proposed for the Corridor were
a new Campus High School for Madison Park in Roxbury, a
new Roxbury Community College, on a long site paralleling
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Columbus Avenue, an Occupational Resource Center near Rox-
bury Crossing. Industry. was proposed for the land cleared
for the Inner Belt in Roxbury, as well as for the areas near
Jackson Square in Roxbury and Lamartine Street in Jamaica
Plain. Housing was proposed for the area near which Ruggles
Street intercepted the proposed Rapid Transit line, where
the Lower Roxbury Community Corporation had been trying to
get housing built for many years, as well as for different
small sites where housing had been- demolished for the
road in Jamaica Plain. Commercial and other community-
oriented facilities were proposed for the areas near the
stations where the investment made by the state would
attract small venture capital for secondary development.
Where there is private development there is money to
be made and accumulated, and as could have been expected,
there were considerable maneuvers by different forces for
how the development was going to be carried out.
There were several proposals before the Massachusetts
legislature for the development to occur in certain ways.
(SWCLDC, 1971) On the one hand there was a proposal for a
state funded Urban Development Corporation patterned after
New York State's UDC which was backed by large liberal capi-
talists who saw "private" investment in cities as the answer
to the urban crisis. There were proposals for a new local
development corporation, for a new Communities Corporation
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patterned after Western European models for new towns, for
parcel by parcel, market-force, relatively unplanned devel-
opment, and a bill authorizing the Massachusetts Housing
and Finance Corporation, MHFA, to engage in community devel-
opment. The Coalition developed evaluations of these al-
ternatives, pointed out the strengths and weaknesses of
each from the point of view of the communties' interests,
and used these reports as political weapons to lobby for
better position.
The alternative advocated was one which favored non-
profit community corporations and small "black-capitalism"
entrepreneurs, but in this issue as well as on the choice
of activities there was a certain amount of ad hoc, case-by-
case maneuvering for each parcel, or for each site. Thus,
the largest developable parcel, Parcel 18, near the new
Ruggles Street Station, was staked out by a. task force
which included nonprofit groups such as the Roxbury Action
Program (RAP) and the Lower Roxbury Development Corporation
(LRDC), as well as an institution like Northeastern Univer-
sity. Development of industry was more or less cornered by
Boston's CDC. Housing development depended on the site in
question. Municipal and state institutions were attracted
to the land through channels in the political process. It
is important to point out that rather than a coherent ideo-
logical position towards development, the Coalition re-
flected the wide spectrum of views which constituted it
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Plans for Parcel 18, developed with the participation of the
Parcel 18 Task Force.
Drawing: Stull Assoc, Inc. (WFEM, 1980).
GRAPHIC No.17
LRDC Townhouses was one of the reforms won from the State.
Drawing: John Sharrat Assoc. (WFEM Archives).
and development alternatives were fought out in the planning
and political arenas. Yet, given the history of popular in-
volvement in the process, it was difficult for large-scale
money to grab the opportunities. These instead went to
those forces which had closer ties to the activists who
stopped the road. The Coalition's report included a series
of inteviews with personalities with experience in develop-
ment and capabilities for carrying it out, such as Ralph
Smith of LRDC, and Dennis Blacket of Housing Innovations,
for example.
Given the reality of the society we live in, develop-
ment is development, and improvements in the urban fabric
have the paradoxical effect of bettering the lives of those
near it and at the same time boosting the market forces
which make the development inaccessible to low-income people
living in the area. The converse of development is disin-
vestment, however, which was also displacing working class
and minority families. The issue of how to fight for im-
provements and still assure that the reforms will not turn
out to be counterproductive, particularly through market
forces, would become more important in the years to come.
Before the BTPR, much of the organized effort of
transportation planners working for the state was to try
to channel energy into discussions about the shape of the
highway: Would it be at grade, elevated, depressed,
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partially depressed? The anti-highway movement was able to
step outside the bounds of these proposals and begin dis-
cussions of whether the roads should be built at all. In
BTPR, the no-build alternative finally became part of the
institutionalized planning process.
Once Governor Sargent announced the moratorium on high-
way construction inside Route 128 and set out to organize
the Boston Transportation Planning Review, the Corridor
struggle entered into a qualitatively different stage. By
stopping the highway construction temporarily the state on
the one hand pulled the rug from under the anti-highway
movement by accepting its central demand, and on the other
hand created the structure where all activity around the
issue of the highway had to be integrated. The Governor in-
vited all "responsible" forces in the controversy to "parti-
cipate". SWCLDC skillfully joined the process while contin-
uing to organize outside, and to prepare independent techni-
cal reports which it then presented to the BTPR.
The BTPR marks the beginning of the institutionaliza-
tion of participation in the Corridor Project. Prior to
its formation, the anti-highway movement had the freedom
of the *outsider, choosing tactics and timing its actions,
forcing the .state to respond to its initiatives. Once the
bounds of participation were established in the BTPR, any
initiative on the part of the anti-highway forces had to
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be circumscribed within the calendar, agenda, and process of
the official study. The- forces grouped around the Greater
Boston Coalition on the Transporation Crises, evaluated the
situation and decided that they had enough technical ammun-
ition to accept the new rules of the game.
The BTPR illustrates other important changes. The pro-
fession of transportation planning came face to face with a
blunt reality; there was a popular movement of considerable
strength opposing its very practice. In the 50's a series
of sophisticated techniques for forecasting travel demand
combined with changes in land use had been developed. By
the late '60's the "failings" of these methods had become
apparent. Even their traffic predictions were shown to be
way off mark. They were made manifest by the organization
of oppressed and working class communities who were the
main victims of these techniques, and by the advocacy of
progressive professionals in planning who chose to ally
with these social groups. The "rationalization" of the
monopoly city, made manifest in the practice of transporta-
tion planning was facing the consequences of its actions.
The state had to recognize the political dimension of pre-
viously "technical" approaches and change its approach.
Ralph Gakenheimer describes it this way:
The creation of the Open Study is an experience in the
modification of formally systematic -- 'Cold War' --
methodology by the demand' of a humanistic era. Exam-
ination of the transition to the Open Study is a
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structured case in the adjustment of American social
conscience to the institutionalized heritage of the
activist 1960's. (Gakenheimer, 1976, p. 1)
In the language of this bourgeois liberal, the "human-
ism" refers to a more political than the prior technical
approach. Rather than simply execute, the state gradually
sought to involve in the policymaking process social forces
previously marginal to it. The technical field of transpor-
tation planning had to mold its practice to new conditions
by instituting a participatory planning process, later
given the name of "Open Study".
In order to institute such a process, Governor Sargent
formed a decision-making task force composed of Alan Alt-
shuller, Secretary of Transportation and Construction, Lt.
Governor Donald Dwight, and Albert Kramer, the Governor's
advisor on transportation. This group advised the Governor,
who had the ultimate decision-making power.
Led by Altshuller, the structure of the study was
organized as as shown in Graphic No. 18. Several features
of this structure are significant. First, the secretary
of transportation, along with the Governor's Task Force,
had the formal decision-making power. Pro- and anti-highway
forces were grouped in the working committee and strictly
advisory powers. Then, the community liaison and techni-
cal staff, led by Alan Sloan, was chosen directly by
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Organization of the Boston Transportation Planning Review
(Sloan, 1974).
Altshuller as a separate consultant structure and put in
charge of managing the contradictions in the working com-
mittee. Participation in the BTPR was, as we mentioned, a
strategically important step in the Corridor process, and
deserves a deep study by itself. However, we can concen-
trate on three significant aspects of the study: the com-
position of the Task Force, the composition of the working
committee, and the ideas guiding the actions of the commun-
ity liaison staff, as summarized by Alan Sloan. (1974)
The Task Force was composed of high-level functionaries
of the state. Given who they are and the power in their
hands, this would put the level of participation somewhre
near the bottom of "Arnheim's Ladder". (Arnheim, 1969)
Since the anti-highway forces were politically sophisticated,
they would accept the arrangement only if they were convinced
they are at least could have an impact on the Task Force, a
possibility which was held open by the opinions of Albert
Kramer.
According to Gackenheimer, there were two basic posi-
tions on the task force: the "Kramer Position" and the
"Altshuller Position". Kramer "disregarded obstructive de-
tail in an effort to induce a strong commitment, to a qual-
itatively different future", while Altshuller perceived the
situation as "very complex" and understood feasibility as
"constrained by technical findings and administrative
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capacity and a belief that the role of the government is to
create compromise between worthy competitive interests."
(Gakenheimer, 1976, p. 144) Both these men were in fact
defending the interest of the state -- using a technocratic
or a visionary approach -- but Kramer was more willing to
dare a solution which would end the controversy, while Alt-
shuller saw it more as a process of painstaking negotiation.
Kramer could be convinced of a solution favorable to the
movement in some degree.
The working committee had little formal power. Some
viewed it as a mere useful adjunct of the real planning
process: it "expressed to the design process the limits of
tolerance for particular consequences of solution". (Gaken-
heimer, 1976, p. 181) Involved in it were municipalities
in the Greater Boston area affected by the study, pro- and
anti-highway groups, and important agencies which themselves
were organs of the state (DPW, MBTA, MAPC, MDC, DCA). The
anti-highway forces, which began as a popular movement, had
evolved into a very respectable coalition called the Greater
Boston Coalition on the Transportation Crisis, GBC, includ-
ing environmentalists, Citizens for Rail Transportation,
CRT, municipalities, as well as the original grassroots
groups. Even within GBC, the genuinely progressive forces
were beginning to be a minority. (Sloan, pp. 83-4) With-
in the working committeed, they were powerless, except for
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the fact that Sloan's staff though officially neutral, had
become the "in-house champion" of the no-road option. The
pro-highway forces were grouped around the MATCO, the Mass.
Association of Transportation Contractors.
Sloan's staff, also called SE-2 for Study Element 2,
skillfully maneuvered the process. They considered it im-
portant to show "good faith" to all parts, to convince
forces that it was in their interest to abide by the rules.
For this, he says, he held no secrets, gave access to infor-
mation, established a timetable and stuck by it, and con-
vinced participants that the final decisions would wait
until the outcome of the study. Having achieved this, he
began with large-scale meetings, identified the most "re-
sponsible" participants, and narrowed the scope of participa-
tion to smaller and more technical meetings as time went on.
By the time Phase II of the BTPR began to operate, the
study had more selective participation, the areas to be
studied had been boiled down to those around important cor-
ridors, highways were being reconsidered (the concept of
smaller urban "new style" highways was being studied),
public transportation was on the agenda, and a regional
transportation policy review was under way. (Sloan, 1974,
p. 96)
Sloan cites several reasons why he considers participa-
tion a "success". A major reason he considers to be the
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skill of the politicians, "whose job is to assess views of
the public and to determine how their assessment applied to
current public issues." (Sloan, 1974, p. 162) A second
reason he attributes to the "responsibility" and skill of
the anti-road forces, whom he perceives as initiated only
by professionals. And a third reason is that "there was
never any question of where the power lay." Eventually the
BTPR accepted the proposals for the Corridor Project almost
entirely as presented by GBC and by the SWC Land Development
Coaltion. It was a dramatic maneuver by the state which
appropriated the program of the movement for itself, incor-
porated it into a structure devised by the state to execute
the project, legitimated the movement (previously projected
publicly as "professional protesters") and generally trans-
formed the political and technical grounds of the contro-
versy.
Given that the movement won their demands, it would
appear totally successful. The future, however, would add
ingredients that would force us to reevaluate the situation.
The Boston Transportation Planning Review played a
crucial role in funneling the technical and political activ-
~ity of the opponents of the highway into a state-sanctioned-
and-controlled process. Prior to the BTPR, the pro-highway
forces and counter-highway forces maneuvered politically
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and technically for their positions. There were contradic-
tions among different participants in the movement against
the highway -- black vs. white, "professionals" vs. "commun-
ity people", hardliners vs. negotiators, but the intiative
was clearly in the hands of the movement. There was a
cost, of course. A planning report may take an enormous
amount of energy for coalition and with low resources, and
could become a mere salvo in the struggle, having little
hope of being implemented. Demonstrations and lobbying may
have no practical results an leave participants demoralized.
As Turner (see Note 9) describes their mood, "Back in 1969
not very many people were talking about the ability of com-
munities to defeat highways. That is, there was an active
struggle going on around the nation, but the whole idea of
communities defeating highways wasn't one that was very
popular or seen as very possible." By declaring the
moratorium and instituting the BTPR, Governor Sargent moved
the movement from one of an opposition movement to one where
divergent forces could have "input" into a decision as to
whether or not the roads would be built. The Coalition
believed it had enough technical and political strength to
particpate somewhat successfully.
In 1972, the Boston Transportation Planning Review
issued its report which included a no-build highway option
that included Rapid Transit in the Southwest Corridor. In
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Expressways in the Moratorium and Restudy Corridors. (Sloan, 1974).
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Expressway Proposals Carried into Phase II of Restudy. (Sloan, 1974).
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Transit Improvements Included in the Restudy. (Sloan, 1974.)
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Highway Proposals Resulting from the Restudy. (Sloan, 1974).
addition, this option adopted most of the recommendations
proposed by the Coalition for the Corridor. When Sargent
decided to implement the project, he knew he had to contend
with the political force represented by the Coalition and
the movement which gave birth to it. It, therefore, moved
carefully, in formalized ways to include both professionals
and community activists who opposed the road in the struc-
tures to implement the project. At all levels in the
structure anti-highway activists found *a place in the imple-
mentation. It cannot be denied that there was an element of
cooptation in this effort or that many activists who began
to work on the project did not have reservations about
doing so. By 1973, an officially constituted Project Work-
ing Committee had signed a memorandum of agreement with the
state to build the project, having bargained serious con-
cessions from the state in the process, including a very
strong Community Participation Commitment.
We have described at some length how the participatory
process up to and through the EIS had been the driving
force behind the decision of the state to modify its plans.
Evidence indicates that the roads were stopped by political
action, that the plans of the monopoly state had failed for
political reasons. In light of subsequent developments in
transportation policy, such as the energy crisis, and in
light of some of the technical findings of the BTPR, it
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also seems valid to think that the state modified its plans
for technical and economic reasons. The Interstate Network
had been planned at a time of almost unrivaled expansion do-
mestically and internationally; oil supplies were considered
endless. A more modest transportation network for the U.S.,
depending on a mixed system, including transit and rails,
appears in retrospect as the more "rational alternative for
the Monopoly City. Thus, the BTPR did not reach its con-
clusion only on political grounds, but also technical.
This argument leads to the troubling possibility that
maybe the Southwest Corridor was not only a political
victory for a popular movement, but that the monopoly state
wanted it for its own economic reasons. It is a fact that
the "New Boston" which has been planned -- gentrified, with
a transformed economic base, etc. -- also benefits from a
good transit network. In order to answer this question,
we would need to analyze the recommendations of the BTPR
in great detail from the point of view of transportation
planning, which is certainly outside the scope of this
study. It's fair to say, though, that Sargent took all
things into consideration, did a crude cost/benefit analy-
sis, and decided against the urban roads. And there can
be no doubt that an important part of that analysis was
the high political cost of building them.
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THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT PROCESS
The Lord said to Moses "All right, all right, you'll
get what you want, but I have some good news and some
bad news. You can take your people across the Red Sea
-- I'll open up the waters for you -- and if the Pharo
tries to follow, I'll let the waters close in on them."
"What's the bad news?" asked Moses. "You've got to
prepare an Environmental Impact Statement."
- Lester Thurow
The Environmental Impact Process was a step further in
the direction of project implementation. It was also a
step further in the institutionalization of participation.
According to federal regulations, any major development
which could affect the environment had to g through a pro-
cess of environmental impact assessment aimed at pin-point-
ing and minimizing potentially negative impacts. Though
the original purpose of this regulation was aimed at pro-
tecting the ecology and the natural environment, it soon
became applicable to the urban impacts of projects like the
Southwest Corridor. Moreover, regulations mandated a par-
ticipatory process. Since the Southwest Corridor communi-
ties were well organized, they demanded and achieved a
significant impact in the EIA process.
In the first place, each of the Corridors involved in
BTPR was to have its own Environmental Impact process,
thereby dissolving the regional coalition which had success-
fully acted up to this point. Within the Southwest Corridor,
the SWC Land Development Coalition remained effective, but
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it was no longer part of the powerful force it had once
been. The state had set one more parameter of participa-
tion, and it was accepted.
The scale of decisions was considerably narrower, more
detailed, and more technical. The no-road option was won,
as well as rapid transit. Decisions had to be made on the
alignment and profile of the rails, the treatment of noise
abatement, location of stations, parkland, industry, housing,
and of an "arterial street" in Jamaica Plain which was seen
as a remnant of the highway and continued to stir controversy.
The priorities on the issues to be considered were set, giv-
en the physical bias of the Environmental Impact process it-
self. Noise abatement, for example, became a priority, while
organizing around development issues, with greater potential
political impact, was moved to other arenas, such as the
State House, to press for its demands.
.Again, the liberal forces were able to win considerable
victories. An agreement that the rail/transit would be de-
pressed rather than on the embankment was the first of
these victories. An agreement was negotiated for an unpre-
cedented high percentage of minority jobs in construction
and for a share of contracts going to minroity contractors.
Industrial development in a Crosstown Industrial Park was
negotiated, with considerable state-sponsored subsidies and
incentives to large corporations for locating in the area.
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Station locations favorable to local neighborhood groups
were established. There was an understanding between the
state, community groups, and the SWCLD Coalition, that
housing would be built to replace some of the units de-
molished for 1-95. Negotiating separately, a Roxbury group
won considerable substitution of the housing through the
Lower Roxbury Community Development Corporation. However,
groups began scrambling to get a "piece of the action" both
in this project and other federal funds and the strength of
the low-income housing forces was diluted. In Jamaica
Plain, racist forces grouped around State Representative
James Craven continued to argue for the arterial street on
the grounds that they didn't want the land used for low-
income housing which would "depress property values", by
and large, they succeeded in preventing housing construc-
tion, although they lost, the road. Considerable funds
were allocated to build decks in areas adjacent to residen-
tial districts. We will return to this issue when concen-
trating on the South End Deck.
Participation was again funnelled into small meetings
as well as to large scale hearings where proposals could be
made. Again, participation was given an "advisory" capa-
city, with community groups limited to "input". In all
fairness, however, the "input" was often accepted in the
recommendations of the study.
123
MONNI 11 11 MR
Another critical aspect of participation occurred dur-
ing the EIA phase which bears noting: the selection of
consultants in 1976. (WFEM, 1980) The relationship between
professionals and the movement which had led the struggle
was, as mentioned earlier, a critical and complex subject.
Planners and architects had been on the forefront not only
of the technical aspects of the struggle but in the politi-
cal leadership as well. As the controversy became more in-
stitutionalized, the language of discourse became more and
more technical. The professionals in the anti-highway move-
ment -- including transportation planners, architects, en-
vironmental planners, urban designers, lawyers -- in fact
generated through the BTPR working committees the proposals
which the EIA process was reviewing, and in many cases re-
commending. The community groups exercised a de facto veto
in the selection of consultants, and they insisted that pro-
fessionals acceptable to their cause be hired. The Gov-
ernor's office was occupied then by Michael Dukakis, who was
very sympathetic to the liberal forces in the anti-highway
movement and this gave the groups considerable clout in
the selection.
The result was the hiring of firms who had done work
for the SWCLD coalition (Stull Associates Inc., for example)
or people with a history of involvement and commitment to
the communities in question. This had the result of inte-
grating many professionals who had fought the road into the
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si-Ate-contracted consultant structure for designing the
project, these people would become indirect employees of
the government, with the added dimension of being direct
employees of private firms. At the same time, it put people
with genuine progressive background in the position to in-
fluence the results of state policy towards the Corridor.
Again, the trade-off between the benefits of independence
and influence were at stake.
Because the EIA procedures had begun nationally as an
ecologically oriented process, and only gradually -- through
lawsuits and regulations -- was becoming sensitive to more
urban issues, several critical potential impacts of the
Corridor were not examined. In particular, the effects on
the real estate market on the housing supply for working
class and minority communities was not part of the agenda.
The EIA mandated minimum demolition, but did not analyze
the impact of the project through market forces. Since it
has become evident that this is potentially the most perni-
cious result of the Corridor, it is important to pause
and evluate this problem.
Perhaps, by accepting the parameters of planning and
participation, the communities had lost strength which they
could have used to demand protection from the market. At
that time, the city of Boston had rent control but would
lose it within a year. Perhaps the issue of displacement
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had not become critical enough. We have to remember that
in 1973-75, the housing market in Roxbury and Jamaica Plain
was a depressed market; a good number of units were being
lost to disinvestment, arson and vandalism. In J.P. there
was organizing against banking practices of redlining,
where banks stop giving home improvement loans and mortgages
in the area. At that time, there was considerable pressure
for more investment, although some leftist community groups
were already warning the potential negative effects it
could have. This problem deserves considerable further
scrutiny which is outside the scope of this paper.
During the EIA, the Southwest Corridor Land Develop-
ment Coalition continued to be a fairly impressive force.
As the technical cadre of the movement were hired to work
on the project, the coalition began to lose strength. This
would influence the organization and structure of the Design
and Enginering Phase which would follow. The Environmental
Impact Analysis hearings were held in 1976, a Draft Environ-
mental Impact Statement was released in 1977, and the final
statement was published in 1978, a year after the Design
and Engineering phase was already in progress.
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III.
THE DESIGN AND ENGINEERING PHASE
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After the draft Environmental Impact Analysis was com-
pleted and public hearings held in 1976, the SWC project
office, arranged to formalize further the process of parti-
cipation. Local, state and federal officials signed a
"Memorandum of Agreement" which mandated that "10% of the
planning and 5% of the basic design contracts let for the
Southwest Corridor be designated for community participation
and technical assistance as consistent with guidelines
approved by the Joint Regional Transportation Committees."
(Final Environmental Impact Statement, Appendix, in WFEM,
1980) By May 1977, the agreement was put into practice
with the beginning of the design and engineering phase.
Several important pieces were in place. The consultants
had been selected; particularly in the participation compon-
ent, a number of former corridor activists from the anti-
highway movement had been selected to important positions.
The project manager was Anthony Pangaro, an architect. As-
sistant Project Manager was Ken Kruckemeyer, another archi-
tect and South End resident who became active in 1969 when
the BRA was planning the South End Bypass -- a part of the
Inner Belt system -- which was to run by the end of his
street. He had been part of the citizen review process of
the BTPR and the EIA, had been a founder of the South End
Committee on Transportation which had had proposed "a trans-
it and traffic proposal for the South End" in the fall of
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1972. (WFEM, 1980, p. 18) Within the structure of community
participation, the involvement of activists as certified
technicians was even greater.
As the contracts for design and engineering were activ-
ated, some construction which had been planned before the
moritorium and some necessary preliminary construction be-
gan simultaneously. The South Cove Tunnel, which would
link the Corridor to the existing Orange Line Tunnel burrow-
ing under the Mass Turnpike, was begun; the station at
South Cove, which had stood unfinished and unused for almost
10 years, was linked to the tunnel. A few- months later,
construction began on the upgrading of the Midlands branch
railroad. Since the Corridor would run along the existing
embankment for suburban and intercity trains, a temporary
route for these trains would be necessary during construc-
tion so that an early "rehab" of the rails, unused for sev-
eral-years, had to be done early. There was some community
discussion about this project in the Dorchester neighborhood,
but this controversy ws managed by the Orange Line Replace-
ment Study. Technically not a part of the Corridor Project,
it was intricately related to it.
Before May 1977, participation had been directed by
the MBTA Southwest Corridor Project office, through the
process. Tony Pangaro had been personally very visible in
this period, attending almost every meeting and devising
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strategies which would later impact, or serve as a prece-
dent for the structure of participation. For example, the
EIA process legally required public hearings, which were
project-wide. In addition to these, however, neighborhood-
based meetings were held and the groups formed at these
hearings were called Neighborhood Committees. (WFEM, 1980,
p. 3) In May, Wallace Floyd, Ellenzweig, Moore, Inc.,
hired to organize and direct participation in this phase,
swinging into action. Jaci Hall, who combined technical
expertise with a history of activism in Boston's Black com-
munity and a knowledge of the neighborhoods of the Corri-
dor, was named project manager and was put in charge of
structuring the process.
PROJECT STRUCTURE
The structure designed for participation was parallel
to the structure chosen for the more technical tasks of
engineering and design. The MBTA Southwest Corridor office,
with authority derived from both the state government and
the MBTA, directed the project and had ultimate responsi-
bility for decisions. As in the EIA and BTPR processes,
"there was never any question" of where the authority lay,
since Pangaro was very skilled at making it clear in the
same steps he granted "reasonable" requests. Under the
Project Manger working for the MBTA as consultant was the
130
"1064,01. ONO" ON W00 -0061 b 0 AN io -- ----
joint venture of Kaiser Engineers and Fay Spofford and
Thorndike. Kaiser was a subsidiary of the well-known
multinational conglomerate of that name which had consider-
able clout in the state government and a history of lobbying
for large construction projects. They would coordinate all
aspects of project design including participation. (See
Graphic No. 23)
Under them was a set of consultants in charge of
coordinating corridor-wide engineering and design. Called
Coordinating Consultants, they had corridor-wide responsi-
bilities. Together they formed the Urban Design Group.
WFEM coordinated planning and community participation (part-
ner David Wallace had worked in the BTPR). Stull Associ-
ates coordinated Urban Design, Roy Mann Associates coordin-
ated landscape design, and Charles Hilgenhurst Associates
coordinated land development.
The Corridor itself was divided into three sections,
each headed by a large engineering firm as section engineer.
The Sections corresponded fairly well to three distinct
neighborhoods in the area: Section I for the South End,
Section II for Roxbury and Section III for Jamaica Plain.
Under each of these section engineers was still another
group of consultants, some responsible for section-wide
work, and others responsible for station-specific design.
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Relationship Between the Consultant Structure and Structure of Participatory Committees.
(WFEM, 1980)
For example, there is a landscape architect for each section,
and perhaps two or three other landscape architects, one
for each station in the section, working under the direction
of the station architect but following the coordinative
plans of the section landscape architect.
Several features of this structure need to be noted be-
fore concentrating on the structure of participation. It
is a pyramidal structure formalized by contracts and sub-
contracts, so that ultimately, the authority rests with the
project manager. At the same time, it granted relative
autonomy to the design and engineering effort at the neigh-
borhood level. Since the problems, both technical and poli-
tical, in each neighborhood were different, the theory was
that the section engineers could be responsive to the needs
of "its" area. It represents a relatively decentralized
model of organization. There is a question, however, of
who benefitted the most from this decentralized model. De-
centralization is supposed to "restore government ot the
people", and although the project is certainly not a govern-
mental structure, the implication is that this structure is
more responsive to the concerns of the neighborhood. It is
also true that the structure can just as easily be described
by the term "deconcentration", which makes the bureaucracy
more efficient by allowing the penetration of the periphery
by the center. We can safely say that this structure
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allowed the MBTA project office a good way to be in close
touch with developments at a very small scale in the project
reacting to them. Since the staff of the central office
was liberal, they generally used this control in granting
concessions, although at times it was used to keep the
situation from "getting out of hand". The structure also
prevented the consultant firms, which were generally skilled
but very uneven in their commitment to the neighborhoods,
from getting enough power to challenge the central office.
This structure also allowed for "dishing out a piece
of the pie" to as many as 40 consultant firms, which was
politically desirable with a sector traditionally allied to
highway construction. A side effect of this was that small
firms could get significant subcontracts and thus make it
easier to enforce affirmative action regarding minority
firms. Every station, for example, was designed by a min-
ority firm or by a joint venture, one firm of which was
minority controlled. These were part of the reforms wrested
by the anti-highway movement from the state and were, to an
unprecedented degree, fulfilled. Of course, given the tech-
nical level of the leadership of the movement, it also inte-
grated those most capable in the struggle into the structure
of the project itself.
Urbanistically, the structure reflects a healthy con-
cern with analyzing the city from both a "macro" and "micro"
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perspective. Regional economic, engineering, political,
and physical issues were. generally managed by the coordin-
ating consultants or by the central staff, more local issues
at a corresponding level in the consultant structure.
STRUCTURE OF PARTICIPATION
Participation was organized and structured in a similar
way. On the one hand were the consultants and planners
responsible for participation and on the other was the
committee structure for participants; each of these two sub-
structures paralleled the larger organization of the project.
(See Graphic No. 23)
WFEM was, as we said, the coordinating consultant for
participation and it organized a central planning staff in-
cluding planners, architects, an editor/graphic designer.
While the organization of this staff varied depending on
the demands of the project, in the early period there was
one planner responsible for overseeing the work in each sec-
tion. The central planning staff coordinated the work,
first structuring the entire process, then organizing sched-
ules for presentations, preparing feedback to the designers
and engineers on the wishes of the community, preparing
and analyzing technical alternatives for community discus-
sions, producing information relevant rather to corridor-
wide issues, or to issues which became the subject of
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controversy at the neighborhood level. As Tom Nally of
the Central Planning Staff has written, "the responsibili-
ties of WFEM's Central Planning Staff include preparing
corridor-wide information, providing back-up support of
graphic and written material for the Section Planners,
conducting special studies on issues such as zoning and
attending the numerous consultant and community meetings to
coordinate liaison activities.... The WFEM Central Planners
provide guidance on participation practices and promote con-
sistency of process among the Sections." (WFEM, 1980, p. 6)
The composition of the Central Planning Staff was also sig-
nificant. Besides Jaci Hall, the staff was unusual in that
it was mostly black and Latino and its white members had a
liberal orientation and tended to side with the progressive
forces in the community meetings when controversies cropped
up. Its official position was one of neutrality, which was
occasionally challenged by conservative forces in the commun-
ities, but generally its "professionalism" was unreproach-
able, since it was highly credentialed and did not openly
take sides. Rather, its opinions affected some of the
programming and design issues in an indirect way, as we
shall see further on.
Each of the three section engineers employed a "Section
Planner" selected jointly by the Central Planning Staff and
the section engineer, with the veto power of the project
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manager. The Section Planners were often called the "front-
line" of the participation effort and it is therefore worth
taking a closer look at them. In general, their official
role was to "co-moderate community meetings; keep the commun-
ity informed with mailings of project updates, meeting
announcements and of minutes; and meet informally with resi-
dents and business people and community groups to discuss
the Project." (WFEM, 1980, p. 6)
The planner for Section I was Janet Hunkel a resident
of the South End/St. Botolph neighborhood. St. Botolph ,is
the major street in a residentail area of about 12 square
blocks divided from the South End by the Penn Central
tracks, where the Corridor will run. Twenty-five years ago
it was considered by all to be part of the South End,
although some institutions in the area like Symphony Hall
have always been part of the Back Bay. Property values have
traditionally been three times higher than in the South
End. However, it became one of the sections of the South
End to first undergo "gentrification", or displacement of
working class and minority peole by young professional new-
comers to the community, until today it is a mostly white,
middle class section literally on the other side of the
tracks from the South End. Recently, the active grassroots
leadership of that new community has insisted on distin-
guishing itself rom the "other neighborhood", calling itself
the "St. Botolph" neighborhood.
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Ms. Hunkel was part of that wave of newcomers. She
became involved in the Corridor controversy in 1975 when
the pre-EIS hearings raised the issue of noise in the
residential areas adjacent to the tracks. A group of St.
Botolph homeowners began to meet in order to get the pro-
cess to recommend a proper accoustic cover for the tracks
in Section I. They joined with residents of the other
side of the tracks in founding the South End/St. Botolph
Task Force on Noise in order to concentrate on this issue.
Her experience in this effort convinced her to become a
graduate student in Urban Planning, and in the summer of
1977 she was hired as the Section Planner. (Hunkel, Note
10, and WFEM, 1980, p. 19)
The Section Planner for Section II, Dee Primm, was
also a homeowner in a neighborhood adjacent to the Corridor
-- Highland Park in Roxbury. A life-long resident of the
community, she had been an activist in civil rights strug-
gles, participating in the reforms won by this movement as
a worker in the Roxbury Multi-Service Center. She became
active in the fight against the highway and became a com-
munity organizer for the Southwest Corridor Coalition. In
that capacity she had been instrumental in negotiations
between the community and the state which arrived at mutu-
ally satisfactory design solutions. In 1977 she became a
Section Planner for Section II..
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In Section III, the selection of the section planners
became more controversial and produced still another profile
for the planners. There was dispute between rightwing
forces led by Representative Craven and progressive forces
led by SWCC over the selection of the Section Planner. The
compromise resulted in the hiring of Don Grinberg, a graduate
of Harvard's School of Design with high credentials but no
prior involvement in either the Corridor or community
issues; because of the political conflict, the Project Man-
ager probably decided he wanted an arbitrator rather than
an advocate, someone with technical credentials and no
attachment or roots in the community. As a "complement", a
second section planner was hired: Regla Coleman, a Cuban
with a history of activism in the right-wing Abdala Cuban
Movement and of work in social service agencies in the com-
munity.
The selection process produced significantly different
results in each of the three sections, reflecting on the
political process of the Corridor. In Section I, the
planner chosen was a community activist, but one with roots
in the middle class newcomers rather than the more working
class oldtimers. While she had fought to get reforms from
the project, the "accoustic deck" issue which propelled her
into action was one attracting the attention of an additional
group, different in 'attitude from those who had fought
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against urban renewal and the roads. By the time the design
and engineering phase of the project had gone into operation,
the institutionalization of the project had effectively re-
placed an independent movement "outside" the state-sponsored
project. The nature of the agenda was dictated by the
needs for implementation, an issue which we shall discuss
further on.
In Roxbury, where the movement was strongest, although
reformist and middle class, the Corridor Project in fact
absorbed into its fold a significant organizer. SWCC,
based in this neighborhood, continued to exist, but Dee
Primm was considered by some as a defector (unfortunately,
and self-critically, a similar thing can be said for activ-
ists working in the central planning staff), as "working for
the man". She did continue to work as an advocate, but in
the process weakened the movement which made advocates ef-
fective. "Ms. Primm thinks that the New Orange Line will
provide the major infrastructure that is required to stim-
ulate the redevelopment of Roxbury. In the Crosstown Street
portion of the Corridor, the major development that is
desired has occurred. Along the Corridor itself, the eight
stations and local service orientation which the community
wanted has been accomplished. The one area in which the
success of the project can not yet be gauged is job develop-
ment." (WFEM, 1980, p. 1.8) She worked for specific reforms,
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gave little thought to the shape of the movement as such
and also was part of the process of institutionalization.
From within, she continued to be an effective advocate.
In Jamaica Plain, the progressive wing of the anti-
highway movement was very strong, but did not have hegemony
as liberals did in Roxbury. The right, concerned with pro-
perty values and patronage in construction contracts, not
wanting any low-income housing in the community, was able
to influence in the selection of Grimberg and Coleman,
effectively neutralizing any advocacy for the remnants of
the progressive movement since support at the level of the
section planners was not forthcoming. Within the Central
Planning Staff these groups had friends, but in the day-to-
day bargaining and negotiation with the consultants the
section planners had a lot of influence and in Section III
they were generally not willing to be advocates for it.
The institutionalization process here had left the movement,
represented by SWCC and independent community organizations
such as the JPCDC and City Life, pretty much out in the
cold. In all three sections, the professionalization of
organizers, which in fact the Section Planners represented,
served to coopt the movement further into the structure of
the Project. This despite the varied background of the
planners, arid their relatively strong links to the community.
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WFEM has grouped the skills needed by the planners into
two categories: "product skills" and "process skills".
Product skills include the ability to produce reports,
maps, diagrams, handouts, memos which describe complex
interrelated concepts verbally and graphically. These ma-
terials are prepared not only for the community but also
for the consultants. They can be acquired principally
through formal education. "Process" skills are less tang-
ible, they are technical in the sense that they require
planners to "analyze and interpret and understand the plan-
ning and design process" and to function as a link between
technical consultants and participants. But "process" skills
also refer to the more political skills of maneuvering in
a complex organizational structure usually with the primary
goal of conflict resolution and consensus building. None-
theless, the very real task of translating some of the
popular desire into technical results was a significant
accomplishment, despite any political shortcomings. (WFEM,
1980)
Some section planners, like Grinberg, had great techical
expertise (product skills) but no political experience.
Coleman, on the other hand, had a lot of street political
skills, which she put to work against the popular movement,
and almost no product skills. Hunkel had both. Dee Primm,
with low "certification" among the Section Planners, was
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most integrated into her community and had significant
"process" skills, few "product" skills. The Central Planning
Staff would complement this unevenness by providing techni-
cal assistance and sometimes by playing a more active role
as mediators; but there were weaknesses. Primm's lack of
technical skill and credentials weakened somewhat her stand-
ing inside consultant structure, thus, her advocacy role,
but she made up for it with political skill.
COMMITTEE STRUCTURE
The structure of committees where the community gathered
to participate in the project was similar. Formally, there
was a Corridor-wide project working committee, a Neighborhood
Committee for each section and a Station Area Task Force
(SATF) for each station. This structure arose both from
the history of prior participation, from the structure of
consultants in the design and engineering phase and from
the realities of the areas. (See Graphic No. 24)
The project working committee was really a remnant of
BTPR and EIA days. In those processes, the state had nego-
tiated with a coalition movement and had reached an agreement
both regarding specific demands and a participatory process
for design.- By the time the design process began the bonds
trying together a regional coalition had vanished, and even
a Corridor-wide coalition had lost its reason for existing.
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The varieties of participatory committees are shown as they
evolved throughout the Design and Engineering Phase.(WFEM, 1980).
In fact, the Corridor-wide working committee existed in name
only and, as far as I have been able to determine, never
met during this period.
The Neighborhood Committees were very active, on the
other hand. They received Corridor-wide and neighborhood-
wide issues such as budgeting, the design of elements consis-
tent throughout the project, such as station platforms, stan-
dards for station components, engineering issues such as
alignments and profile of the tracks, etc. They met both
in Open Houses, where numerous issues could be discussed in-
formally with the consultants, and in Neighborhood Commmit-
tees where specific issues were debated and largely resolved.
Their meetings were moderated by the Section Planner, and at-
tended by members of teh Central Planning Staff and the pro-
ject manager's office. The Neighborhood Committees had in
fact functioned during the EIA review process and were in-
corporated into the design phase. They reflect Boston's
bias for neighborhood-level political action -- parochialism
-- and perhaps a conscious effort on the part of the project
manager to further downplay Corridor-wide unity. Issues
which could have created the basis for such a unity, such
as jobs for minorities and for Boston workers, were really
outside the reach of the Corridor Project Manager. (Machia-
velo was probably higher in the state government.) With
the Corridor-wide working committee a mere formality, there
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there was no longer a place within the state-sponsored
structure for the issues that had bound the coalition to
come together.
Each of the Neighborhood Committees was subdivided
into subcommittees called Station Area Task Forces (SATF's).
These were formed to discuss station-specific concerns.
The station areas were defined as the area within a 1/4
mile limit to each side of the track and halfway between
stations. (See Graphic No. 23) The SATF's were co-moderated
by the Section Planners and an elected representative -of
the group. They included residents, business people and
institutions which were either in the area or which had a
particular interest in the area due to its function. Their
powers, as those of the Neighborhood Committee, were strictly
advisory, since they had no authority to demand that the
project management follow a particular recommendation. They
generally reviewed issues such as station architecture,
landscape design, and land development which would take
place within the boundaries of the SATF. It is significant
that in almost every case the recommendations of the SATF
were accepted by the project office and consultants were in-
structed to implement them. This is a reflection of the
history of the project, where the project manager and others
in his staff had in fact emerged from the participatory pro-
cess. It also reflects the desire of the project manager
to maintain legitimacy by incorporating the recommendations
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of the project. Formally, a SATF unable to reach a decision
by consensus takes a vote, and the different sides are pre-
sented to the MBTA usually which makes the final decision,
although in some cases decisions are made by other agencies
or by elected officials. Furthermore, the balance of forces
was such that most recommendations were well within the
bounds of the project's parameters by the time they reached
consensus stage. The major exception to this issue was the
Forest Hills garage where State Representative James Craven
had managed to mobilize support for a demand to eliminate
the garage in that station. The project invoked the EIS
where this major decision had already been settled and
their recommendations were resisted. The group represented
the only segment of the pro-highway forces who remained
active during the decision phase at the level of community.
After an initial period in the spring and summer of
1977, when the neighborhood committees were the primary
vehicles for discussion, the SATF's became very active in
the fall of 1977. They met every few weeks in all sections
during the winter and spring of 1978; there were fewer meet-
ings in the summer of 1978, partly because residents wanted
fewer meetings, but primarily because the architects and
other consultants needed time to develop the issues discussed
at meetings into concrete plans for the project. In the
fall of 1978 the SATF,. Neighborhood Committee and other
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task force meetings resumed. (WFEM, 1980, p. 7) The SATF's
were the arenas where a number of significant issues were
debated. Station design, for example, was the subject of
considerable controversy in a few areas, as were land devel-
opment concerns. At this point, rather than going in-depth
into them or discussing specific examples, it is improtant
to note that these discussions took place in isolated small
task forces. For example, those residents of Jamaica Plain
who continued to raise the issue of the need for low income
housing parcels could no longer realistically ally themselves
with people from other neighborhoods, since their SATF's
were debating other issues at the time.
The structure was not limited to the Neighborhood Com-
mittees and SATF's. A number of issues arose in the course
of design which were handled by the creation of special
task forces set up to deal with specific issues. In Jamaica
Plain, for example, SWCC organizers had fought for a large
area of the Corridor to be covered by accoustic decks. The
EIS had recommended a deck at Minton Street, but residents
and clergy a few blocks north also wanted the tracks covered
in the area of Boylston Street; still another group wanted
decking at Green Street. A Joint Committee of the Boylston
Street and Green Street SATF's was named to design what
came to be called the Minton Street deck. SWCC had expected
that by fighting for a. deck at Minton Street they could
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push the manager's office to deck the entire area between
Boylston and Minton Streets, effectively doubling the area
decked. In effect, however, there were limited funds for
decking established in the EIA, and the area covered at
Minton Street was deducted from the area covered at Boylston
Street and two smaller decks resulted. The days when South
End residents had fought for -- and obtained -- a promise
to deck the tracks in the entire neighborhood, were in the
past (the EIA process).
In Section II, Roxbury, a special task force was set
up to coordinate efforts to plan for development of the
largest and potentially richest development parcel in the
Corridor -- Parcel 18. Roxbury had suffered the greatest
devastation during the highway demolition and residents of
that neighborhood had concentrated many of their organizing
efforts in fighting for state-sponsored community development
in the area. During the BTPR and EIS process community
groups had joined in proposing a Land Bank controlled by
the community to coordinate land resources in redeveloping
the area. Eventually, the unity was bruised by manipula-
tions of the state, which negotiated separate deals with
different community groups. (Honoroff, Note 11)
Some of the development was "assigned" to specific
groups who had been active in the Corridor process all
along. LRDC became the developer for housing in the Madison
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Park area. Boston CDC, led by Marvin Gilmore, became devel-
opers of the Crosstown Industrial Area. According to Krucke-
meyer, these development packages were "spun off" consciously
once the Corridor Project felt that their criteria for com-
munity control was established and the goals of participation
were guaranteed.
Some groups won considerable reforms, but a joint
effort to direct all development basically dissolved. Par-
cel 18, however, was critical to much of the surrounding
community and nearby institutions, partly because it would
be located adjacent to Ruggles Street station, which would
replace Dudley Street as the major transportation road in
Roxbury. WFEM and the Section II planners organized the
task force, which included Northeastern University, the
Roxbury Action Program, Greater Roxbury Development Corpor-
ation, the Community Development Corporation of Boston, the
Lower Roxbury Community Corporation, the Mission Hill Exten-
sion Task Force, and the Mission Hill Planning Council
(WFEM, 1980, p. 16) as well as individual developers who
had been active in the area, such as Dennis Blacket of
Housing Innovation. This is a more heterogeneous group
than that which had struggled earlier for a joint develop-
ment policy and included a white bourgeois institution like
Northeastern University. Activists in the black community
and in the Corridor Project felt that including Northeastern
150
in the process was a way to "keep an eye on them, preventing
them from continuing to buy property unchecked." The pro-
cess of design for the parcel, besides many technical issues
affecting design included mediation among these different
groups to arrive at some sort of consensus. It is signifi-
cant, for example, that the potential effects of this
development on displacement of tenants of two adjacent
public housing projects was not a priority, even though
that may be the most powerful factor affecting the racial
and class characteristics of the surrounding residentail
communities. The task force, working with the consultants,
has produced an important development proposal.
The potential effect of Parcel 18 development is enor-
mous. For the last 40 years the geographic center of the
black community, Boston's black turf, has been the Dudley
Street transit stop and bus terminal, which has generated a
commercial area around it. The traffic functions of this
stop will be transferred to the Ruggles Street station of
the Corridor, and the development around it on Parcel 18
has the potential of either replacing the Dudley area, or
displacing it. The black community, including black profes-
sionals, have been conscious of this and have been parti-
cipating in decisions. Whether the results will actually
benefit black workers, or only a few developers, time will
tell. Adjacent to Parcel 18 is the Mission Hill Extension
public housing development, in advanced stages of decay.
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The forces militating for the abandonment of public housing
are of course way beyond the Corridor Project, although
the project may contribute to it. In broader terms, if we
see the Corridor as part of the rationalization of the
monopoly city, which includes roads and urban renewal,
public housing is certainly part of the same problematic.
This raises the need to make more such connections in the
future.
Another special Task Force was a subcommittee of the
Back Bay SATF organized to review the design of accoustical
canopies adjacent to that station and the design of small
parks at the ends of the streets abutting the Corridor.
Still another special Task Force was in fact an incarnation
of the Section I Neighborhood Committee when it met to
debate the design of track cover in that neighborhood,
which will be discussed in detail further on. There was a
Corridor-wide committee set up as the Parkland Management
Advisory Committee, and there were advisory committees
formed to oversee the expenditure of funds for art mandated
by federal guidelines. There was some controversy around
the appointment of Sidney Rockefeller to lead the art
search, with some community-based artists feeling they
were left out of the process.
In all these meetings, SATF's neighborhood committees
and special task forces, the process was one where conflict
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resolution was usually successful. "The operation of hun-
dreds of community meetings held in the SWCP has followed a
fairly simple pattern, the most important items brought
before the community are the reports of designers on their
current work. Frequently several options are considered at
the meetings with the advantages and disadvantages for each
course of action presented and discussed. The consultants
and the MBTA formulate options before the meetings (at work
sessions and meeting dry runs), and often there is a pre-
ferred option which might be more compatible with the rest
of the design. The consensus seeking process often leads
to protracted discussions as meeting moderators attempt to
let every point of view receive a fair hearing. A repre-
sentative of the MBTA attends all community meetings and is
often able to indicate which suggestions are acceptable and
which are not, thus eliminating needless speculation. [Em-
phasis mine.] Generally, after a lengthy debate, the parti-
cipants are able to decide which options to recommend to
the MBTA." (WFEM, 1980, p. 9) As we said before, the MBTA
usually invoked the EIS to rule out some "ill-conceived pro-
posals", but often this was done for other reasons, such as
costs constraints, engineering necessities, etc.
It is significant that the option of multiple arenas
of struggle in order to pursue a goal was now virtually
ruled out. The project 'was underway, and the calendar by
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which issues could be raised as well as the agenda of the
meetings was determined by the logic of design and engineer-
ing, not by political concerns. Even those groups and in-
dividuals who were inclined to keep pressing for further
gains from the state were busy confronting design issues as
they came up. The "proper channels" had been widened, made
effective and relatively responsive, leaving other channels
as largely irrelevant for the purposes of the project.
WHO PARTICIPATED, WHEN AND HOW?
The composition of participants was largely determined
by the history and development of the process and by the
issues which were the subject of discussion at specific
periods and in particular places.
Throughout the struggle against 1-95, and even through-
out the BTPR and EIS stages, the state had confonted a com-
plex popular movement making a relatively coherent and uni-
fied set of demands. As the design and engineering phase
began, the people who participated most avidly in the
committees and task forces were basically the same people
who had been most active in this movement, as well as those
few who had opposed it.
The professionals who were in a leadership position in
the anti-highway struggle had either moved on to other
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issues since they considered the f ight "won", or they had
been integrated into the consultant structure of the SWCP, in
many cases to ensure there would not be a relapse to the
highway. This was especially important when Ed King, a
long-time highway proponent, was elected governor on a
"build 1-95" platform. Other professionals who had been
active, though not in a leadership role, basically continued
to participate at their neighborhood and SATF meetings,
becoming most vocal when issues of particular concern to
them were raised. Thus, for example, those who had parti-
cipated in the South End Committee on Transportation con-
tinued to attend those meetings where transportation policy
was at stake; those who had become active fighting for an
accoustic deck in Section I continued to participate when
this issue was brought up.
Minority group and working class activists had generally
become involved in the coalition by tying together a variety
of smaller issues which affected them very directly. What
participation in this stage did was to make the procedure
for addressing these issues again distinct from one another
by both location and topic. Thus, the people whose homes
had been razed in Roxbury attended neighborhood committee
and SATF meetings which had some bearing in housing develop-
ment in the area. By and large, negotiations leading to
housing in the area of Ruggles Street, for example, were
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carried out outside the Corridor structure of participation,
although the Corridor structure set them up to achieve
their goal and gave support. Rather they were done directly
with state agencies concerned with housing, such as the BRA
and MHFA, so that while people from these groups continued
to attend, they did not see the corridor meetings as a
forum to which they urgently needed to mobilize. Those in
Jamaica Plain who were concerned with housing, such as the
community organization City Life, also attended but realized
that the corridor structure did not lend itself well as a
forum to wage this fight. Those opposed to low income hous-
ing in Jamaica Plain such as Ruth Parker, also continued to
attend in order to make sure that the Corridor did not
become the vehicle for such a fight.
The majority of people attending the meetings were
local residents, with a high representation of homeowners
and longtime residents. It is a commonly-held belief that
this group feels a "higher stake" in what happens in a
neighborhood and therefore tend to be more active. I sug-
gest the alternative explanation that this group tends to
be more integrated into the local political structure,
tends to be white and therefore have felt less rejection
from participation in "civic" activities and generally tend
to be petty bourgeois and have a history of such participa-
tion anyway.
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A number of local residents who don't fit the descrip-
tion above also participated more sporadically. Usually an
issue would be discussed at a meeting which prompted someone
to mobilize. For example, the discussion of the Minton
Street deck affected a nearby Catholic church, and the
priest mobilized parrishioners to the meetings.
Newcomers to the neighborhoods of the Corridor --
usually young professionals -- also attended the meetings,
although in smaller numbers. Generally, this group was
looking for a way to find out what's going on in a neigh-
borhood and to become involved in some local activities.
Representatives of business generally did not attend
meetings except for specific purposes. Executives from the
insurance companies near Back Bay station attended the
SATF's there in order to insure architectural solutions
favorable to their property and employees. Owners of com-
mercial property near Forest Hills station allied with
State Representative Craven attended the meetings there,
in order to ensure they could control competition from new
commercial development within the station.
Land developers and speculators with property near
the Corridor also attended SATF meetings in order to pro-
mote their interests. Personnel from city agencies were
occasionally asked by t.he MBTA project office to make
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presentations of relevant topics (utilities, for example).
(WFEM, 1980, p. 12)
As the subject of the meetings changed with time, the
composition of those attending meetings also changed. When
development was an issue, for example, developers, home-
owners, and community development corporations became very
active. When the issues were parkland and station design,
the crowd tended to be more heavily made up of civic asso-
ciation-type people. When there was an important contro-
versy both sides of the issue tended to mobilize people to
the meetings. Again, such mobilizations tended to be for
very specific purposes and for the time the controversy
was alive. Afterwards, attendance tended to drop off.
PARTICIPATION AND TECHNICAL
ISSUES
The technical nature of the project may be expected to
limit participation from less educated or less technically
oriented people. The Central Planning Staff foresaw this
possibility and spent considerable effort devising means
for translating technical information into lay language so
that it would be within the reach of such people in the
neighborhoods.
Perhaps most original were a set of documents called
the SATF notebooks. Meant to demystify technical jargon
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and give participants an edge in communicating with consul-
tants, the notebooks "begin with an explanation of the
station design process and the kinds of drawings prepared
at each step. Materials on landscape and urban design
follow to provide background for site specific information
on the stations. Reference material about who's who on the
project and a list of abbreviations follow. An extensive,
illustrated glossary concludes the notebook." (WFEM, 1980,
p. 14) The feeling, however, is that the notebooks were
"overwhelming" in their scope, were used sparingly and
generally did not raise that much the technical capacity of
those attending the meetings. It has been my experience,
however, with a few activists who participated in the
process, that at least a number of individuals benefitted
from the notebooks. They feel that "next time they won't
confuse me so much with all that mumbo jumbo."
Another major effort by the Central Planning Staff in
breaking through the technical barrier was the Corridor
News, an. eight to twelve page newsletter published every
two months. Editions of up to 16,000 copies are printed
and distributed throughout the Corridor. A mailing list
consisting of everyone who has ever attended a meeting and.
a large number of community activists was used with every
issue -- up to 4,500 people. The content of the newsletter
varied considerably with.the subject being discussed at the
meetings. For example, when the design of the stations was
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approaching a milestone community review, the newsletter
would include an article on each station with accompanying
graphics. When more technical issues were under consid-
eration -- from subsoil conditions, to ventilation of the
covered tracks, to noise and vibration studies, the news-
letter included articles trying to describe the technical
issues as directly and clearly as possible. It is felt
that the newsletter was successful in this task and raised
the technical capacity of thousands of participants, allow-
ing them to engage in discourse usually outside the reach
of a lot of people.
The newsletter, however, tended to shy away from con-
troversial issues. When it was begun, the project manager
rejected a community editorial board and instead allowed
only a small review committee. Eventually, even this re-
view committee was dissolved and the Project Manager per-
sonally censored each issue at three stages -- selection of
articles to be included, the text of each article written
and a final proofreading of the mechanicals just before
going to press. This process was used to prevent "inflama-
tory" subjects such as the potential of the project to
accelerate displacement as well as preventing the explicit
treatment of controversial subjects -- the racist implica-
tions of some design alternatives, such as attempts to re-
inforce the separation of St. Botolph from the rest of the
South End. That is not to say the project had racist goals,
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but that they did not want the issue to explode. The
limits of progressive professionals working within the
parameters of the project become explicit in this example.
The project manager had a very clear interest in conflict
resolution, and in maintaining all debate within acceptable
bounds, and he saw issues such as explicit anti-racist or-
ganizing as inflamatory. That became more important to him
than his liberal views. The newsletter editor asked that
his title be changed to that of newsletter coordinator.
Other techniques used to try to demystify technical
jargon were a series of hand-outs -- ranging in size from a
single leaflet to a multipage discussion of the construction
process. They were helpful in disseminating information
and making complex subjects accessible. Finally, the usual
architect's tools of models, slides and wall graphics were
not only encouraged but actually mandated for community
meetings. The overall effect of these techniques was com-
plex. They did, by and large, facilitate participation by
less-skilled people, but they were also used to "boost" the
project, to provide it with a positive image, and to "sell"
specific solutions to some problems. As time went by and
the movement outside of the institutional structure weakened,
the techniques became more and more the voice of the Project
Manager. Those working within struggled to get issues re-
solved in a way favorable to the communities involved, and
were successful in many instances, but the conditions which
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made this possible tended to fade. Piven's (1971) warning
about shifting the struggle to a technical arena seems to
be partially validated by the experience of the design and
engineering phase.
The problem is complex, however, since at this stage
the task was one of implementation. Those who were part of
the project structure saw themselves as making sure that a
hardwon reform was carried out. In the words of Assistant
Project Manager Ken Kruckemeyer, "When it gets this far,
the struggle is likely to be already won or lost. The re-
sponsibility is to make sure it stays that way. From this
point of view, dissention becomes a tool of those who would
like to see the project fail (the highway interests). It
seemed to the project manager and staff that assuring the
delivery of the early transit construction was essential
towards assuring that the other community-oriented develop-
ment would have the possibility of taking place. (Krucke-
meyer, Note 12)
THE NATURE OF THE AGENDA
Another important factor affecting the composition of
participants and the nature of discussion was -- not sur-
prisingly -- the agenda of the meetings. Here we consider
not the specific issue which would mobilize a natural con-
stituency, but more the generic issues which were discussed.
162
WFEM has identified several of these: programming issues,
station and parkland design, development and construction.
(WFEM, 1980, p. 12) Not surprisingly, programming issues
generated the most successful participation. Once the pro-
gramming issues had been settled, participation focused on
the design of the stations and landscape. Generally, sta-
tion design was not very controversial. The issues varied
from SATF to SATF. In Back Bay,. for example, the image of
the station in the neighborhood and the formal historical
allusions designed by the architect were of interest to the
mostly middle-class crowd that attended the meetings. In
Mass. Ave. station the issue of safety -- translating the
program requirements for it to a forum -- was an issue, as
was the issue of "fitting into the neighborhood". In
Roxbury, access by public housing tenants was important as
were the relationship of the station to the planned develop-
ment around it. In Jamaica Plain, the "residential character
of the area" was important, and Green Street station in par-
ticular went through numerous revisions of form to meet the
recommendations of participants with concerns with scale,
character, materials, the amount of glazing, and the possi-
bility of the booth collector surveilling the area adjacent
-to the station for added security. Generally, people
attending most heavily the station design meetings tended
to be the "civic activists" mentioned earlier, to be more
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concerned for artistic expression and be less concerned
with, or sympathetic to, social issues. (This is not meant
to imply that there were not people concerned about both
art and society.)
In retrospect, it seems obvious that the landscape
design meetings would be controversial and well-attended,
but that is not what many people expected at the beginning,
since landscape architecture is popularly conceived to be
purely aesthetic, and less social and political. This
history of this subject in the Southwest Corridor casts a
new light on urban landscaope architecture.
In all three sections of the Corridor landscape design
became the subject of concern and in some cases considerable
controversy. In Section I, the entire length of the Corridor
was to be decked over as decided in the EIS. The issue be-
came one of what to put on top of the deck. Among the
issues raised were the degree to which the corridor should
join or separate the South End from the St. Botolph area,
the active vs. passive recreation (active recreation per-
ceived to attract "black teenagers" and "noise"), the orien-
tation of activities towards the very local condition of
street ends as opposed to the concept of a Corridor-wide
park tying into Olmsted's Emerald Necklace, the technical
issue of ventilation stacks for diesel trains running under
the deck and the treatment these would receive, the issue
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of crime, which was perceived by some people as crossing
the tracks from the South End to St. Botolph, and the de-
tailed treatment of details. There was concern that govern-
ment agencies were incapable of providing maintenance for a
large-scale park. Coupled with a preoccupation for local
control, this translated into requests for a very localized
design. Through a process to be described in more detail
later, the landscape design issues in this area became a
prime concern.
In Section II the landscape design issues centered
more on the desire of tenants of public housing to have the
decks be an asset to their neighborhood. Since the percen-
tage of children is high in this area, it is not surprising
that there was great desire for active recreation and
tot lots. In Section III the issues, besides the earlier
resolved attempt to increase the amount of decking, became
one of improving the character of the area with lawns as
well as more active recreation. Generally, landscape design
was perceived as affecting the neighborhoods more than sta-
tion design (WFEM, 1980, p. 12) and therefore received more
attention from residents. In many implicit and explicit
ways, urban landscape design organizes social space in a
significant scale and therefore is more subject to political
struggle than the more symbolic social content of a single
building like a trans.it station.
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As in other programming and design issues, the MBTA and
planning consultants "developed an approach to move towards
a consensus" in landscape design, emphasizing negotiation
and manipulating the situation to resolve the contradiction.
As in other issues, the consultants and the MBTA both
favored the more "democratic" solutions --- e.g., open
access to decks -- but were officially neutral. They in
fact used their position to bring about a solution where,
in the words of Jaci Hall, "You get as much as you can for
the people and move on to the next issue." Those who par-
ticipated in the debates about landscape design learned
something about fighting on technical issues, but learned
little about political activity that they did not already
know. Development was potentially the most economic-oriented
and political issue to be alighted in the participatory pro-
cess and therefore the most potentially explosive. In the
days of the anti-highway fight, the BTPR and the EIS it
had initiated the most organized activity. Yet, during the
design and engineering phase, development issues were almost
boring to the participants. This remarkable fact bears
some consideration.
Early on, the Project Manager's office selected the
consultant firm of Charles Hilgenhurst Associates as co-
ordinating consultants in charge of development and place
them as one of the team of Coordinating Consultants with
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Corridor-wide responsibilities. Some of the major develop-
ment packages in the immediate vicinity of the Corridor Pro-
ject was not their jurisdiction, such as Copley Place and
Tent City. The Southwest Corridor Industrial Park, the
LRDC townhouses were all negotiated and "spun off" outside
the structure of participation in the SWCP. Whether this
was the decision of the Project Manager, or whether power-
ful economic interests managed to exclude these issues from
the Corridor, I do not know. The effect, however, was to
locate the discourse about the hottest development issues
outside the Corridor structure.
Once Hilgenhurst went to work on a development strategy
for the Corridor, overall development policy was not debated
at the meetings, as it had been during BTPR and the EIS
phases. During 1977 and most of 1978 development was simply
not on th agenda and efforts to put it there were met with
MBTA replies that the study was not ready for discussion.
During that time Hilgenhurst redefined the development par-
cels identified in the EIS, did a parcel by parcel analysis
of each site, pointing out the kind of development which
could take place, the necessary investment, the modifications
to streets which would make it feasible, etc. These were
combined to form a series of "developer's packages" for
each parcel, and compiled into an overall development plan
which was published and distributed. Included in the plan
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were a series of "joint development" possibilities for com-
mercial space in the new stations.
The development packages were then presented at the
SATF and Neighborhood Committee meetings, when they aroused
considerable attention. In Roxbury, development was seen
as desirable, since the community had been undergoing
gradual disinvestment for a long period, which became more
serious after the demolition for 1-95 left a large area
looking like wasteland. It was further believed that de-
velopment would generate a considerable number of construc-
tion jobs and a significant number of permanent service
jobs. It was during negotiations during BTPR that the
state had agreed to the precedent-setting Altshuller plan,
calling for 30% minority participation in all state-sponsored
projects in this part of metropolitan Boston. More develop-
ment, therefore, was seen as a positive step by the partici-
pants. At that time little attention was being paid to the
potentially devastating effect of displacement and therefore
there was no attempt made to negotiate any protection from
the state for forces that operate through the market.
In Roxbury as in other places, leaderhsip on develop-
mentrelated issues was taken by a particular segment of
the population -- those who had either access to becoming
themselves developers or who worked through community de-
velopment corporations which had some hope of influencing
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the outcome in some way. The average working class tenant
or homeowner was less active around these issues, as were
private market developers.
In Jamaica Plain the response to development was more
heterogeneous. On the one hand, the conservative and
liberal forces formed rival CDC's in order to bid for par-
ticipation, neither one very successfully. On the other
hand, the voices to control development, to limit it, came
from several quarters. Conservatives feared subsidized
housing more than they feared the plague and they opposed
development for this reason. Others wanted to maintain the
residential character of the community. Still others wanted
to maintain the residential character of the community.
Still others feared the potential impact of development on
accelerating displacement. Merchants feared competition,
particularly in the Forest Hills Station area. There was a
rare consensus on the wish to limit development. There was
some controversy in J.P. around the use to be assigned to
certain parcels. Some favored and some opposed, for example,
the construction of a new police station on a parcel near
Green Street station, but genrally there was not much con-
troversy around development. As the actual possibilities
of developments approach in time, the issue will probably
arise again as very important.
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Concern for participation in construction was latent
during 1977 and 1978. During the BTPR and the EIS, minority
communities had struggled for a commitment to jobs and to a
percentage of contracts going to minority-controlled con-
tracting companies. As the contracts began to be signed,
this promise appears to be largely respected by the state.
But during the early stages of design, construction issues
did not come to the surface. In 1979, when the first con-
tracts became a reality, concern surfaced. "When informa-
tion on construction 'went public' at Neighborhood Commit-
tee meetings in 1979, the planner's insights were confirmed.
Many residents expressed concern about construction noise,
work hours, rodent control, materials-hauling by truck, de-
tour routes and parking by construction workers on local
streets." (WFEM, 1980, p. 12) The MBTA has made some con-
cessions to the participants regarding these concerns, in-
cluding some which will raise the cost of the project: con-
tracts will specify maximum noise standards, requirements
for onsite parking, regulation of work hours, etc.
During construction, participation will take place less
through meetings and more through divulging information
in a new version of the Corridor News and handouts, through
construction task forces, as well as a quick-response tele-
phone "hotline" where people can call to get information
and register complaints. This represents a couple of steps
down in Arnstein's "ladder of participation."
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It seems also important to review briefly some items
which were not on the agenda of participation, although
very much related to the project; one of these is related
to transportation, the others to development.
The Southwest Corridor will replace the existing Orange
Line elevated transit service which runs along Washington
Street through all three sections of the Corridor. Its im-
pact will be greatest in Roxbury where the community depends
heavily on public transit and the only existing alternative
is bus service. At some point in the project's history,
the decisions about the Orange Line replacement were separ-
ated from those of the Corridor and the MBTA commissioned a
separate study of this problem, with a separate and not-so-
thorough participatory component. It is beyond the scope
of this paper to discuss at any length the nature of the
replacement service study but we can point out that by
separating this topic from the rest of the Corridor, the
complexity of decisions ws narrowed, the agenda of par-
ticipoation was defused of a potentially politicizing issue,
and the possibility of implementing the Southwest Corridor
Project improved. (See Graphic No. 25)
Among the development issues not on the Corridor agenda
were the Copley Square Development and the Tent City Site,
in the northern part of Section I. Both of these sites
have been the object of intense struggle between developers
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The area covered by the Orange Line Replacement/Improvement Study is shown.
(SWCC Planning Report, Section III. WFEM Archives).
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and the BRA on one side, and progressive forces in the South
End on the other. Neither site was included as part of the
Corridor in the EIA process and was therefore left out of
the participatory process. Had they been, there is little
doubt that working class and minority residents would have
been able to bargain for a significant number of low income
housing units, jobs and other reforms. It is tempting to
say that these pieces were too valuable for the bourgeoisie
to allow them to be "participated".
Similarly, the displacement of public housing tenants
from housing adjacent to the Corridor was an issue outside
the legal bounds of the mandate for participation, as was
the already mentioned displacement of private sector tenants
through market forces.
The lesson we can draw from these examples is that be-
fore a popular urban movement agrees to the parameters of a
participatory process, it should carefully evaluate issues
which can be essential in the future although they do not
appear so at the time. For this, both technical and poli-
tical sagacity is necessary. Even more to the point,
however, is the fact that, had the movement outside the
participatory process remained viable, capable of giving
direction to the movement inside, the state may be forced
to put these items on the agenda.
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The Project Staff deliberately played down development
decisions during the King adminsitration in order to protect
the possibility of more relative community control of this
process. They felt that the King administration would try
to reverse prior to victories of the movement. The elimin-
ation of low income housing from Copley Place was seen as
a good example of what could happen to development. In-
stead, they maneuvered to postpone these decisions until a
new election could bring in the possibility of better pol-
itical conditions. (Kruckemeyer, Note 13)
It is important to note that the Corridor was a trans-
portation project and would therefore appear to not lend
itself readily to the broad scope of issues which were in-
volved in a participatory process. It is certainly unique
in the U.S. in this respect. This has to be attributed to
its birth in a process of popular struggle.
By contrast, some agencies -- like the BRA -- organi-
cally encompass a host of issues on their agenda.. For
example, the issue of displacement is directly their re-
sponsibility. They do set up participatory processes which
are more manipulative and dishonest. The difference, per-
haps, is rooted in their history as agencies set up by the
state to exercise its rule and on the balance of forces
among actors organizing around specific issues.
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THE DECLINE OF ACTIVISM
Over time several factors tended to reinforce a trend
for activism to decline. The more consciously political
organizers in the Corridor communities started out partici-
pating very actively in the committees and task forces.
They continued to see the process as a vehicle for organizing
and raising consciousness as well as place to struggle for
specific issues. As the subject of the meetings became
more technical and more station-specific, working class
and minority residents attended in fewer numbers. This
being so, the more progressive political people had a
smaller audience. Sometimes they remained, fighting for
specific reforms, but gradually they sought other issues
which were drawing more attention from their social base.
This in turn, tended to weaken the movement in the project.
The Southwest Corridor Coalition (SWCC) had been the
primary focus for the remnants of the Corridor-wide movement
as the project entered the Design and Engineering Phase.
As we stated some of the leadership of SWCC became integrated
into the consultant structure. Others, like Chuck Turner,
felt that whatever reforms were going to be won were already
on- the agreements and that he would concentrate on other
issues such. as fighting for jobs for minority workers.
Still others, such as Ralph Smith of LRDC, concentrated on
specific reforms which had led them to the coalition.
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The last significant effort of SWCC to organize around
an issue was their campaign against an arterial street in
Jamaica Plain. The EIS'had left open the option of a major
arterial street paralleling the Corridor along Section III,
and SWCC felt that this was a scaled down version of the
highway as well as taking land which could be used for de-
velopment, particularly housing. They were successful in
organizing against it. After that victory, they were never
able to successfully combine working both within and outside
the structure of participation. Project Manager Pangaro
skillfully denied them access to any significant issue
around which they could organize and insisted on treating
them "just like any other community group in the Corridor",
when their reason for being was precisely to be a coalition
of other groups. When they raised an issue, the results
were negotiated with others, and groups began to see SWCC
as superfluous. Eventually, SWCC was unable to obtain fund-
ing and dissolved, unable to survive without them.
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IV.
THE CASE OF THE SECTION I COVER
177
In the twenty-two years between the 1948 Massachusetts
Master Highway Plan and the 1970 moratorium on highway con-
struction inside Route 128, the struggle around the South-
west Corridor centered on the issue of highways. Interstate
95, the Southeast Expressway, was to stop just short of the
South End; it was to join the Inner Belt at a mammoth inter-
section in lower Roxbury. The highway then funneled traffic
onto local South End streets, and the BRA proposed an alter-
native highway ramp system called the South End by-pass,
which would have affected the South End, but the implications
of the road for displacement of housing or industry was not
as severe in the South End as it was in Roxbury. Further-
more, the South End was, beginning in the early '60's
subject to one of the most intensive urban renewal projects
in the United States, and South End residents correctly
perceived that the threat to their community could come
more from urban renewal than from roads, and organized
accordingly.
On the other hand, as early as 1960 the state proposed
a variety of road and transit plans related to Interstate
95 which did threaten a substantial amount of housing in
the South End. At one point, the plans called for stopping
all intercity trains at Route 128, with rapid transit link-
ing that stop to downtown Boston. Other plans called for
both trains and transit lines to continue through the South
End along the existing Penn Central alignment. Still other
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plans combined trains and transit with the South End bypass
in a combined megastructure which would have destroyed about
150 bow-front buildings; the project, called Southway by the
BRA, included housing construction on air rights over the
combined road/transit/rail right of way.
These different proposals were centered on the same
route over the South End. The tracks would enter the South.
End from Roxbury on the existing Penn Central Cut, move
towards the northeast under Massachusetts Avenue and West
Newton Streets, pass under Back Bay Station on Dartmouth
Street and follow the alignment of the Massachusetts Turn-
pike towards the East, with intercity rails continuing on
to South Station and transit rails burrowing under the turn-
pike, through the South Cove Tunnel, to meet the existing
Orange Line transit tunnel at Washington Street. (See
Graphic No. 26)
THE ISSUE OF TURF IN THE
SOUTH END/ST. BOTOLPH
The tracks either bisected the neighborhood or separated
St. Botolph Street from the South End, depending on your point
of view. In order to understand this distinction, which
would play an important part in the politics of programming
and design, it is important to briefly review the territorial
history of the area. Originally, the entire area was a salt
marsh; as Boston grew in the 19th century from the Shawmut
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peninsula, the marsh was filled in from Washington Street
towards the west and a wealthy residential neighborhood of
bow-front brick residences, the homes of the emerging
industrial borgeoisie, was established in the area, called
the South End.
The residential distict was not even finished when,
during the Civil War, a major social transformation began
to take place. Further to the north and west, the Back Bay
was being filled and more exclusive housing was being built.
At the same time, European migration was accelerating. In
a few years, the rich moved out of the South End and the
immigrants filled the stately homes. Nineteenth century
North American works like The Late George Apley and Silas
Lapham documented a new found fright of the bourgeoisie
about sharing a residential area with workers, a phenomenon
that had not existed in the 18th century commercial city.
The architecture of Back Bay and the South End was strikingly
similar, the Back Bay being slighlty more ornate and varied.
The street grid layout of the streets was formal, in the
French style, while the South End's was slightly more histor-
ically determined, more British and informal, and included
more squares. Socially however, they were two worlds
apart, and they were perceived as being two worlds apart
by people of all classes and races. Physically they were
separated by the Boston. and Albany train yards. For the
last twenty years of the 19th centrury and the first fifty
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years of this century, the entire area east of the train
yards was the South End. The Penn Central tracks were con-
sidered to be a physical object that bisected an essentially
homogeneous neighborhood. In the first part of the twentieth
century, an insurance business district grew north of the
tracks, and it too became a territorial division between
the two neighborhoods. (For a more detailed description of
this process, see Whitehill, 1973). In the period where
class and race segregation in space was being built into the
North American city, the South End was considered to include
the area between the Penn Central tracks and the B&A railroad
yards.
In the early '60's, the yards were taken over by the
Prudential Center, as the corporate core of Boston pushed
out like an octopus along several lines. It was development
encouraged by the City Planning Department, whose plans for
the city included nurturing the growth of this tentacle
(officially dubbed "The Spine" by the BRA later), and the
transformation of the residential areas closer to it into
the residences for the professionals the BRA hoped to
attract to the "new Boston". (See Graphic No. 27) The
area of the South End closest to the Prudential Center
became the first part of the neighborhood to be "gentrified"
by the early '60's white petty bourgeois professionals
began moving into th.e area, buying up homes, evicting the
tenants of the existing rooming houses. Along St. Botolph
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Street rooming houses and even whore house yielded to
newcomers, as one of the most vibrant, multiracial, working
class neighborhoods of the city was under attack. It is
not tangential that this attack was not a "spontaneous
result of market pressures" but a well orchestrated project
directed by an able ideologue, the BRA's Ed Logue, and
financed by substantial federal funds; for years the South
End was the largest urban renewal project in the U.S. and
received the largest share of monies.
This reality conditioned the nature of participation
in the South End to a great extent. The main focus of
activity was the urban renewal plan and related issues.
The initial BRA proposals were coarse -- (master plans were
proposed which laid out in detail large areas to be razed
and replaced with new housing, large areas to be rehabbed,
others to be dedicated to commercial centers. The imple-
mentation began with wholesale evictions, which resulted in
wholesale resistance. The BRA then turned to a more incre-
mental and transactive approach, setting up a field office
in the South End, identifying "responsible" neighborhood
representatives who would be on the one hand legitimate their
proposals and on the other hand allow them to detect which
proposals were meeting greatest resistance. The first im-
portant struggle occurred in 1968, on an urban renewal site
and parking lot near.Back Bay Station. Residents occupied
the site, organized a Tent City and fought for low income
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GRAPHIC No. 29
Tent City sparked a period of intense struggle against
(Goodman, 1971).
Urban Renewal in the South End.
housing instead of corporate use. (See Graphic No. 29)
Progressive forces later organized a South End Prople's Ur-
ban Renewal Committee (SEPURC) with elected representatives
throughout the neighborhood. The Mayor countered by organ-
izing the South End Project Area Committee (SEPAC). At the
same time there was considerable struggle around the control
and implementation of programs for low and moderate income
housing. The mostly latino Emergency Tenants Council (ETC)
and the mostly black South End Tenants Council (SETC)
fought to control the housing development. These were
only a few of literally dozens of such struggles. Parallel
to the urban renewal and housing issues were issues of
education, health, social services, access to jobs and
civil rights which were very much in the agenda of the
South End during this period. In all these struggles, the
demand for reforms was oriented by fairly sophisticated
political activity and consciousnessraising.
PARTICIPATION IN THE SOUTH END
AROUND THE ISSUE OF THE CORRIDOR
The struggle against highways began to coalesce into
a metropolitan movement through the coordination of local
efforts into the Greater Boston Coalition against the Trans-
portation Crisis (GBC) in 1966 in Cambridge. The South End
joined the effort in '68. Urban Planning Aid, which was
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instumental in organizing GBC was also lending technical
assistance to groups like, ETC, SETC, and SEPURC, and they
encouraged housing organizers to become involved. Those
who first joined the anti-road movement in the South End
were progressive, middle class, activists, people like
Phil Bradley, Bob Fortes and Abe Fortas, but they had a
substantial mass base. For example, on the People Before
Highways Day demonstration in the Boston Common in January
1969, there was a contingent from the *South End led by Mel
King. One sector however, was active in the movement form
the beginning, and that is a small group of liberal profes-
sionals -- architects, computer programmers, transportation
experts -- who were involved in GBC because of concern for
"what the city should be", as well as out of concern for
the neighborhood. Included in this group were Ken Krucke-
meyer, an architect who later became Assistant Project
Manager for the Corridor; Ann Hershfang, later a board
member of Massport; Clark Frazier, a transportation enthus-
iast; Ellen Gordon; John and Suzie Goodrich, he an environ-
mentalist, she a municipal bureaucrat. This group grew
out of the Tubman Area Planning Council which fought against
the South End By-pass under the leadership of the old
Harriet Tubman House on Holyoke Street, and black activist
Bob Fortes.-
Several other factors affected participation in the Cor-
ridor in pre-moratorium days in the South End. One of these
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was the fact that only those people in the area adjacent to
the tracks took a really active interest. This ruled out
almost all Chinese residents, who had been displaced out of
the St. Botolph area by this time. There were some latino
residents in West Canton Street, on buildings later bought
by developer Goldweitz, but they were not generally active.
An important group consisted of mostly Black residents of
the Cosmopolitan Neighborhood, from Claremont, Wellington
and Greenwich Street. (Hunkel, Interview, 1980). Ken
Kruckemeyer points out that black residents Barry Adams
and David Scott, as well as organizers Abe Fortas and
Isaac Graves were very much part of the effort.
After 1970 and during the BTPR process, the only Corri-
dor issue particular to the South End was the proposed con-
struction of the South End by-pass, an issue which essen-
tially hinged on the decision to build or not to build the
Southwest Expressway. When the then-governor Sargent an-
nounced his no-road decision, the BTPR had little else to
say about the Corridor in the neighborhood. The track bed
would remain where it is, basically an open cut, while with
the issue of widening and possible demolition was still po-
tentially important. Participation was essentially dormant
between 1972, when the BTPR decisions were announced and
1974.
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In 1974 the nucleus that would remain active for the
rest of the Corridor process began to organize. The Envi-
ronmental Impact phase was approaching and the issue which
prompted the group to form was noise. As plans for the
Corridor evolved, it became public knowledge that as many
as 842 trains a day would travel through the neighborhood.
(WFEM 1980, P.19) Janet Hunkel, who would eventually become
the Section I planner, was at that time a tenant in the St.
Botolph district. She recalls the formation of the group:
some friends, mostly white middle-class newcomers, had been
talking about the Corridor and the issue of noise. When
someone suggested they could wrest concessions from the
MBTA for the benefit of the neighborhood, they called a
meeting in the Fall of 1974. They soon became The South
End/St. Botolph Task Force on Noise.
Several things are significant in this formation. They
actually recognized the division of the two neighborhoods in
the name. Secondly, the choice to concentrate on the issue
of noise, a decision which betrays a lot of technical and
political sophistication. The Environmental Impact Process
consisted of an evolving set of regulations which demanded
that a project minimize environmental disruption of the
surrounding areas, and noise had been an explicitly recog-
nized category of impact. By concentrating on noise, they
could force the project to spend considerable money on
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noise-abatement. Social impacts had much less precedent
as a part of the EIS process, and the group's concern was
not primarily with social issues anyway. This was not
surprising given its composition and history of activity.
Besides the more liberal professionals which we have
already mentioned as being involved in the pre-EIS process,
the Task Force on Noise included a number of other profes-
sionals. Keith Brown was interested in urban design, Bill
Karg was an architect and planner, Eben Kunz was an expert
on acoustics and noise, Bill Satterthwaite was a teacher
and Jeff Stonberg was a developer who owned property in the
Ellis' neighborhood and had bough and renovated six buildings
on West Newton Street.
This group, identified by Hunkel as the most active
during the EIS process, was different from the oppressed
and working class activists who, along with progressive pro-
fessionals, had stopped the roads. Though somewhat hetero-
geneous, Hunkel herself describes them as "the second wave
of gentrification". (The first wave represented by those
involved pre-EIS). Some, like Stonberg, was a developer
promoting the real estate market "out front". Others, like
like Hunkel, had been involved in successful efforts to
have the state renovate abandoned buildings adjacent to the
tracks for subsidized housing. "We were looking at the
possibility of getting UMTA to- help finance rehabilitation
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of abandoned buildings for low income housing. There were
a lot of abandoned buildings at the ends of the streets
next to the tracks, causing blight...Some of the people may
have in fact been anti-gentricication, if you had asked
them. They were more interested in a plain stable community.
They wanted people to be able to stay. In the back of your
mind you knew that improving the neighborhood would increase
pressure in a maturing real estate market, but you really
wanted to improve the neighborhood -- you were really caught
in a bind. At the time, the area was racially and economic-
ally mixed. Some wanted to keep it that way, other were
oblivious to it, and others were plotting to change that".
(Hunkel, Note 14) Despite differences of opinion, this
group had an objective economic interest in the kind of
neighborhood improvement which would have the effect of
displacing workers and minorities although some of these
people had an ideological position more in favor of low
income and minority residents of the community.
INSTITUTIONALIZATION
0
The beginnings of institutionalization of participation
which, during the BTPR had a somewhat different effect in the
South End than it did in the Corridor's other two neighbor-
hoods. There, the mass working class movement against the
roads was weaker, since that social group was involved in
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fights against urban renewal and for reforms. The progres-
sive professionals which led the fight elsewhere were also
present in this neighborhood, but unlike Roxbury, and to
a much greater extent than in Jamaica Plain, there was
also a coherent group which we may call "conscious gentri-
fiers", professionals who were active politically, who
brought their technical expertise into community affairs,
but who specifically defended causes which were in contra-
diction with working class and minority residents of the
area. Thus, everyone favored noise abatement, and could
work together for a cover on the tracks, but some of these
people were also opposed to low income housing and worked
for a cover in order to promote a rise in property values.
In Jamaica Plain, those who participated for the purpose
of preventing low-income housing -- Craven, Parker, etc.
-- were tied to an old political machine but were not
technicians. In the South End, architects, computer pro-
grammers, engineers, developers, were involved and they
could function effetively in a technical arena. As we
said, the group we have just described began to organize
during the Fall of '74, and they met periodically to discuss
strategy for about a year. Since the more progressive
people in the group had informal connections to technicians
working for the MBTA, or some of the consultant firms in-
volved at the time (such as Stull Associates). They were
able to keep abreast of developments as well as influence
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decisions in a minor way. In the Fall of '75 the MBTA
organized the first community meeting of the EIS process
in the South End/St. Botolph neighborhoods. (We will use
this name since this separation had been a de facto well
established about the identity of the area). In this
meeting, the Task Force on noise made its first public
appearance. The Task Force came forward with the demand
that the tracks be placed in tunnels; the MBTA insisted on
looking for other alternatives (Hunkel, 1980, interview).
The technicians in the Task Force knew they had a right to
demand technical studies of the effects of different con-
figurations on noise in a residential area and they demand
it. Larry Whittig, of the acoustics firm of Bolt, Beranek
and Newman (BBN), and David Lee, of Stull Associates,
looked at different configurations, and estimated the
potential noise level for both the loudest events and the
equivalent noise over time on the South End's housing.
BBN measured events of up to 120 decibels on the window
sills of houses adjacent to the tracks, the equivalent of
a very loud rock band. The criteria eventually established
in the EIS were that the noise level should not exceed 67
decibels, or the equivalent of city street noise. (WFEM,
-1970, p. 10) Similar studies were also carried out for
other sections of the Corridor where housing lay near the
tracks. Among the alternatives studied were noise abatement
canopies, covered tracks and an open cut. As expected,
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the predicted noise level for both the open cut and -the
noise abatement canopies were so high as to constitute a
serious environmental nuisance. The community then had
legal grounds to press for a track cover. From then on,
the Task Force insisted on a cover; professional expertise
among the Task Force members and the sympathy of technicians
working for the MBTA aided this victory. It should be
pointed out however, that one member of the Task Force
was against covering the tracks; Clark Frazier, a computer
programmer and transportation enthusiast, thought that the
additional money needed to cover the tracks should be used
to electrify commuter rails. Hunkel characterizes him as
being more concerned for transportation than for neighbor-
hood-centered issues.
The final EIA hearing was scheduled for February 1976,
it was delayed and finally occured in July of that year.
For that hearing, the major effort of the Task Force was
preparing for the issue of noise criteria. Technically, they
were armed with the BBN noise studies. They had friends
among the MBTA and consultants. They were politically well-
connected; Ann Hersgfang, a Task Force member, used her
political clout and considerable connections to pressure at
the state and federal levels for a covered track. They
basically succeeded and the agreement to cover the tracks
was incorporated into the EIS, with the results of the noise
study published as an appendix. It was a major victory for
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the activists, though it should be pointed out once more
that it was a victory on a different issue than victories
in Roxbury, for example, where participants won demands for
low income housing, productive industry, development poten-
tial as well as decks. In Jamaica Plain (Section III) and
Roxbury (Section II) the decks covered a relatively small
percentage of the area. In Section I, nearly the entire area
was to be covered by tracks. The rationale that the cover
should be used only where adjacent housing, or a proposed
school could be seriously affected explained in technical
terms the decision to cover the entire South End, (See the
EIA) since there the housing was denser and closer to the
tracks. The political and technical clout of the Task
Force, as well as its concentration on the issue of noise
must also be considered important factors; in fact it appears
from what we have reviewed, that the issue was essentially
political and that the technical manifestation was secondary.
(See Graphic No. 30)
CONTROVERSY IN THE DESIGN
OF THE SECTION I COVER
After the Fall of '75, the particpatory process in the
South End again entered a period of dormancy until the begin-
nings of the design and engineering phase in the Spring of
1977. Almost immediately, the South End deck became the
subject of considerable controversy. The more conservative
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Graphic No. 30
The Section I Cover. (WFEM Archives).
and racist forces in the St. Botolph neighborhood were con-
cerned that the cover would contribute to the elimination
of the turf distinction between the two neighborhoods, a
distinction which some of them had long labored to establish.
They began to organize in the Summer of '77. They pro-
posed at the Seciton I Neighborhood Committee that the
"Cover" consist of a barrel vault, or some other physical
barrier which would "reinforce the distinction" between the
neighborhoods. Since they had architects, noise experts,
and engineers on their side, they prepared a substantial
case. The EIS criteria stated that the project should
strive to minimize the impact on the adjacent areas, and
that therefore, any design for the deck which would join
the two neighborhoods was essentially "disrupting the
status quo." They further claimed that crime in their
neighborhood was a result of "criminials" coming across
the tracks from the South End and stealing their stereos
and TV's.
This proposal, with its racists undertones, brought to
the surface existing class and racial divisions in the
area. Progressive and liberal forces, particularly blacks
in the area, pressed for a counter-proposal which would tie
the two neighborhoods to give them as much as possible and
utilize the cover as a resource for recreation in the area.
They also has assistance from some. professionals sympathetic
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to their cause, as well as indirectly by professionals with-
in the Corridor Project Structure. The latter remained
officially neutral but consciously presented information and
designed the process in such a way as to "come to a solution
as favorable as possible," in the words of Jaci Hall.
The situation was potentially serious, and the MBTA
project office was concerned that an open struggle would
flare. They therefore asked the Central Planning Staff to
design a process which would begin to resolve the controversy
through programming and design.
The first step was the re-constitution of the Section I
Neighborhood Committee as the Cover Task Force which first
met in August of 1977, and immediately began what was called
"preliminary programming." A team of urban designers, land-
scape architects, and planners prepared models for different
alternatives. They incorporated what we can call the "con-
servative position" into a "no use" alternative; what we
can call the "left position' into a "high intensity use"
alternative and developed a middle ground called "moderate
use" alternative, with the intention of moving the extremes
towards the middle. (See Graphic No. 31 for a more detailed
description.) The Task Force was divided into three sub-
committees, each working on a model for each alternative,
which could then be evaluated by the entire group and the
consultants. They further tried to de-polarize the situation
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4MARY OF THREE ALTERNATIVE MODELS
The "no use" alternative prepared by the Cover
Committee in September has a dome shaped barrel
vault or a sloped deck over the right-of-way to
discourage use on the Cover. Circulation is
confined to a pedestrian way and emerqency access
along Carleton/Claremont Streets. Plan-tings on
the wall and small gardens are located at the
ends of streets facing the Cover, but green space
was kept to a minimum to reduce the need for
maintenance. Access between sides of the Cover
is by bridges over the deck so that the deck
itself is free of people.
The "moderate intensity use" alternative is
occupied primarily by quiet, passive recreation
activities in the area between Yarmouth Street
and Massachusetts Avenue. One point of view saw
the Cover as a set of separate developed areas
with local connections, while another view looked
at the Cover as a single long development. The
group that worked on the model suggested that small
areas along the deck could be leased to adjacent
-owners to insulate the residential blocks from deck
activities. Access to and across the deck is pro-
vided at several streets.
The suggested "high intensity use" alternative
emphasizes local orientation and a variety of
activities. Active recreation areas for spor:s
like tennis and basketball are located toward the
northern end of the Cover, and quiet areas for
sitting or picnicing are placed toward the south.
Trees and water for background noise and a varied
topography help to divide the deck into several
smler areas. A pedestrian path meanders along
the deck connecting activity centers, and access
from adjaceat streets is provided at several
points. Leased open space areas along part of
the deck could help to provide privacy for nearby
buildings.
GRAPHIC No.5)
Alternative Models used in preprogramming the Section I cover.(WFEM Archives).
by asking the cover task to focus on more specific problems.
Different possible uses were presented at meetings with
analogies of similar activities in other landscaped areas.
(WFEM 1970, p. 10) That way, concrete alternatives were
proposed which could attract support from diverse interests.
For example, the most reactionary position was that a high
intensity use would result -- in the words of a St. Botolph
resident -- in "dozens of Puerto Rican teenagers playing
basketball and making noise." The consultants offered the
possibility of passive recreation such as flower gardens,
and someone suggested the the Zinea Society be invited to
open a garden. (WFEM, Neighborhood Cover. Task Force hand-
out, 1980) This alternative was clearly less threatening
to the right, while the left did not object and considered
it a great improvement on a barrell vault. Uses like animal
farms, urban gardens, the corridor-wide jogging and bicycle
paths, and others were also introduced. At this stage, the
Fall of '77, the project did not press for resolution, but
rather discussion of possible programs for the use of the
cover. (See Graphic No. 32)
In the Winter of 1977-78, the project engineers re-
studied the alignment and profile of the Corridor, including
Section I. The preliminary engineering studies done during
the Environmental Impact phase showed the alignment of the
tracks adjacent to the St. Botolph side, allowing room at
ground level for fire safety lanes on Claremont and Carleton
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GRAPHIC No.32
Record of the pre-programming process in the Section I cover.
Drawing: KE/FST (WFEM Archives).
Streets on the South End side. The profile of the deck was
eight feet higher than ground level, facilitating the sep-
aration of neighborhoods desired by the right, which was
stronger on the St. Botolph side. New studies by engineers
and sub-soil specialists suggested a change in the planned
profile and alignment. It had been feared that depressing
the tracks deeper than the EIS criteria had established would
affect the water table, which in turn could undermine the
foundation of the bow-front row houses on either side of
the tracks. A study of subsoil conditions showed that this
was not the case. A look a construction techniques also
suggested that it would be safer, and cause less noise, to
locate the tracks in the center of the space between St.
Botolph and the South End, rather than adjacent to the St
Botolph side. A new alignment and profile was proposed which
essentially allowed the deck to be a continuous surface
uniting the two neighborhoods at ground level. (See graphics
Nos. 33 and 34) This, of course, somewhat alarmed the
right, since it made the "no-use" alternative harder to
justify.
After the alignment and profile had been redesigned,
the project again reconvened the Task Force. This time, a
different approach was taken. Rather than working on the
three alternatives which had been the focus of prior debate,
the meetings focused on a discussion of "issues." In a
series of five meetings held between March 1978 to July
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Handout discussing profile and alignment changes in Section I. (FMAcie)
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1978, the issues were grouped in three categories, "social
issues" which included the separation or unity of the two
neighborhoods, cross corridor pedestrian access, the class
and racial composition of users, etc.; "technical issues"
such as the necessary forced ventilation of the tunnel and
the appearance of ventilation stacks, vibration and noise,
etc.; and "programming issues" such as the different uses
possible in the deck, where they should be located, how they
should be oriented, and the form of the corridor-wide paths.
(WFEM, 1980, p.11) This strategy lent itself better than
the previous one to the desired goal of conflict-resolution.
"The MBTA and the consultants developed an approach to move
towards a consensus about cover uses. Common elements from
the three models that had been developed were identified in
an attempt to deemphasize the potentially polarizing concepts
of the no-moderate, and high-intensity use which the models
reflected. Guidelines on privacy, security, and maintenance
were also prepared by the MBTA and the consultants." (WFEM,
1980, p. 11)
The more conservative forces resisted at first, insist-
ing on the no-use model, until they were reminded that the
participatory process was advisory and that the MBTA set
the agenda and made final decisions. They agreed to con-
tinue participating, making each issue a point of conten-
tion. The existing tracks had separated the neighborhoods
except for a cross street at West Newton Street, so they
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insisted that this situation not be altered, they asked for
brick walls closing the streets at the St. Botolph side.
The project agreed in principle to maintaining the status
quo in terms of cross-corridor access, but the argument
shifted to the treatment of this separation, shifting the
debate from concept to physical form. For this, the co-
ordinating landscape architect, Roy Mann, was asked to
prepare a series of models and drawings for "treatment
options" which were then discussed at the meetings. The
right pushed for as much separation as possible, the left
for as much integration as possible, and in the end the
MBTA chose a moderate solution with existing dead-ends of
streets fenced off and present bridges replaced by circu-
lation paths including a new connector at at West Canton/
Harcourt to replace the former Yarmouth/Irvington pedes-
trian bridge that was removed by the Turnpike Authority.
"To avoid conflicts that could impede the consensus process,
the MBTA and the consultants developed a policy on cross-
corridor pedestrian access which essentially was to maintain
the status quo, but allow for future acess possibilities
in design detailling." (WFEM, 1980, p. 11) It was a hard
fight which resulted in a compromise; but as Jaci Hall
said, "at least in the future those fences can be opened.
It's not like knocking down a brick wall."
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Another issue, which was hard-fought was significant
not only to the politics of the process, but to the relation-
ship between participation and design. The more conservative
forces insisted that each street program and design the act-
ivities at the end of its block. In a way this was paroch-
ialism ad nauseam. From a metropolitan-wide movement which
presented unified demands, the units of participation had.
gone to the level of the municipality, then to the corridor-
wide level, then to the neighborhood level, then to the
station area level and now to the street-end level. The or-
iginal landscape plan was itself conceived as an addition
to Olmsted's "Emerald Necklace," and therefore was concept-
ually regional, with regional linear trails. The conserv-
ative groups at first insisted on eliminating the trails,
but the project over-ruled this suggestion. They then in-
sisted on making the trail meander and therefore discourage
regional use while encouraging uses, a suggestion which was
accepted. Then they insisted on having each street group of
residents influence, but not define, the uses taking place
at the end of each street, a principle which was accepted.
"The basic strategy supported by these technicians was to let
the street alignments on top of the deck and the overall
program of uses emerge from aggregation of street end use."
(WFEM, 1980, p. 11) Though these issues were considered
part of the "program issues" category, rather than "social
issues", they aroused almost as much controversy as the
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latter. Maintenance, also became an issue, because active
uses were perceived to be harder to maintain. Surveillance
and security likewise, were strongly debated and a series
of guidelines were established.
One technical problem which prompted considerable con-
cern was that of ventilation, although there was less
debate and controversy. The train tunnel required exhaust
stacks and intakes for diesel trains. Residents, particu-
larly those concerned with the architectural character of
the neighborhood, wanted to insure they were not prominent
or readily distinguishable from the brick buildings. Na-
turally, no one really wanted the stacks at the end of
their street. The Urban Design Consultants therefore pre-
pared a series of alternatives for the location, group-
ings and design of the stacks, which were then discussed
at Task Force meetings. (WFEM, Ventilation Handout, July
1978) A consensus was reached without much controversy.
(See Graphic No. 35)
The techniques used in this process were sophisticated
and participatory. At every Task Force meeting, residents
were encouraged to record their comments, draw suggestions
on maps, actually work on models, using clay, wood blocks,
cardboard cut-outs, etc. Elaborate handouts were prepared
for the Task Force meetings; simpler ones were mailed out
by the thousands. Several issues of the Corridor News
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GRAPHIC No.35
One of many handouts on alternative location and design for venti-
lation stacks in the Section I cover.
Drawing: Stull Assoc., Inc. (WFEM Archives).
a E- ORTH2PUCKM A
devoted space to the design of the deck, informing residents
of the area of the process underway and giving them tech-
nical information valid for participating. It should be
noted however, that the more controversial class and race
conflicts of the process were censored out of the project
sponsored literature. Eventually, agreement began to be
reached on a program for the deck, and by the end of the
summer of 1968, the landscape architect produced a coordin-
ative landscape plan. The plan showed the location, size
and some detailing for sitting areas, tot-lots, gardens,
planted areas, ventilation stacks, lawns, and one basketball
court. Passive recreation dominated the activities, the
corridor trail was included as a meandering path, and
cross-corridor access was kept to the existing conditions,
with possible openings in the future. (See Graphics Nos.
36 and 37)
Once the coordinative landscape plan was published, each
section of the Corridor had a separate landscape architecture
firm in charge of detailing the plan further. The Section I
landscape architects, Moriece and Gary, prepared these de-
tailed drawings, and presented them at a Cover Task Force
Meeting in the Fall of '78, beginning what WFEM called the
third stage of participation on the cover. The community
endorsed these plans, making suggestions about materials
to be used, types of plants, etc. Budget constraints
required a revision which was then presented at an Open
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GRAPHIC No. 36
Diagramatic Program and Partial Site Plan for Section I Deck.
Drawing: Stull Assoc. Inc. (WFEM Archives).
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Section One residents have met since Fall, 1977 as the Neighborhood Committee/Cover Task Force. They advised the MBTA about the activities and lands-
cape, how each would function with the other as well as how the cover would relate to each individual street and the abutting neighborhoods.
This design was eased into by first establishing criteria to which all plans would need to respond and by agreeing to some basic principles. Next,
the task force explored numerous options. From this storehouse of information residents on each street specified what they wanted for their area. And
finally each street's plan was coordinated with the others and the cover wide elements--lighting, furniture, signage. The information below summarized
the criteria, agreements and the plans which developed from this process. (THE CONCERN: AFTER MUCH DISCUSSION, RESIDENTS AGREED TO THESE PRINCIPLES:
SSACHUSETTS AVE.
The access between the
ver, Mass. Ave, and the
ition passes by a gar-
n for --- '-y the Mass.
rticultural Society.
WELLINGTON STREET
o The focal point is
a plaza with a sitting
area overlooking Wel-
lington and Albemarle.
GRAPHIC No. 67
ALEMARLE, BLACKHOOD & CUMBERLAND STS
o These 3 dead
paved area with
enclosed with a
the end of each
end streets have a
some planting and are
wrought iron fence at
street.
L
1,2,3 CLAREMONT STREET
o These 3 houses have front yards & parking.
CLAREMONT PA K AND GREENWICH PARK
o These focal points are dominated by plant-
ings in plaza areas. Sitting is ircorporated
into the adjacent community gardens.
ACCESS
LOCAL
ORIENTATION
CARLETON/
CLAREMONT
STREETS
VENTILATION
DURHAM STREET
o A garden provides a visual
ending to the street.
o Non-intense usage buffers the
street from the park.
o A straight, visaully open path,
responds to security concerns.
I (II
o The status quo will be retained. Cross-corridor access
remains between Durham/W. Rutland Sq. and Follen/Braddock Park.
Albemarle, Blackwood and Cumberland Sts. remain dead ended.
o Copley Place creates access between Harcourt/W. Canton Street
and in conjunction with the Mass. Ave. Station, access is created
between the cover, Mass. Ave. and the station.
o Residents recognized that the cover tied into a more regional
SWC Parkland System, but planned the area to be locally orientated
o Both streets will be 14 feet wide and one way in a northerly
direction. Their design will accommodate the municipal service
trucks, police and fire vehicles and local traffic. However,
they are designed to discourage through traffic and speeding cars,
restrict public parking and compliment the parkland. Bikes, in
most cases, will have to use the roadway.
o A ventilation system is required for the rapid transit (pri-
marily for emergencies) and the railroad system (emergency and
daily operation). The best design solution incorporates the ven-
tilation exhaust structures into the streetscape. They will be
built next to the end buildings at 34 Yarmouth and 230 W. Newton
Sts. and faced with brick, as if the row of buildings continued.
FOLLEN STREET
o The focal point has plant
ings with a sitting area.
o The pedestrain access is
visually open.
I.. . . . . . .. / BRADDOCK PARK' '
o Carleton St. is dis-
W. RUTLAND SQ./SPARROW PARK continued between W.
o The existing basketball court is reduced by Newton and the alley.
30% due to changes in grade. o The focal point
o The sitting area at W. Newton provides a has plantings with a
vista down either end of the cover and park. sitting area.
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HARCOURT STREET AND COPLEY PLACE HOUSING
o There is pedestrain access to W. Canton,
Copley Place housing and the cover.
o Carleton St. provides vehicle access to
the townhouses facing onto the cover.
o The lawn area forms a formal green space
similar to existing South End parks.
COPLEY PLACE
HOLYOKE 'STREE'T I 1
o The basketball court is moved away from homes.
o The focal point combines sitting with a tot lot.
o The ventilation intake is at ground level.
W. CANTON AND YARMOUTH STREETS
o There is pedestrain access to Harcourt St. and
the cover.
Handout developed by Section I Planner, KE/FST, showing results of Programming. (WFEM Archives)
CRITERIA/GUIDELINES: THE PLANNING RESPONSE:
o Protect the immed- o A passive landscaped buffer will be between
iate abutters' pri- the end houses and the activities, with high
vacy intensity activities located away from residences.
o Provide maximum o Activities, particularily sitting areas and path-
security for both ways, are situated in a safe unconfined space. Users
users and abutters can also view other activities.
o The location and types of plantings do not block
vistas, paths or activities.
o Provide for easily o The State's Department of Environmental Manage-
and well maintained ment (DEM) will own and maintain the 80 acre SWC
facilities Parkland.
o The type of plantings and materials used respond
to the city environment and the need for durability.
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House in February 1979, another cover Task Force meeting
was held in March "to review the status of the overall
design," and further discussion has been delayed pending
review by the MBTA and Federal agencies. (WFEM, 1980, p.
11) What Reagan's austerity program will do to all this
programming and design is at this time an open question.
PARTICIPATION FROM AN
ADMINSTRATIVE PERSPECTIVE
While we have explored at some length the potential
cost -- to working class and minority communities -- of
institutionalized participation, it is important to review
both sides of the argument. After all, the Corridor, and
the deck were serious reforms wrested from the state at
considerable effort. The communities involved had a valid
and and serious interest in implementation; this had to be
guaranteed, since the opposition had not given up. (In the
middle of the Design and Engineering phase, Ed King, a
reactionary politician, was elected governor running on
a platform which included stopping the Corridor and build-
ing 1-95 -- an insane proposition by then, but worthy of
note.) Because of the history of the project, the project
manager, the Central Planning Staff and several key consul-
tants had emerged from the stop-the-highway movement --
they were more progressive and more committed to the commun-
ities than some important consultants, particularly in the
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Coordinating Engineering firm of Kaiser. For these reasons,
improved administrative control by the central office was
often a positive factor -- a very unusual reality in a U.S.
city.
There were many ways in which participation was benefi-
cial to the administrators. Important conflicts became
clear early on in the process allowing administration to
take measures in the design of the process. In the case of
the South End deck, its fair to say that the administration
did not approve of "fencing off" St. Botolph and worked'to
make the final design more democratic. A good confrontation
may have been better, and the administrators avoided it
like the plague.
The residents' knowledge of their local area was also
a great help to engineers and designers. Some sophisticated
homeowners in the South End had technical knowledge of sub-
soil conditions and foundation structures, which directed
the administrators and engineers to study the problems of
construction carefully.
In many cases, design was definitely improved by par-
.ticipation. The design of the transit station at Green
Street in Jamaica Plain went through about 10 versions
because of community suggestions, and the architects felt
the results were definitely better because of it. (WFEM,
1980) The design of the Section I deck likewise became
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very sensitive to conditions and particularities of each
small area, which is positive.
Using Burke's typology of administrative uses of parti-
cipation (see page ) we can identify several areas in
which the project administration benefitted from participa-
tion. By using the process, the administration encouraged
behavioral change in participants, discouraging an honored
tradition of confrontation. While we.cannot say that par-
ticipation served as staff supplement, early participants
certainly became a quarry for the recruitment of staff.
Cooptation, "capturing or neutralizing the opposition", was
practiced with vigor by the administration. Community em-
powerment, which Burke frowns upon, was carried out to a
degree not without administrative encouragement.
As mentioned earlier, the decentralized structure,
with multiple committees at every geographic and functional
level, allowed Pangaro room for maneuver against some forces
in the community. In the case of the Forest Hills Station
area, where reactionary forces led by State Representative
James Craven tried to influence design, administrative
power played a liberal role. The structure also provided
the administration with allies against some consultants.
For example; landscape and urban design was often referred
to by engineers as "frills" and "soft design"; popular
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occupation with these issues was shared by administration,
which benefitted from participation.
Generally, the administration gave considerable free
reign on details, exercising its power over them occasion-
ally for a purpose, or to remind someone of who was in
charge. They kep control of the dynamic of the process and
its general direction. They benefitted from participation.
TECHNICAL ISSUES IN
PROGRAMMING AND DESIGN
The programming of the Section I deck was a complex
and difficult process. Technically, it illustrated a number
of issues which we have discussed previously.
In the first place, the participatory process served
as a platform where coordination took place among different
design and engineering disciplines. Architecture, urban
design, engineering, and landscape architecture were all
involved. As we saw, any significant change made by tech-
nicians in one area had repercussions in the others. A
great deal of coordinating consultants and the Project
Manager's office, but also much coordination took place
through the community meetings. The calendar of community
meetings often determined the calendar for technical pre-
sentations, and therefore served as a scaffolding for much
of' the coordination which took place.
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The structure of the process also sheds some light on
the way design and programming issues can be structured for
participatory discussion. In the first chapter, we dis-
cussed Gary Hack's proposal to group programming issues
into four categories: 1) environmental packages, 2) en-
vironmental patterns, 3) performance guidelines, and 4)
clientship. The first three of these can best be discussed
under technical issues; clientship we shall discuss under
social and political issues.
Environmental Packages is the name that Hack gives to
the most common form of environmental programming, partic-
ularly of individual buildings, consisting of specific
"rule-of-thumb" guides, such as 'X parking spaces per
housing unit", and definite predetermined needs, such as "X
hospital rooms"; environmental packages are not useful when
they "cannot be readily derived from existing criteria".
Since the deck was such a wide-open proposition, we can
agree that environmental packages did not play a signif-
icant role in programming the deck.
The concept of environmental patterns on the other
hand is a very useful one. If defined as "relationships in
space with geometric properties, context and human use", we
could consider it the generic category under which the
three alternative uses for the pre-programming phase could
be classified. Such patterns are intrinsically meaningful,
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since they embody human relations in space. It is not sur-
prising that the use of space, as summarized by such propos-
als as the "barrel-vault, no-use alternative", can become
symbols around which groups actually organize and struggle.
From the experience of the deck, these are useful ways to
discuss the needs and desires of people, to translate social
opinions into spatial and physical form. Also, from the ex-
perience of the pre-programming of the deck, these patterns
are not very promising as a method for steering the discus-
sion of programming into a consensus. Performance standards,
finally, which Hack recommends be used in "structuring the
dialogue in participatory settings", were not very relevant
to the deck. These refer to specific physical requirements
for certain activities. In the case of station design, the
MBTA has developed a comprehensive set of standards for
the functioning of stations -- everything from station plat-
forms to graphics. In programming the Corridor stations,
they were very useful, although when there was debate this
usually centered around problems other than performance
standards. In programming the deck these standards were
practically non-existent, with the possible exception of
the technical requirements of ventilation we have discussed.
Finally, the method used in the final programming for
the deck -- the grouping of issues under "social", "tech-
nical" and "programming" does not fit well into Hack's
scheme. This strategy was conceived in discussions about
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the goal of establishing a process of consensus building.
By focusing on issues which participants could tackle one
at a time, and around each one a certain degree of compro-
mise and agreement could be reached through it, the consul-
tants were able to defuse a potentially polarizing situa-
tion. The selection of this structure, to our knowledge,
came from the direct experience in the pre-programming
process rather than from some other pre-developed scheme.
In this case, the organization of programming was deter-
mined by politics more than by technical requirements or
common professional practice.
Some professionals, notably engineers, tend to view
participation as a nuisance which cannot possibly make a
contribution to design. In fact, I believe that even in
highly technical issues participation aided the process of
design. I have already mentioned some residents' knowledge
of sub-soil conditions and foundations in alerting designers
to problems with construction techniques. Ventilation for
the deck was another area where participation may have
helped.
As stated before, it is a difficult, if not impossible,
task to separate the technical from the socio-political im-
plications of participation in a project like the Corridor.
If only for the sake of an exercise, however, it may be use-
ful to attempt an evaluation of the technical aspects of
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the problem. In that category, the Project office and the
consultants would rate an excellent mark. The combination
of fairly difficult engineering and design problems with a
complex participatory sitaution was carried out smoothly
and resulted in the design for an urban park which should
get professional recognition for excellent design. An eval-
uation of the social and political aspects of participatory
design is more complex.
SOCIO-POLITICAL ISSUES IN
PROGRAMMING AND DESIGN OF THE
SECTION I COVER
In the programming and design of the Section I Cover
are reflected a number of important aspects of the implica-
tions of participation, which are best seen in the context
of institutionalization of the process.
In the South End, the movement against the roads was
different than in the other Corridor neighborhoods. While
this community had a militant history of working class and
minority activism, these groups were mostly engaged in bat-
tles against urban renewal. They joined the other neighbor-
hoods and the regional Greater Boston Coalition on the
-Transportation Crisis in order to build alliances, and out
of a vision of a better city. For these reasons, the lead-
ership of the movement in the South.End tended to be more
professional than in other neighborhoods.
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When the moratorium was declared and the state arranged
the first step in the institutionalization of participation
through the BTPR, the movement in the South End still had
enough strength to form the independent South End Committee
on Transportation. This organization was linked to the pro-
housing and anti-renewal organizations of the community --
the new South End Project Area Committee, a group concerned
with urban renewal, endorsed SECOT proposals for example --
it was by that time a mostly white professional progressive
group. Some of the leadership then became more directly
linked to the state by going to work for -the project.
Though they fought from within, and obtained good reforms
for the area, the movement outside began to wither. By the
time participation entered the Environmental Impact Phase,
the participants in the project were organized in the South
End/St. Botolph Task Force on noise. The composition of
this group, particularly the leadership, was whiter, more
professional, and for the first time, conservatives played
a more important role. They were able to win a major
victory -- covering the tracks with a deck -- but it was a
victory with ambiguous results. It was costly improvement
financed by the state, but it would accelerate a process of
gentrification, displacement of minority and working class
residents which had been promoted by BRA in the area for 20
years. During the Design and Engineering phase this process
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was intensified, as was the inability of the participatory
process to confront it.
This points to a dilemma common to numerous "urban"
movements., If workers and minorities fight for reforms and
concessions to improve their lives, these very reforms often
operate through the market to their detriment. It is a cru-
cial lesson to be learned by hundreds of activists and pro-
gressive professionals: somehow the struggles for specific
goals in the environment can be counter-productive. Those
professionals working within the state can aid in reproduc-
ing the system unless a mass political movement is strong
enough to give direction to the struggle. (The answer to
the dilemma seems to be in the politization of the partici-
patory process outside the boundaries of the state).
Participation is therefore a double-edge sword. It
can be effective in winning specific reforms, but it can
also funnel a popular movement with a serious progressive,
if not revolutionary, potential into the confines of a
process designed by the state for the sake of resolving con-
flicts. Professionals within the system can and do contrib-
ute, but often at the loss of strength among workers and
minorities. By joining the state in a project where the
priority becomes implementation, they put themselves in a
position where they promote a de-politization of the process
and contribute to its weakening. The case of the South End
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deck is a clear example. Had politics been a priority, the
class and racial antagonisms which arose around the program-
mming and design of the cover would have to the forefront
rather than been manipulated in order to build a deck with
"as much as you can get given the circumstances." Since the
urban battles, of which the deck is only one, will continue
and intensify, this loss of politization of the process is
in fact tragic.
Janet Hunkel, the Section I planner explained the chang-
ing role of a professional participant in the institutional-
ization of the process this way:
"During the EIA reviews, the task of the planners in-
volved in the Task Force was more advocacy than any-
thing that's happened afterwards. Before the EIA,
this was even more true. The Task Force would meet,
hash out differences, discuss strategy, prepare for
meetings with the 'T' and their main consultants, and
would meet again later to evaluate the situation.
The community would not only meet, but do research
and prepare plans and documents before meeting with
them. Now, we argue in front of the 'T' planners.
Since the EIA that has not happened. The whole SATF
thing is so well organized that people could get
information there rather than go and try to research
it themselves.
"I worked as a community person and as a planner hired
by the Project. What I did before is a lot what I do
here, but all of a sudden I'm getting paid for it.
That took a lot of the burden off the community's
doing their own work as volunteers." (Hunkel, Note 15)
The degree to which a professional within the state-
sponsored project is in fact linked to the people affected
is as important to their effectiveness as their ideological
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orientation. In the Southwest Corridor, these links are
strong, perhaps unprecedented in the U.S. in a project of
its kind. But the working class and minority movements, as
well as the progressive professional movement from which
these professionals emerged was weak, so that even with the
best intentions the dynamic of the project made their part-
isan activity very difficult. In the case of a liberal
Janet Hunkel, whom, as we have. seen, was both a liberal
and a resident concerned with improving property values,
her links to the community may in fact serve to legitimate
the activities of the state and may be a barrier to the
politization of the process. The fact that she at times
advoated for the "barrel-vault crowd" is an indication of
the potentially reactionary function of a participatory
process.
Other professinals in the project -- in the Central
Planning Staff, in the Project Manager's office, or in some
other consultant capacity, were in a similar situation,
except that their location within the project structure
militated to weaken their links to the working class and
minority communities. The Section Planner's job was to
serve precisely the function of linkage. In the other
jobs, the linkage had to take place through social and
other contracts outside the place of work. The fact that
there were many able,. committed, liberal professionals
in these places did not guarantee that the project respond
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to the interest of these communities. The fact that many
of these people had been the leadership of the movement to
stop the road, rather than technical participants, meant
that their incorporation into the project hastened the
demise of an independent, politically conscious movement.
Participation in a technical arena, warned Piven, can
de-rail a movement from politics to technical discourse.
The process of the Section I cover confirms this, but not
without.reservations. In fact, in a community like the
South End there is a considerable reservoir of technical ex-
pertise among the working class and minority activists, the
result of participatory efforts like the Corridor. It is
significant that the planners involved both in management,
and in the Central Planning Staff spent considerable effort
disseminating technical information and skills. The SATF
Notebooks, the hand-outs, the presentation, deserve credit
as contributing to this.
But this effort appears to fall short of benefitting
the oppressed in one significant aspect -- ideological -clar-
ity. As stated in the first chapter, the role of urban
planning under state monopoly, capitalism is political --
to- mediate conflict and exercise the hemogeny of the ruling
class in a democratic atmosphere -- but it is also ideolog-
ical. Urban planning exercises what Castells calls "the
ideology of the urban," obscuring class-rule and racial
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oppression with the concept that the problems of urban
life are somewhat inherent in cities, the result of an
"urban crisis" rather than an unjust social system. The
participatory process aimed at "defusing polarization,"
channeling'debate into technical issues, reaching concensus,
etc. cannot help having this negative ideological content.
Even the concept of advocacy planning considered "left" in
planning circles, is based on a pluralistic model of society,
where different groups compete freely for their "fair share
of the pie," with technical advocacy compensating for dis-
advantages. Promoting this idea may in fact contribute to
hiding the need for struggle. The participatory process
of programming and designing the cover was ideologically
very opaque. In fact, the greatest ideolgical clarity
occured in the pre-moratorium days; gradually, the institu-
tionalization of participation obfuscated the political
essence of the process until it was almost invisible. The
diligence of the project in preventing a public discussion
of the racial and class issues involved in the cover design,
at least outside of the Task Force and SATF meetings is
evidence of this phenomenon. Progressive professionals,
commited to "the rules of the game" and to implementing a
hard-won reform, contributed to it.
Another concept common to the participation process is
that European social-democratic invention: "The community".
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Conceived as above class and racial differences, above the
actual organization of society, it funnels activity towards
the attainment of "common good." In the case of the Cover,
the fact that it was decked and landscaped was seen as a
benefit to the community. The contribution that this and
other urbanistic transformations will make towards entrench-
ing monopoly capitalism in the city are not even part of
the discussion. In this area, progressive professionals
can make a great contribution, since we are trained in the
exercise of ideas. We must fight to make class rule and
racial oppression part of the professional and participatory
discourse, even when talking about the location of venti-
lation stacks for a train tunnel.
This lack of explicit ideological discussion weakens
the participatory process. In Arnhein's ladder of partici-
pation, on page , the participatory process in the Corri-
dor reached only a degree of tokenism; information was
disseminated and collected, citizens were consulted, and
there was placation of anger at the state. The process
contributed to the empowerment of workers and minorities as
a group only to the degree that some people were able to
bargain their skills for higher education and a job within
the project structure. The masses of these social groups
will benefit to the degree that a future strong movement can
lay claim to the skills of these professionals and direct the
struggle. Under these conditions, the participatory process
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can perhaps contribute to the empowerment of the working
class and the oppressed. Using the Van Til's matrix for
participation, the participants in the cover were composed
of elites and non-elites together, and they focused on what
they call administrative concerns (though in a technical
form), yielding a citizen's advisory formation. (See page
30) More politics and greater "non-elite" strength would
have yielded what they call "grass roots" participation.
The general depolitization of the institutionalized par-
ticipatory process can be analyzed with the typology used
by Jose Olives (1975) in classifying struggles against
urban renewal in the reconstruction of Paris. (See Graphic
No. 2) The Corridor, and the deck in particular, were
definite reform victories. In depoliticizing the struggle,
the effect was a positive reform, had politics been main-
tained on the participatory public agenda, a link could
have been strengthened between the "reivindicative" and the
political, leading to a superior level of struggle. There
is no question that the implementation of the project could
have been made more difficult, however the issue was there-
fore not only the reluctance of planners in the structure
to put politics on the agenda, but the absence of a movement
which could guarantee, from outside the boundaries of the
state, that politics could not be ignored.
It may be argued that the decline of progressive activ-
ism in the Corridor for the last ten years cannot be blamed
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on the machinations of the st-ate and on the matriarchal
politics of participatory planning. To a great degree this
is true. Participation in the project, we repeat, must be
viewed in a historical context. For the last ten years the
popular movements of the '60's have been losing strength and
often the Corridor Planners wished there was still a pro-
gressive movement in the community which could force the
agenda. But the sapping of the popular strength of the
Black and Puerto Rican liberation movements, as well as the
weakening among both white workers and progressive profes-
sionals, cannot be explained without the massive interven-
tion of the liberal state in granting reforms and funneling
particpation within reformist limits. Viewed this way,
the progressive and liberals involved in the Corridor were
both perpetrators and victims of a process which weakened
the left. Black and minority communities lost a potentially
powerful movement, learned some technical and political
lessons and attained some concrete reforms, some of which
will accelerate the process of gentrification which may
more effectively limit their interest and their search for
power than the roads and urban renewal they began fighting
against thirty years before.
The participatory process in the Section I Cover also
raised, although to a small degree, the danger of the reac-
tionary uses of participation. Conservative elements among
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the "second wave of gentrifiers" effectively defended their
interests and obtained some legitimacy and credibility
through the process. This phenomenon is not isolated. Ayn
Rand freaks have been elected block representatives in
neighborhood networks begun by the left in Dorchester, where
they are raising the slogans of "self-help" and promoting
capitalist solutions to problems caused by capitalism. In
Europe participatory schemes are promoted by the right in
order to penetrate working class communities. The rise of
a "grass-roots" new-right racist movement in this country
only underscores the need to view participation with a more
dritical eye and more ideological clarity. Technical exper-
tise is invaluable in this effort, but it must not be divorced
from the political issues involved in planning if we are to
make a contribution to changing the city for the benefit of
the working class and minorities.
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EPILOGUE
This study of Boston's Southwest Corridor Project
first attempts to identify important issues pertinent to
participation and later reflects upon them as they are made
manifest throughout the history of the project. The major
observations, reflections and lessons drawn from the study
are therefore incorporated into the text, and it is not the
purpose of this epilogue to catalogue them, but rather to
go a little beyond them and point to some of the questions
this study leaves unanswered.
We began by asking whether struggles around urbanistic
transformations are a vehicle through which the working
classes and the oppressed can further their interests. In
a sense, it is a moot question; these struggles emanate
from contradictions in Monopoly Capitalism. Resistance by
working people to changes in the urban environment stem
from the fact that these changes are actually attempts to
rearrange the urban fabric better to serve the needs of the
monopolies. Whether or not conscious activists get involved
in these struggles, they will emerge spontaneously from
changing social conditions. This study also makes apparent
the fact that bourgeois society, particularly the State,
has developed a sophisticated array of measures -- technical,
organizational and ideological -- aimed at confronting these
movements. Sponsoring officially sanctioned participation
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in the graning of reforms is one of these measures. The
question then becomes not whether to engage in these
struggles, but how to engage in them: how to raise the or-
ganizational, political, ideological level of these struggles
so that the workers and the oppressed peoples suffering
these transformations will engage in them and emerge stronger
than they began. The case study points to a few good lessons.
One of the characteristics of participation in the
Southwest Corridor, and other similar struggles, is lack of
ideological clarity. The coalitions engaged in them are
heterogeneous in composition and ideas, and the prevailing
ideology seems to have been a sort of left wing "urban ideol-
ogy" as labelled by Castells. Little explicit class analysis
has been part of the polemics or negotiations. Key bourgeois
concepts like "the community" as a force above class inter-
ests, "participation" as democracy incarnate, decentraliza-
tion as justice, etc., have predominated. It became appar-
ent that the bourgeois state is willing to put a building
here or there, even to drop plans for a super highway, as
long as it can circumscribe the public discourse within
the language of bourgeois democracy. The lesson we can
draw is that explicit analysis should not be negotiated
away in bargaining for a reform. There is always a danger
that clarity will be labeled illegitimate, and that for
that reason Marxist urbanist must learn to speak in English.
Nevertheless, principles should not be negotiable. Another
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lesson of the Southwest Corridor -- rather, a cluster of
lessons -- center around the different ways the state can
circumscribe the boundaries of debate through participation..
In this problem planners can play an important role, since
we are trained in the analysis of urban issues. In the
case of the Corridor we have pointed out several important
examples of this. The development of Parcel 18 and the
abandonment of adjacent public housing are two issues
impossible to disentangle one from the other, as are the
Section I Deck, Copley Place, and Tent City. Yet the
state manages to keep them separate. The displacement
effect, through the market, of Corridor development is
another such connection. This points out the need to
sharpen our analysis of urbanistic transformations, to
make the explicit analysis of the context of any particular
situation part of the strategizing done by urban movements.
Another problematic area pointed out by the Corridor
experience is the nature of alliances forged in the struggle.
There is considerable Marxist literature on this subject.
The contribution planners can make in this area, however,
is in the role of technical debate in determining the nature
of these struggles. It has been the practice of progressive
planners to forge counter-plans and counter-studies to des-
tructive proposals by the state, corporations, bourgeois
institutions. But the experience of the Corridor points
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out the weakness of advocacy when it substitutes for
political leadership. Planners and architects may draw
beautiful plans, and even get a few things built, but if
the working class, Blacks and Puerto Ricans, who originally
were to use them, end up weaker -- or moved somewhere else
-- the purpose of progressive planning has been subverted.
This signals the need to ensure that a participatory
process be directed not by planners working for the state,
even if they are leftists, but by an independent political
movement which can use the process to develop.strength for
the working class and minorities affected. The construc-
tion of such a movement is outside the bounds of this study.
In the context of participatory situations, however, we
should examine carefully the consensus-building techniques
advocated by bourgeois planners in order to make sure they
do not absorb and diffuse popular demands. In the Corridor
we have seen this happen in several stages -- preliminary
planning for the highway, negotiations during teh BTPR and
EIS, and even during engineering, programming and design
decisions.
We also need to pay attention to the implementation of
reforms wrested from the state and large corporations, to
ensure that 'we don't wind up limiting political intiiative
for the sake of ensuring the successful completion of a
particularly urban project. As planners we should not
waste our time developing normative models of planning in a
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bourgeois society; rather, we should concentrate on more
detailed analysis of the functioning of the bourgeois state
-- its role in capital accumulation, legitimation of bour-
geois rule, and midwifing of capital's projects to transform
the city to better suit its needs. We should be doing the
work collectively, which is rarely the case today. The
recent organization of a progressive planners' national
structure is a hopeful step in this direction. We should
also be.building, as progressive planners, closer ties with
minority and working class communities engaged in these
struggles.
In conclusion, let us throw in a monkey wrench: the
role of the bourgeois state is changing rapidly in the
United States. There is an organized fascist movement
gaining ground, but this does not seem to be dominant at
the moment. Castells argues that the bourgeois state will
not be dismantled but rather modified into something he
calls "authoritarian statism". Whether or not this is
true, and what it may mean, it deserves careful study. It
cannot be denied that we are witnessing important changes
in the role of the state. On top of that, monopolies seem
to be preparing an incursion into areas formerly handled by
the state. In Reagan's Transition Team's proposal for the
neighborhoods there is a series of recommendations for the
state to facilitate corporate involvement in housing, neigh-
borhood physical, social and economic planning, social
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services, even neighborhood-level social organizations. All
this makes an analysis of participation in the Southwest
Corridor appear prematurely outdated, but I believe the
lessons drawn are general enough to be useful in the coming
period, whatever it may bring.
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